COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
CASE NO. 02-P-318
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
168 Fairfield St.
Needham, Mass. 02492
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities iii
Table of Abbreviations vi
Statement of Issues Presented 1
Statement of Case 2
Statement of Facts 5
Summary of Argument
I. None of the defendant’s motion claims are waived for inclusion in the defendant’s first motion for new trial because the claims are either "Brady" violations, or factual issues not appearing on the trial record, or claims that should have been raised by the defendant’s appellate counsel, or claims of miscarriage of justice. 10
II. The prosecution knowingly presented false evidence of the alleged victim’s, Tom King’s, eye injury at trial and the trial attorney allowed it. 15
III. The prosecution knowingly deceived the jury into believing that the alleged victim made a legal "citizen’s arrest" and the defense counsels knowingly allowed the fabrication. 25
IV. The prosecution knowingly allowed their witness-in-chief, Tom King, to falsely testify that the defendant used a broken beer bottle to assault the entire bar and the defense counsels knowingly allowed it. 35
V. The prosecution knowingly allowed their witness-in-chief and alleged victim, Tom King, to lie about his drinking in the bar 3 hours prior to the underlying incident and the defense attorneys allowed it. 41
VI. The prosecutor knowingly allowed trial witnesses to change their prior probable cause hearing testimony and defense counsels allowed it. 44
VII. The prosecutor engaged in illegal conduct during his opening statement, and closing argument in violation of the Due Process Clause and the defense attorneys allowed it. 49
Motion Judge’s Memorandum and Decision 1-18
Certificate of Service
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Com. v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 639 NE2d 1092 (’94)… 13
Com. v. Baldwin, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 200 (’87) 21
Com. v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1 (’82) 21, 32, 38, 42
Com. v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 632 NE2 821 (’94) 14
Com. v. Cross, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 340 NE2d 923 (’76) 13
Com. v. Elbery, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 912 (’95) 19,40
Com. v. Ennis, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 864 (’74) 22
Com. v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556 (’67) 50
Com. v. Frisino, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 488 NE2 51 (’86) 13
Com. v. Forte, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 597 NE2 1056 (’92) 6,7,39, 48
Com. v. Harris, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 415 NE2 216 (’81) 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34
Com. v. Hoppin, 387 Mass. 25, (’82) 50
Com. v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, (’94) 49
Com. v. LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 551 NE2 906 (’90) 30, 33
Com. v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 714 NE2d 805 (’99) 14
Com. v. Mayfield, 398 615, 500 NE2 774 (’86) 33
Com. v. Miranda, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 10,490 NE2 1195,(’86) 10,13 14
Com. v. Page, 352 Mass. 403 (’67) 23
Com. v. Sowell, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 609 NE2d 492 (’93) …10, 13
Com. v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583 (’87) 20
Com. v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 589 NE2d 1216 (’92) 12,19,31,37
Gibney v. Com., 375 Mass. 146, 375 NE2d 714 (’78) 12, 40
Rolanti v. Boston Edison, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 526 (’92) 18
White v. White, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 662 NE2d 230 (’96) 12
Supreme Court of the United States:
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (’35) 38, 42, 49
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 685, 106 S. Ct. 2142 (’86) 50
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (’85) 11
Giglio v. United States, 405 150 (’72) 19,21,31,32,38,42, 43, 48
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (’70) 20
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (’75) 20
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (’59) 31
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668,(’84) 22,24,34,41,43,49,50
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (’76) 11, 19, 37
Elbery v. Sklut et al 97-11743MLW 19
Gray v. Greer, 800 F2d 644 (7th Cir. ’85) 11
McGuire v. Estelle, (CA 9 Cal) 902 F2d 749 (’90) 32
Amendments to the United States Constitution:
Fifth Amendment 32
Fourteenth Amendment 2, 20, 21, 32, 49, 50
Sixth Amendment 32, 50
Mass. Statutes & Rules:
MGL C. 231 s. 79 22
MRAP – Rule 8 12
MRCP – Rule 24 49
MRCP 30b 1, 2, 11, 12, 30
MRCP 30c2 14
Legal Treatises, Encyclopedias, Digests, etc.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 70, Perjury, ’87 47
Mass. Practice, Evidence, Vol. 20, s. 801.8 (’98) 28
Mass. Practice, Vol. 32 2001 26
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Memo "Memorandum and Decision" by Motion Judge Hillman
Motion Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial" (1st 115 pages of Appendix)
PC Probable Cause Transcript
RA Record Appendix
TR Transcript of Trial
WPD Worcester Police Dept.
1. Whether the motion judge improperly found that the defendant's motion claims were waived for presentation on a motion for new trial under Rule 30b, where all the defendant's motion claims are either "Brady" claims, factual claims not on the trial record, claims of which both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, and all motion claims rose to a "miscarriage of justice". Arg. I.
3. Where the trial defense attorney failed to present exculpatory evidence that would have totally changed the evidentiary picture of the trial, vindicating the defendant, and making the trial counsel ineffective, did the motion judge err in denying a new trial? Arg. II, III, IV, V, VI.
4. Where both the defendant's trial and appellate attorneys failed to raise the same legal and factual issues, making them ineffective in their assistance of counsel, did the motion judge err in denying the defendant a new trial? Arg. II, III, IV, V, VI, VII.
5. Where the prosecutor engaged in illegal conduct during his opening statement and closing argument rising to a Due Process Violation, did the motion judge err in denying the defendant a new trial? Arg. VII.
6. Where the trial judge allowed inadmissible evidence to be presented at trial then instructed the jury to use the inadmissible evidence in the most prejudicial manner possible was the defendant's trial arbitrary and fundamentally unfair in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Arg. III - p. 32.
This is an appeal from a denial of a "Motion for New Trial" (motion) under rule 30b of the MRCP. That motion was filed by Michael Elbery-pro se, (defendant), on July 6, 1999 in Worcester Superior Court. The decision of denial (hereinafter, memo) of that motion was made on 12-26-01 by motion judge, Hillman (hereinafter, court). Hillman was not the trial judge. The court also denied an evidentiary hearing and discovery as provided under rule 30b.
This case resulted from the defendant being arrested by citizen and alleged victim, Tom King, on 9-29-92 in Worcester, Mass. on Shrewsbury St., about 100 yards from the Winner's Circle Bar. A
few minutes later the Worcester police, Officer Perma, arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct at 1:47 a.m., see RA 129 (WPD incident report) and PC 162-23, PC 159-7. By 8:00am the charges were increased to include mayhem, assault by a dangerous weapon-beer bottle, assault and battery, disorderly conduct. See Exhibit F - RA 134.
Probable Cause Hearing
On 1-20-93 a probable cause hearing was held before Worcester District Judge-Milton Raphelson on the above four charges. Prior to the hearing starting, Raphelson inquired about the cop (King) with the missing eye for the charge of mayhem, the prosecutor then reduced the charge to "assault with intent to maim". See Exhibit M, RA 159 (docket 93-0135),PC 3.
After a five-hour hearing of testimonies by King and his friends, and no testimony from the defendant, Raphelson found there was no probable cause to charge the defendant on the three most serious charges. See RA 135 (Ex. G - Worcester. T&G 1-20-93) & PC to 265-266.
In March of 1993 the Worcester D.A.'s Office rid themselves of all witnesses and exculpatory evidence produced at that probable cause hearing and indicted the defendant with the sole false
testimony of the alleged-victim and off-duty Westborough cop, Tom King. In doing so, the Worcester DA's Office impaired the grand jury process, see RA 65 (motion claim VIII).
Trial & Conviction
After a five-day trial, starting on 6-28-93, the jury convicted the defendant of the three charges before them after the deliberating for less than an hour. The charge of assault dangerous weapon was directed not guilty by the trial judge. See RA 159 (Ex. M docket 93-0135, item 5.0).
10 (TEN)Year Prison Sentence & "Stay of Sentence"
On 7-15-93 the defendant was sentenced to 10 (TEN) years in state prison on the assault with intent to maim charge ("attempted mayhem") and 1 year probation, on and after, on the two misdemeanor charges. See RA 160 (Ex. M docket entry 13). The defendant was then allowed to walk out the front door of the courthouse on a "stay of sentence pending appeal". See RA 160 (Ex. M docket entry 13). The stay was revoked 13 months later due to a false arrest that resulted in a disposition of not guilty on all charges at a trial.
The facts below are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
The defendant entered the Winner's Circle Bar on 9-29-92 at 1:30am at last call and was served, and never asked to leave. TR 1081-12. The jury heard prosecution testimony that the defendant started and escalated an argument with the bartender, Schlener, and alleged victim, King, and that the defendant was the aggressor and caused all the trouble in the bar. However, these same witnesses testified just the opposite at the probable cause hearing. The testimonies at the probable cause hearing were that the defendant was minding his own business not bothering anyone and the bartender started insulting the defendant. The bartender apologized to the defendant at the probable cause hearing while testifying. The undisputed fact, via the probable cause testimonies, was that alleged victim, King, threatened the defendant inside the bar and had to be restrained by several people while the defendant remained in his seat. See RA 73-89 & 67-68 (motion claims X & VIII-p.67-68). The jury was never alerted to these changes in trial witnesses' probable cause
testimonies, which were all substantive evidence. Com. v. Forte, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 185 597 N.E. 2d 1056, 1058, 1059 ('92).
The jury heard evidence the defendant smashed a beer bottle, TR 191-4, 300-23, however, at the probable cause hearing these same witnesses admitted they did not know how the bottle broke. See RA 67 item 4 (motion claim VIII p. 67-item 4). The jury was never alerted to this change in testimony.
The court claims, p. 3 of memo, that half an hour passed between the bar argument and the bottle breaking in the bar, however, per trial transcript, there was no such evidence given at trial.
The court claims, per memo p. 3, that 1 minute passed between the bottle breaking and the defendant exiting the bar. However, only King testified at trial the defendant was in the bar for 30 seconds threatening the whole bar with a broken beer bottle. TR 192-194. At the probable cause hearing all the witnesses, including King, admitted the defendant exited the bar immediately after the bottle broke, and never used a bottle as weapon. See RA 49 & 67-item 5 (motion claim VI p. 49 & VIII p.67-item 5). The trial jury was never alerted to these changes in testimonies of
the probable cause hearing, which is all substantive evidence. id.
Contrary to the court's memo, p. 3, there is no trial transcript testimony that King yelled at the defendant to stop and wait for the police because someone was hurt. Per RA 86-item 3 (motion claim X-item C3), King testified, at trial, it was his understanding that "Jeff the bartender" was on the phone calling police. However, at the probable cause hearing, PC 55-11, he testified he presumed, because the bartender was near the phone, that he was calling police. The bartender, Schlener, testified at the probable cause hearing he never called the police prior to King exiting the bar in pursuit of the defendant. See PC 113-(1-24) & RA 67 item 6 (motion claim XIII-p. 67 item 6).
It was undisputed at trial that King and his friends pursued the defendant down the street after the defendant fled the bar, see memo p. 3. Although the trial testimonies of all witnesses were substantially different, as to how and what happened when King actually reached the defendant, King testified and documented, RA 139 (Ex. H Westboro PD report-last ¶) (trial Id. A), he made a citizen's arrest. King testified and documented he
prevented thedefendant from escaping. See RA 39 (motion claim V). King's citizen's arrest, as a matter of Mass. law, was actually a false arrest and a series of assaults followed by battery. See RA 39-46 (citizen's arrest).
The prosecution presented two fabricated events inside the bar (Mann's injury & bottle assault), as justification to the jury for King's arrest of the defendant. RA 30-38 & 46-57 (motion claims IV & VI).
The prosecution knowingly allowed King and most of the witnesses at trial to falsely testify that King suffered a list of bloody-brutal injuries to his eye after King's arrest of the defendant. See Arg. II.
Although no other witness would corroborate, King also was allowed by the prosecution to falsely testify about the cause (defendant's repeated thumb gougings) and treatment of his eye injury. See RA 1-46 (motion claim I, II, III).
The independent third party documented hospital record evidence is that King sustained a superficial injury to his eyelid, and a small laceration to the conjunctiva causing a red eye. King admitted to his treating physician, a few minutes after the incident, his "injury" was caused by catching a finger in the eye
The Worcester Police Dept. (W.P.D.) arrived at 1:47am, a few minutes after King made his arrest of the defendant, and found the defendant under 3-4 men in the middle of the street, see RA 67 item-11 (claim VIII p. 67 item 11). Officer Perma then arrested the defendant for disorderly person. See RA 129 (Ex.D WPD incident report), RA 68 item 2 (claim VIII p. 68 item 2) & PC 162-23, 159-7. The police then brought the defendant to the hospital. See RA 169 (Exhbibit Q Central Mass. Medical Center documenting 9-29-92 at 2:25am).
The court found, per memo, (see App.), that none of the defendant's motion claims were valid and the defendant appeals as follows:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant's motion proves not only that he did not receive a fair trial, but that he was innocent of the crimes convicted and further that he was framed for the crimes he was imprisoned for 10 (TEN) years. In order to convict the defendant, the prosecution deceived the jury into believing that King's pursuit and stopping of the defendant was a legal citizen's arrest, not a
false arrest. Arg. III. The prosecution then allowed King to testify to numerous fabricated injuries allegedly occurring after this illegal citizen's arrest. Arg. II. The prosecution also fabricated 2 events prior to King's Arrest to falsely justify King's actions. Arg. III,IV & RA 30-58.
Argument I-None of the defendant's motion claims are waived because they are either "Brady Violations", or factual issues not appearing on the trial record, or claims that should have been raised by the defendant's appellate counsel,or claims of miscarriage of justice.
The court per memo has found that all the defendant's motion claims are waived for review under Rule 30b, except for the trial attorney's ineffective assistance claims not raised by appellate counsel, see p. 7 of memo. The defendant agrees that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that could have been raised by the defendant's appellate counsel are a "waiver exception" and properly included in a motion for new trial. Com. v. Miranda, 490 NE2 1195, 1200, 22 Mass. App. 10, 17-18 ('86), Com. v. Sowell, 609 NE2 492, 494 ('93), 34 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 231. Contrary to the court's memo p. 7, (court claims the defendant raised his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel only to the extent of failure to raise on direct appeal ineffective assistance of trial defense counsel), the defendant
raises a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, claim XVIII-RA 114, to the extent that motion claims should have been raised on direct appeal. There is a constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396-97 105 S.Ct. 830, 837 ('85), Gray v. Greer, 800 F2 644, 646 (7th Cir. '85). Constitutional law does not limit the right to appellate counsel to only claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Evitts id.
None of the defendant's motion claims are waived for review, via Rule 30b, because all the defendant's motion claims fit into one of 4 categories that, per Mass. law, can only be raised in the first instance on a motion for new trial, or are a recognized "issue waiver exception". Rule 30b is properly used for more than "newly discovered evidence" and "issue waiver exceptions", as a matter of law.
1. The first category of claims raised by the defendant are the numerous "Brady" violations that must only be raised in the first instance via a motion for new trial under 30b. All the "Brady" violations in the defendant's motion are of the first category mentioned in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103 96 S.Ct.
2392, 2397 ('76), "knowing use by the prosecution of perjured/false evidence". Com. v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 405, 589 NE2 1216, 1219 ('92)-ftnt. 3. These type of claims, obviously, raise factual evidence not of the trial record. The appellate counsel is only able to raise issues on direct appeal that appear on the trial record. White v. White, 662 NE2 230, 232, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 133 ('96) & MRAP-Rule 8 (record of lower court is record for appeal).
Per Tucceri 412 Mass. 408-409, "there is no reason why a non-disclosure issue could not be advanced by a motion for new trial to which the regular principles of MRCP 30b, 378 Mass. 900 ('79) apply. Even if an undisclosed evidence is not "newly discovered", the failure of a prosecutor to furnish exculpatory evidence in his possession is a proper basis for a new trial motion based on common law or constitutional grounds".
2. The defendant also raised other motion claims that, like "Brady" claims, are based on factual issues not appearing on the trial record. This category that can only be raised on a motion for new trial, under Rule 30b, includes ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims based on facts not appearing on the trial record.
Per the Mass. SJC in Gibney v. Comm., 375 Mass. 146, 148 375 NE2 714 ('78), "constitutional arguments raised by the petitioner that are based on factual questions are best left for resolution in the first instance by a trial judge on a motion for new trial".
"Moving for a new trial is the customary practice in situations involving ineffective assistance of counsel". Com. v. Frisino, 488 NE2 51, 55, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 556 ('86). "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved on direct appeal of the defendant's conviction when the factual basis of the claim appears undisputedly on the trial record. But when the trial record provides an insufficient factual basis for appellate review, the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is best left for resolution in the first instance by the trial judge on a motion for new trial." Com. v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 639 NE2 1092, 1076 ('94), Com. v. Cross, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 54,57, 340 NE2 923 ('76).
3. The third category of claims in the defendant's motion that avoid waiver, via presentation in a motion for new trial, are issues that should have been raised by the appellate attorney on direct appeal or ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. As above, the court agrees, per p. 7 of memo, on this point.
A recognized exception to the issue waiver rule is when both the trial and direct appeal counsel areineffective. Miranda1, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 17, Sowell2 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 231. A claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel must be raised in the
1 the Mass. SJC in Miranda recognized an exception to the waiver rule where the trial defense attorney fails to object at trial and the appellate attorney fails to raise the issue on direct appeal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
2 Sowell also recognizes that failure of the appellate counsel to argue errors of the trial counsel is an exception to the "waiver rule". Per footnote #4 of Sowell there should be a showing that these errors create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
first motion for new trial. Com. v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 172 ('99), 714 NE2 805, 808 (recognizing right to raise ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on first motion for new trial). See above for constitutional law to right to appellate attorney.
4. Another recognized exception to the waiver rule is a claim of "miscarriage of justice" under the "Freeman standard". Miranda, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 16. The federal standard of ineffective assistance of counseland "miscarriage of justice" are the same. Com. v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 625, 632 NE2 821, 826 ftnt. 4 ('94). The claims raised in the defendant's motion, whether individually or collectively, rise to a level of a miscarriage of justice. RA 115, motion conclusion.
As a result of the above, the court's memo, p.5 (II Waiver of Claims), concluding the defendant's motion claims are waived is an error of law. Particularly disturbing is the court's reliance on Rule 30c2 which pertains only to second and successive new trial motion filings; this is undisputedly the defendant's first motion for new trial.
Argument II - The Prosecution knowingly presented fabricated evidence regarding the alleged victim's, King's, eye injury and the trial defense attorney knowingly allowed it. Counts I,II,III-RA 1-30.
The most important evidence at trial, the alleged victim's, King's, eye injury, was knowingly fabricated by the prosecution. Tom King, the alleged victim, falsely testified he suffered these serious injuries to his eye. See RA 2 (p. 2 of motion).
1. a cut eyeball, T.R. 204-1, 468-9.
2. a lacerated eyeball, T.R. 203-24, 385-12, 440- 15, 479-3.
3. bleeding from his eyeball, blood coming out of his eye, T.R. 202-24, 203-1, 468-14.
4. vitreous fluid was leaking out of his eye, T.R. 202-24, 203-1, 468-14.
5. King claimed permanent eye damage, T.R. 204-3, 204-10.
6. Repeated testimony by King that he almost lost his eye, T.R. 203-9, 469-17, 468-24, 405-15.
7. Eye blind, T.R. 203-3, 426-9, 468-11, 381-5, 202-2, 383-23, 437-10.
Five trial witnesses, all friends of King's, confirmed and enlarged this perjury by King about his eye injury. See RA 142 (See Exhibit J - "Tom King's injuries"-ftnt. 1).
Cause of King's Eye Injury
As per RA 4,King claimed that these serious eye injuries were caused by repeated thumb gougings by the defendant, not as the court states per memo, p. 4, by the defendant sticking his finger in King's eye while the two were on the ground. As to cause of
his eye injury King testified,
TR 201-17 - TR 202-14 "He (Elbery)took his thumb and jammed it into my eye. On the outside of my eye he jammed it in almost behind the eye and kept pushing the thumb in real hard. He (second thumbing) jammed that thumb back into my eye on the inside of my eye and kept pushing the thumb into my eye, TR 431-22, harder and harder and harder with his thumb nail, TR 432-5.
None of the four witnesses, who claimed they witnessed the contact between King and the defendant, would corroborate King's claim, as above, of cause of his injury, see RA 13. As per RA 13, prosecution witness and friend of King's, Richard Traskiewicz, testified the defendant's finger went in King's eye while King was sitting on top of the defendant in the middle of Shrewsbury St., TR 544-12-17, TR 501-6, TR 573-24. See RA 144 (Ex. J Tom King's Injuries p. 144-"Traskiewicz").
It was undisputed at trial that King went to the hospital, at 2:10am, minutes after the underlying incident on Shrewsbury St., see RA 118 (Ex. A-1)(Ex. 18 at trial). King's hospital records, RA 118 & 120 (Exs. A-1 & A-2)(Exs. 18 at trial), document to a scientific certainty that King lied about the extent and seriousness of his eye injury, as well as, the cause of his eye injury. See RA 3&4.(claim I,p.3 & 4).
Medically Documented Extent of King's Eye Injury
Per RA 120 (Ex. A-2), King's medical/hospital record, and its readable deciphering, RA 123, (Ex. B-3 AIS Report), King had a superficial abrasion to his eyelid and small conjunctiva laceration causing a red eye. See RA 128 (Ex. C-Dr. Hull's 3-12-96 letter in support of affidavit, paragraph 1). See also RA 3.
Per RA 126-128 (Ex. C), expert medical witness, Dr. Joe Hull, discloses in affidavit that King's hospital record reveals, in addition to only a superficial injury, there was no bleeding or vitreous fluid from the eye, and that the eyeball was not cut or lacerated. Dr. Hull further states, per affidavit, RA 126-127- Exhibit C, that King's superficial injury is consistent with being poked in the eye and that he would expect to find a more serious injury had the eye been repeatedly thumb gouged as described by King to the jury.
Dr. Hull explains that King's medical reports, Ex. A, RA 118-120,as produced by Dr. Dennis Arinella, and their readable deciphering, RA 123 (Ex. B-3), "Conjunctiva plus 3" means King's eye was red or moderately inflamed, see RA 128, (letter of 3-12-96 in support of Dr. Hull's affidavit). See also RA 3.
Medically Documented Cause of King's Red Eye Injury
King's hospital records document that King admitted to the treating physician and registered nurse, only minutes after the incident, that his red eye was caused by "catching a finger in the eye", see interview sections of RA 118&120 (Exs. A-1 & A-2), and deciphering of Ex. A-2, RA 123(Ex. B-3).See also RA 4.
Specifically, King told his treating physician, "Patient (King) chased person and got finger in eye." See RA 120&123, (Exs. A-2 & B-3). Statements made by patient to physician pertinent to treatment are hearsay exceptions allowed as substantive evidence, Rolanti v. Boston Edison 33 Mass. App. Ct.516,526 '92.
Compare the documented truth, via third party medical reports, to the false evidence presented at trial to the jury. King was allowed to be the sole expert medical witness at trial while the prosecution, who undisputedly possessed and admitted these (unreadable) medical documents into evidence at trial, allowed King to blatantly lie to the jury about the cause, injury and treatment to his eye. See RA 5-20.
This documented medical evidence of King's injury was confirmed by Dr. Arinella, under oath, on 5-23-02, during the federal case Elbery v. Sklut, 97-11743MLW. See docket entry #10 of this appeal #02-P-318.
The prosecution had to prove that the defendant was trying to take out or destroy King's eye for the charge of "attempted mayhem", see RA 191 (indictment).
This false evidence knowingly presented by the prosecution regarding King's "injury" is what caused the jury to find the defendant guilty of "assault with intent to maim" and "assault and battery". "Assault with intent to maim" requires evidence of "specific intent" which, as above, was knowingly fabricated by the prosecution to the jury. Com. v. Elbery 38 Mass. App. Ct. 912 ('95)(specific intent required). Under the Due Process Clause, the prosecution's suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of good or bad faith; whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the prosecutor's responsibility. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154. The prosecutor is responsible for all evidence at trial that he knew or should have known to be perjury. U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103.
"A new trial is required if there is any reasonable likelihood that the prosecution's knowing use of false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury". Tucceri 412 Mass. 405, ftnt. 3. See RA 16-20.
See RA 17-20 for more evidence the prosecution knew that their evidence about King's eye injury was perjury.
The defendant's 14th Amendment Due Process Rights were further violated at trial as a result of this "knowing use of false evidence" by the prosecution regarding King's "injury" because the prosecution has a duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged and facts that would otherwise mitigate criminal culpability. The prosecution used this false evidence to prove excessive force and specific intent and deadly force by the defendant and to falsely defeat the defendant's claim of self-defense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 ('70), Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 ('75), Com. v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 590 ('87). See RA 8 & 14.
ADA Ball procures perjury-Bolsters prosecution's case
Further, per motion claim II-B, RA 21-24, the prosecution solicited and procured the perjury regarding the extent, cause and treatment to King's eye, and used fabricated evidence to deceive the jury in order to bolster the prosecution's case against the defendant. This another violation of the 14th
Amendment Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Giglio,405 U.S. 153 and Massachusetts law, Com. v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 14 ('82). This illegal prosecutorial conduct requires a new trial.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - RA 1-16
Instead of calling the treating physician as a witness or any other medical witness to testify at trial and disclose the truth about King's superficial injury, and show King was lying to the jury about the extent and cause of his eye injury, the trial defense attorney, Louise P. Aloise, allowed King to be the sole medical expert witness at trial. RA 12.
King's hospital records, as above, were submitted at trial as an exhibit, but they were inadmissible because they were illegible. Com. v. Baldwin, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 200,203 ('87). Additionally, King's medical records were inadmissible at trial because they contained technical medical jargon that could not be understood by a jury. Com. v. Ennis, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 865 ('74). An expert medical witness was needed at trial to explain the content of the medical jargon on those medical reports so the jury could understand them. Further, King's medical records were not admissible because they contained references to liability. MGL C.
231 s. 79. Both the defendant's trial and appellate counsels were ineffective regarding the inadmissibility of King's medical records. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 '84. See RA 26-30 (Claim III of motion).
Since Aloise never challenged the prosecutorial evidence regarding King's eye injury, there would have been no reason for the jury to even consider King's illegible hospital records that were submitted at trial, RA 120 (Ex. A-2). The jury under such circumstances would have considered Dr. Arinella's hospital report, RA-120,Exhibit A-2, a confirmation of the perjury from King and other witnesses at trial regarding King's eye injury, even though they could not read it.
Court Per Memo
The court, per its memo and decision p. 9, makes claim that the trial defense attorney, Aloise, was effective on this issue of evidence presented about King's injuries because Aloise acknowledged in his closing argument King had only a "superficial abrasion". See page 9 of memo where the court cites Aloise's closing argument, TR 1224, TR 1225, as advantageous to the defendant's defense regarding King's eye injury.
However, as per motion, RA 7, this only proves that Aloise knew King was lying about his "injury" and what the truth was about King's eye injury. None of the trial transcript cites by the court, as above, are evidence at trial because they were made by Aloise only in his closing Argument. Com. v. Page, 352 Mass. 403, 409('67)(Opening statement & closing Argument not evidence at trial). As per motion claim I, RA 1-16, and the trial transcript, defense attorney, Aloise, never presented any true evidence of King's eye injury or challenged the perjury at trial surrounding King's eye injury. Aloise knowingly concealed the "real documented evidence" of King's injury.
Because King's medical report, RA 120 (Ex. A-2 of motion), written by Dr. Arinella, was illegible, Aloise must have had someone interpret it for him to make the above remarks in his closing. Since Aloise obviously knew that King was lying about the extent and cause of King's injury, due to his closing Argument, TR 1225, Aloise should have presented the real evidence regarding King's injury at trial, instead of concealing it from the jury. RA 12-14. See also RA 7, last ¶, for more evidence Aloise knew the truth about King's eye injury.
As a result of Aloise refusing to present the truth about King's injury to the jury and allowing the prosecution to fabricate the evidence regarding King's eye injury, cause and treatment, Aloise also deprived the defendant of his defense of self-defense, and defeated the defendant's claim he never used excessive force, deadly force or specific intent to maim. RA 8. Further, had Aloise exposed the truth about King's injury the prosecutor and his witnesses would have had no credibility with the jury. RA 14.
The deficiencies by Aloise, above and per motion claim I, renders the trial verdict unreliable and shows a total breakdown in the adversarial process required for a fair trial. Due to Aloise's ineffectiveness regarding King's eye injury, as above, the entire evidentiary picture at trial was totally different than the truth. Had the jury been told the truth about King's injury there is more than a reasonable probability that the jury would have found the defendant not guilty, this claim I of the motion, alone, requires a new trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. RA 15-16.
One of the things Aloise should have done in his closing argument was to highlight the one piece of exculpatory evidence he
inadvertently tripped over during cross-examination of prosecution witness, Traskiewicz,
TR 544-(12-18) (Trask.) When I observed Elbery put his finger in his (King) eye, King had Elbery on his back in the middle of Shrewsbury St. See RA 13 & RA 144 (Exhibit J. p.144/p.3 - "Richard Traskiewicz").
Aloise also should have highlighted to the jury that King's injury was so minor that he was discharged after 90 minutes, at 3:35am, including the time it took for the doctor to arrive on call. TR 478-22 & RA 118,Exhibit A-1. And that the injury or "bump" to the eye healed in 2 days and King went back to work. TR 465-18.
Argument III - The Prosecution knowingly deceived the jury into believing that King made a legal "citizen's arrest" and the defense attorneys knowingly allowed the falsification. Count V of motion - RA 39-46.
The prosecution deceived the jury into believing King made a legal citizen's arrest while pursuing the fleeing defendant 60-100 yards down the street, TR 197-17, TR 331-1, TR 377-(1-2),and then stopping and assaulting the defendant. See RA 138 & 139 (Westboro PD report)(Ident. A at trial). See RA 25.
It is undisputed, as per trial testimony, that the defendant fled the bar and that King and his friends pursued the defendant down the street. See court's memo, p.3-3d¶, and RA 25-26, and TR 1043-1056.
The defendant's version of facts as to what happened after King pursued him 100 yards down the street is completely different than King's. The defendant testified that DePasquale and other friends of King's tackled him on the street followed by King. The defendant testified that King and his gang repeatedly assaulted the defendant and King tried to gouge the defendant's eye out, while King's gang held the defendant down in the street. TR 1043-1056.
King's admission, via trial testimony, that he chased the defendant, who was fleeing in fear down the street, TR 1107-6, 1108-15, 1128-8, is an admission he assaulted the defendant. (The elements of assault are an overt threatening or menacing gesture coupled with an apparent ability to do harm. Mass. Practice, Vol. 32 p. 335 (2001)). King was the aggressor not the defendant. Per RA 139, Exhibit H-last page (trial Id. A), See TR 423-16, King confirms his claim of citizen's arrest,
I became involved because a felony had been committed in my presence to wit the beer bottle that hit the two girls and cut one of the girls. Under state law from the Mass. Appeals Court a police officer out of his jurisdiction can make a citizen's arrest upon probable cause the (sic) a felony has been committed. I felt I had the right to detain the subject until the proper authorities arrived." RA-43.
However, different King's testimony was from the defendant's, the "prosecution's best light evidence" was that King admitted under oath that not only did he pursue and stop the defendant, but that he further initiated contact (assault) and subdued the defendant while making his arrest. See RA 39-40, and TR cites as follows:
King's stop and arrest of the defendant
TR 199-24, (King) I said, "you're not going anywhere. You're going to stay here until the Worcester Police arrive.
TR 199-8,(King) I advised him he hurt an individual in the bar, a young lady in the bar and he's not going anywhere until the police arrived.
The prosecution's "best light evidence" was that King initiated force/assault and battery all before the defendant reacted.
TR 401-6, (King) I said, I had my arms out to the side, with my arms open and facing him.
TR 401-16,(King) I knocked him to the ground. I grabbed him around the arms and knocked him to the ground.
Other prosecution witnesses and friends of King also testified it was King that stopped and initiated assault on the defendant. See RA 39-40.
TR 594-6 (Schlener), Like he (King) was going to tackle him (Elbery).
TR 636-6(Schlener)King went to grab Elbery and that's when Elbery threw a punch.
TR (498-20) (Traskiewicz) King had his arms extended and palms out (approaching Elbery).
King admitted he was "out of jurisdiction" as a police officer and made his "arrest" as a citizen. TR 213-(17-24), TR 386-4, TR 395-22, 409-7. Trial Judge, Dan Toomey, decided the law of the case was that King acted as a citizen, that there was no cop. TR 218-17.
The prosecution judicially admitted at trial sidebar that King's pursuit, stopping and assault and battery of the defendant was a legal and justified citizen's arrest. See RA 41 & 42.
TR 1070-(9-22) (ADA Ball sidebar)... any citizen would have the right to arrest for that felony. I am going to ask for a citizen's arrest instruction as well.
TR 1072-22 thru TR 1073-1 (ADA Ball sidebar) He (King) had a justification (to make arrest). A felony was committed, and apparently the felon was leaving the area, and he was acting as a citizen. TR 1075-a felony, justifying King's action, giving him authority to make a citizen's arrest and doing what he did.
Admissive statements by counsel whether made in opening statement or colloquy between respective counsel and court are judicial admissions binding on the party-such facts are removed from dispute for the purposes of the proceeding. Mass. Practice, Evidence, Vol. 20, p. 36 s. 801.8 ('98)
However, King's "arrest" was illegal, a false arrest not a "citizen's" arrest. Under Mass. law a citizen can not make an "arrest" unless he can point to a felony the alleged criminal
(defendant) committed before the citizen's arrest took place. That felony has to pass the "in fact test", which means it has to result in a felony conviction in a court of law before there is a valid "citizen's arrest" in Mass. Com. v. Harris, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 165,170 ('81), 415 N.E. 2d 216, 220. See RA 40 &44.
The defendant did not commit a felony before King's pursuit and "arrest" of the defendant. See claim V of motion, RA 41-43, the prosecution claimed at different times during trial that the fabricated bottle assault, (Arg. IV), and then Mann's imagined/alleged injuries were the "felonies" giving citizen-King the right to pursue, stop, detain and beat/assault the defendant. Neither of these two false accusations/incidents resulted in felony convictions. See RA 160 (Ex. M docket entry 5.0) the bottle assault charge was directed not guilty. There was never a criminal charge regarding Mann's imagined/fictitious "glass in her eye" (See RA 30-39, "Christina Mann's Cut Face"). If the "in fact test" not satisfied then no citizen's arrest but assault and false arrest. Harris, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 170. See RA 44.
The prosecutor prior to Mike Ball documented that King pursued the defendant due to alleged disorderly conduct. See RA 133, Exhibit E. That first prosecutor, Salloum, acknowledged, per RA 133, the WPD incident report and investigation, RA 129-132,Exs. D & D supplement which said, "no girl went to any area hospital for treatment". See Arg. IV, Salloum knew/acknowledged no bottle assault.
Judge Raphelson knew this citizen's arrest law at the probable cause hearing, as per RA 44,PC 265-266.
P.C. 265-8 (Judge Raphelson) Mr. King went to stop a person who he had no right to stop.
P.C. 266-2 (Judge Raphelson) and there was no felony committed by Elbery in the bar.
See also RA 135, Ex. G of motion, the Worcester T&G of 1-21-93.
The Prosecution's Evidence, Must be SUPPRESSED
Since the defendant committed no crime to satisfy the "in fact test", not only was there no citizen's arrest, but all the evidence, although fabricated, claimed by the prosecution during and after King's false arrest must be suppressed. Com. v. LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 75, 551 NE2 906, 909 ('90). Leaving after suppression an assault, assault and battery, andassault and battery dangerous weapon by King and his friends. Harris at 170. See also RA 44.
The prosecutor had a duty to alert the jury that King did not make a legal citizen's arrest. The prosecution had a duty to alert the jury that King had no right pursuing and arresting the defendant. The prosecutor deceived the jury with this false evidence of a citizen's arrest by King. "A lie is a lie and if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth". Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S., 264, 270 ('59). The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with the rudimentary demands of justice. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153. A new trial is required. Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 405. See RA 42.
Prosecutor Used False Citizen's Arrest to Bolster Case
The prosecutor further used this fabrication of King's actions being a citizen's arrest to bolster his case against the defendant when he stated in his closing argument,
TR 1242-18 I'm telling you a citizen has just as much right as anybody to go after someone that has caused injury to another person like they did. Mr. King should be commended. (Ball also admitting King (they) acted in a gang).
This blatant misrepresentation by the prosecutor (ADA Mike Ball) in his closing argument to the jury coupled with the falsified evidence at trial that King was legally justified, via a citizen's arrest, to pursue, stop, and assault the defendant, inescapably causes need for a new trial. Collins 386 Mass. 14. This bolstering by the prosecutor with false evidence at trial is also a Due Process Violation causing a trial that was unfair in violation of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Giglio 405 U.S. 153. See RA 42 & 43.
The trial court allowed this inadmissible "assault" evidence, that should have been suppressed, and compounded the effect by instructing the jury to use this "assault" evidence, and the defendant's flight down the street, in the most prejudicial manner possible (as "attempted mayhem", TR 1280, & "consciousness of guilt", TR 1267-1269). This renders the trial arbitrary and fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14thAmendment. McGuire v. Estelle, (CA 9 Cal) 902 F2 749, 753 ('90). See RA 44.
Defense Counsels were Constitutionally Ineffective
Per claim V of motion, RA 44-46, the trial defense attorney, Aloise, should have alerted the jury that King was violating the law by pursuing, stopping and assaulting the defendant, Harris 11 Mass. App. 170. Aloise should have motioned to suppress all the evidence the prosecution presented at trial regarding the two assault charges (even though the evidence was fabricated) because these alleged assaults came after King's "illegal citizen's arrest". Com. v. LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 75, 551 NE2 906, 909 ('90). Aloise should then have motioned for a dismissal of the indictments for "assault and battery" and "assault with intent to maim". id. See claim VIII-"Grand Jury" of motion, RA 64. A dismissal would be required due to suppression, additionally the assault evidence was fabricated, and King committed the criminal act via his false arrest. Com. v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 500 NE2 774, 778 ('86)(the prosecutor must inform grand jury of all exculpatory evidenceknown to it and the prosecution cannot knowingly use false evidence to gain an indictment.).
Lastly, the defense attorney should have asked for an instruction on citizen's arrest so the jury would know that King did not make
a legal "citizen's arrest" and that King committed the crime during the incident. Harris, at 170. Instead, Aloise, "strongly opposed a citizen's arrest instruction", TR 1071-1, and also see RA 43-44, and allowed the trial judge to instruct that the defendant's flight was "conscious-ness of guilt", TR 1267, and to also give instructions on the two fabricated assault charges. No instruction was given at trial on "citizen's arrest".
Instead of doing the above, and alerting the jury that King had no right to pursue the defendant, let alone arrest/stop him, Aloise allowed the jury to believe that King's actions (pursuit, stop/arrest and assault) were perfectly legal.
The above makes both the trial and appellate defense attorneys constitutionally ineffective regarding this issue of citizen's arrest; Sheketoff failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. It is undisputed that, if there was not evidence at trial, due to suppression of the evidence or dismissal of the indictments, and the jury knew King and his gang were the criminals, there would have been a different verdict. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Argument IV - The prosecution Knowingly allowed their witness-in-chief, Tom King, to falsely testify that the defendant used a broken beer bottle to assault the entire bar and the defense attorneys knowingly allowed it. Count VI of motion - RA 46-58.
The trial was further infected with constitutional "Brady" violations because the prosecution knowingly allowed witness-in-chief, King, to testify falsely that,
TR 192 (11-23), TR 194-21, TR 195-3, Elbery held off the entire bar for 30 seconds with a broken jagged beer bottle not only making jabbing threatening gestures at Schlener but the rest of us patrons in the bar. See RA 52 & RA 151 (Ex. L - Bottle Incident p.2).
This evidence was used to support the prosecution's "assault by a dangerous weapon charge" (beer bottle). Also, the prosecution used this false evidence at trial to justify King's fabricated citizen's arrest before the assault dangerous weapon charge was directed not guilty. See RA 160 (Ex. M-docket entry 5.0)& RA 41.
The bartender, Schlener, first fabricated to the responding WPD officer-Perma that the defendant used a broken bottle in a "threatening menacing gesture" at him and the other patrons in the bar. See RA 129 (Ex.D-WPD incident report) & RA 49-50. Schlener, the bartender, who originally fabricated the beer
bottle assault story to justify his friends beating the defendant in the street, admitted under oath at the probable cause hearing that the defendant did not assault anybody with a beer bottle.
PC 112-3, It was a random breaking of the bottle, it was pointed at nobody.
PC 112-(9-14) Elbery went right out the door after he looked at everybody.(see RA 47-50).
King, reluctantly, testified at the probable cause hearing that the defendant never assaulted anyone with a broken beer bottle. That the defendant threw the bottle down immediately and left the bar after the bottle broke,
PC 21-16 Q. Sir, were you placed in fear by the beer bottle that Mr. Elbery had in his hand?
A.(King) The distance between us, NO. He had thrown it down.
PC 53-11 Q. Now after Mr. Elbery either broke the bottle on the side of the bar or on the pole he stood up from his seat, his stool and left via the front door?
A. (King) yes, sir.
PC 54-1 Q. Well he already was up from his seat after smashing the bottle and he immediately went out the door didn't he?
A. (King) Yes. (See RA 48-49).
As above, the prosecution was put on alert that the beer bottle assault was a fabrication; it never happened.
The original prosecutor, Salloum, who was scheduled to handle the probable cause hearing, knew the truth. He documented, per RA
That didn't stop the Worcester D.A.'s Office from impairing the grand jury by allowing and sponsoring King to testify to a brand new fabricated story. RA 50
GJ 6-4 Elbery made jabbing motions at Jeff and then me and the other patrons with the broken beer bottle.
And as above, the prosecution/Worcester D.A.'s Office further encouraged and sponsored King to lie to the trial jury about the defendant and the fabricated charge of assault with the broken beer bottle. See TR 192-(11-23), TR 194-21, TR 195-(3-11). The jury was left, due to King's perjury, with an image of the defendant as a mad man who would try to stab a group of people he had no controversy with. RA 53 & 57.
This fabricated bottle assault evidence is another count of "knowing use of perjury by the prosecution", requiring a new trial. Tucceri 412 Mass 405; U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 103. See RA 53.
Prosecutor Used False Bottle Assault to Bolster Case
The prosecutor compounded the effect on the jury of this bottle assault perjury by using it as the justification, felony committed, for King's alleged "citizen's arrest" of the
defendant. (See RA 41 - motion claim V). The prosecutor also lead (used leading questions) his own witnesses and DePasquale at trial, soliciting them to testify that the defendant used a jagged broken bottle to assault all the patrons in the bar. (See RA 150-157, Ex. L Bottle Incident *items of 9 pg. exhibit). The prosecutor used this false/perjured evidence in his opening statement,
TR. 111-20 (Ball) They saw the defendant standing there with this broken beer bottle and he is waiving this broken beer bottle now, he is waving this beer bottle at all the people in the bar.
TR 115-17 (Ball) He did swing the broken beer bottle, not only at the girl, King is named as a victim where it was swung at him.
Where the prosecutor compounds falsifications at trial, as above, by blatantly misrepresenting evidence to the jury, the Mass. SJC held a new trial is required. Collins, 386 Mass. at 14. This is also a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and causes a trial that was unfair. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,84-89 ('35), Giglio 405 U.S. 153, RA 111 & 53.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel RA 52-58
Trial defense attorney, Aloise, also represented the defendant at the probable cause hearing. See PC transcript. As above, Aloise knew from the probable cause testimonies of King and
As per RA 54, defense attorney Aloise, refused to present to the jury the above testimonies that proved the bottle assault charge (Assault dangerous weapon) was a knowing fraud by the prosecution. These testimonies at the probable cause hearing would have been used as substantive evidence, not just for credibility. Forte, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 185.
Additionally, Aloise refused to have that assault-dangerous weapon indictment dismissed. The defendant demanded Aloise dismiss the charge because, as above, the prosecution witnesses already admitted the bottle assault never happened. See RA 51 and motion claim VIII, RA 65-70.
Instead, Aloise allowed, unchallenged, the prosecution's alleged victim and witness-in-chief to testify,
TR 192 (11-23), TR 194-21, TR 195-3, Elbery held off the entire bar for 30 seconds with a broken jagged beer bottle not only making jabbing threatening gestures at Schlener and me but at all the other patrons in the bar. See RA 52 & RA 151 (Ex. L-p.2).
Further, Aloise allowed the prosecution to use this fabricated bottle assault as the alleged felony justifying King's
"citizen's arrest", and to make the defendant look like the initiator and aggressor during the incident; this helping the prosecution trick the jury. This deficiency made the defendant falsely look like a violent out-of-control maniac causing the jury to more easily believe he attempted to dig King's eye out of his head. TR 936-21. RA 57-58.
Regardless that the bottle assault-dangerous weapon charge was directed not guilty by the trial judge, the jury was left with King's false testimony that the defendant was a raging maniac with a broken beer bottle assaulting everyone in the bar. The alleged curative instruction by the trial judge,
TR 1274-5 don't draw any inferences from the fact the indictment is no longer in front of you.
had no curative effect on that highly prejudicial evidence. Even the Mass. Appeals Court was convinced, per their decision on the direct appeal of this case, that the defendant used a bottle to menace the otherpeople in the bar for half a minute. Com. v. Elbery, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 645 NE2 41, 42 ('95). RA 58.
Aloise by knowingly allowing this false evidence of a bottle assault changed the entire evidentiary picture of the trial and caused a breakdown of the adversarial process at trial making him ineffective in his assistance of counsel. Strickland 466 U.S.
696. The defendant's appellate attorney, Bobby Scheketoff, failed to raise this claim on direct appeal making him ineffective, again. id.
Argument V - The prosecutor knowingly allowed alleged victim-witness, Tom King, to lie about his drinking for a period of 3 hours prior to the underlying incident and the defense attorneys allowed it. Count VII of motion - RA 60-64.
The prosecutor allowed the alleged victim, Tom King, to lie about his drinking, on duty as a cop, at the Winner's Circle Bar 3 hours before the defendant arrived. The prosecution judicially admitted at trial sidebar that King was drinking on duty,
TR 452-12 (Mike Ball) the reason he (King) didn't do that (i.d. himself as a cop) is because he was drinking on duty. See RA 60.
The trial defense attorney asked the right question,
TR 408-20 (Aloise) Q. Were you drinking on duty that night sir?
A. (King) NO. RA 60.
As per RA 60-61 King entered the Winner's Circle Bar at about 10:30pm on 9-28-92, before he got off-duty at 11:00pm, TR 186-14, and more than 3 hours before the police arrived at 1:47am on 9-29-92 due to the incident, See RA 129 (Ex. D of motion). The
jury never knew that King was drinking on duty 3 hours before the incident.
King told the jury that he went in the bar "just to say hello" and had "almost two whole drinks". See RA 62 & TR 244-5 & TR 188-15, TR 211-14.
The prosecutor had a duty to correct that perjured evidence, as above. The prosecutor had a duty to let the jury know King had been drinking for 3 hours before the incident started and that this 3 hour drinking period started at 10:30pm while King was still on duty with the Westboro PD. This evidence would have had a great effect on the jury's appraisal of King's credibility. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (when reliability of a witness may be determinative of guilty or innocence, credibility evidence must be disclosed). See also RA 60.
And the prosecutor compounded this perjury in his closing argument to artificially bolster his case,
TR 1241-12 What is that business he was drinking on duty?
TR 1241-16 We didn't hear anybody saying, "Well, King was obviously drinking on duty". He wasn't at the police station. See RA 108.
This kind of deliberate deception of the jury system requires a new trial. Collins, 386 Mass. 14, Berger 295 U.S. at 84-89. Giglio 405 U.S. 153.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As above, Aloise knew and refused to tell the jury that King had been in the bar since 10:30pm drinking before he got off-duty on 9-28-92 at 11:00pm. The defendant was deprived of evidence, by his own attorney, that would have allowed the jury to infer King was drunk by 2:00am when the incident occurred with the defendant; that King's perception and recollection was impaired due to 3 hours of drinking. RA 62. King insisted throughout the trial, as above, he was sober. TR 439-445.
Aloise should have alerted the jury that King was committing perjury when he testified he was not drinking on duty, TR 408-21, in order to further impeach King's credibility. RA 62. Further, had Aloise done his job the jury would have learned, as the prosecutor judicially admitted, TR 452-12 (Ball sidebar) King was "conscious of his guilt" at the bar and in the street that night because he didn't identify himself as a cop. RA 63.
The appellate counsel, Sheketoff, failed to raise this claim making him and Aloise, as above, constitutionally ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. 694.
Argument VI- The prosecutor knowingly allowed trial witnesses to change their prior probable cause hearing testimony, perjury, and the defense counsels allowed it. Count X of motion - RA 73-89.
In addition to the conflict and discrepancies between trial and probable cause hearing testimonies, (which is perjury), allowed by the prosecution surrounding the bottle assault charge and Mann's injuries, (see motion claims IV, V-RA 39 & VI RA 46), there were many more prior inconsistent statements not brought to the attention of the jury resulting from probable cause hearing testimonies of various trial witnesses. All the changes in probable cause hearing testimonies given at trial were to the prejudice of the defendant, or falsely inculpatory.
Note, DePasquale and Perma (arresting officer) were, allegedly, defense witnesses, but DePasquale testified during the prosecution's case, and like Officer Perma, was a friend of King's.TR-242-18. This had the effect of the prosecutor cross-examining his own witnesses; at a minimum DePaspuale and Perma were hostile witnesses.
These changes in trial witnesses probable cause testimonies (perjury) are highlighted and summarized as follows: (see RA 74-89)
1. Schlener, the bartender, at the probable cause hearing, admitted he was at fault for insulting and starting the exchange of "negative statements" between the defendant and he. Schlener apologized on the witness stand in open court to the defendant. See RA 74-75. At trial he said the opposite, RA 75-76.
2. At the probable cause hearing, Schlener and DePasquale both said King came around the horseshoe bar after the defendant, who remained seated while King was restrained by many people in the bar. They both testified King stuck his nose in the conversation ("barbs") between the defendant and Schlener that was none of King's business. They both testified that they told King to mind his own business and go back to his seat. They both testified that the defendant wasminding his own business and not bothering with any other customers in the bar. See RA 74-75 & RA 83-84.
However, at trial they said just the opposite, testifying the defendant was the initiator and aggressor, a "steaming big madman" that was also first arguing with other patrons in the bar. See RA 75-76 & RA 84.
3. Prosecution witness, Schlener, and DePasquale admitted under oath at the probable cause hearing that most of the bar emptied
out after the defendant, who immediately left the bar after the bottle broke, (minimum of 5 men). PC 113, PC 114-19 through PC 118, PC 199-(6-9), PC 234-23. See also RA 67-item 5.
Yet, at trial the prosecution's witnesses tried to convince the jury that King acted alone pursuing the defendant to make his "arrest". TR 371-19, TR 402-5,6, TR 199-1.
4. All witnesses testified, including King, at the probable cause hearing they had no idea how the bottle broke. See RA 67-item 4.
However, at trial several prosecution witnesses, including King and Schlener, testified the defendant smashed the bottle. TR 191-4, TR 300-23.
5. Schlener testified at the probable cause hearing that somebody yelled, "call the police", PC 113-8.
However, at trial Schlener gave King the credit, testifying, TR 588-14 Tom King yelled, "call the police". At the probable cause hearing, PC 113-(1-24), Schlener admitted no police were called before King exited the bar to chase the defendant. RA 67-item 6.
Prosecution witness-in-chief, Tom King, alleged victim
Presented are conflicting changes in testimony by
King not appearing in other claims of the motion. See RA 84-88.
6. King at the probable cause hearing testified he only presumed the police had been called, PC 55-15.
However, at trial King testified, TR 195-18, I yelled to somebody to call the police. RA 86-item 3.
7. Street v. sidewalk incident
See RA 86 item 4, where at the probable cause hearing King truthfully testifies the entire pursuit, arrest and struggle with the defendant occurred in the street. All witnesses at the probable cause hearing testified the incident with King and the defendant took place only in the street. See RA 67-item 7.
However, after King was told to change his testimony because no one would believe the defendant would come to a sudden stop in the middle of the street, King testified the entire incident was on the sidewalk, TR 198-(5-7), TR 380-12. See RA 87-item 4.
These changes in testimonies, as per claim X of the motion, RA 73-89, are all perjury that helped the prosecution falsely convict the defendant. 70 C.J.S., Perjury S. 40 p. 287, ('87). (Contradictory statements under oath about same point is
perjury). The above conflicting changes in testimony, perjury, distorted the evidentiary picture of the beginning stages, (bar argument & confrontation, exit from bar and flight by the defendant, and chase by King & his gang down the street 100 yards), of the short alleged criminal incident, to the defendant's prejudice. The prosecutor had a duty to correct that perjury and not "knowingly use the above perjury" to convict the defendant. New trial required. Giglio, 405 U.S. 153.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Aloise, who also represented the defendant at the probable cause hearing, failed to alert the jury to this exculpatory evidence, via trial witnesses' probable cause hearing testimonies. This was not just credibility evidence but substantive evidence that could have been used for its full probative value at trial. Forte, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 185-186.
In failing to alert the jury to these changes in testimony Aloise missed an opportunity to impeach the credibility of the above prosecution witnesses, and caused the defendant to look like the initiator and aggressor at the underlying barroom incident, instead of, as at the probable cause hearing, the victim.
These changes in testimonies that Aloise failed to present to the jury changed the entire evidentiary picture of the trial to the prejudice of the defendant making Aloise constitutionally ineffective in his assistance of Counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. As was Sheketoff who failed to raise this claim on direct appeal. id.
Argument VII- The Prosecutor engaged in illegal conduct during his opening statement and closing argument in violation of the Due Process Clause and the defense attorneys allowed it. Claim XVI [RA106
Count XVI of the motion, RA 106-111, is a long list of every type of "error" (prosecutorial misconduct) a prosecutor can make in his opening and closing statements, not itemized in other motion claims. These "errors" by the prosecutor, at trial, are violations of MRCP-Rule 24 and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment causing a deprivation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 84-89. These violations were deliberate and outrageous and adversely influenced (prejudiced) the jury's verdict against the defendant because they went to the heart of the case requiring a reversal of the jury's verdict. Com. v. Kelley, 417 Mass. 266, 271 ('94). Even if the judge instructs the jury that the arguments are not
evidence, the case will still be reversed if the prosecutor's argument is prejudicial to an extreme, as is the status per this instant case. Com. v. Hoppin, 387 Mass. 25, 30 ('82). See RA 146 (Ex. J p.5) & TR 1234-18, where in closing Ball fabricates, that the defendant testified/admitted to gouging King's eye.
Aloise failed to object at trial to the above, and Sheketoff failed to raise this claim on direct appeal, making them both constitutionally ineffective in their assistance of counsel. Strickland 466 U.S. 694.
The above claims, (and all the claims of the defendant's motion), constitute one giant miscarriage of justice, Com. v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564 ('67),and a trial that was not fair, and a trial that prevented the defendant from having a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, in violation of the 14th & 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 685, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 ('86). See RA 115 (motion claim IXX-the conclusion). Also see the above on the defendant's Web page, coming soon. The Constitution of the United States demands a new trial for the defendant.
Michael Elbery, June 23, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
WORCESTER, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ANDREQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
On July 2, 1993, after a five-day jury trial, thedefendant, Michael Elbery, was
convicted of assault and battery (G.L. c. 265, §13A), assault with intent to
maim (G.L. c. 265, §15), and being a disorderly person (G.L. c. 272, §53).1 A
fourth count of assault with a dangerous weapon (G.L. c. 265, §15B(b)) was
dismissed at trial. The defendant's convictions were affirmed on appeal. 38 Mass.
App. Ct. 912.Representing himself pro Se, the defendant now moves for a new
trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crm. P. 30(b)2.In addition, the defendant seeks an
evidentiary hearing and further discovery as allowed by Mass. R. Crim. P. 30
regarding the injuries
1The defendant was sentenced to ten (10) years' imprisonment at M.C.I., Concord, on the maiming charge. At the sentencing the judge, Toomey, J., expressed his intention that the defendant serve one (1) year. The defendant was also sentenced to concurring one (1) year's probation for the other two convictions to be served after the maiming sentence.
2Despite a 60-page limit ordered by Judge Toomey, the defendant submitted a 115-page memorandum of fact and law and an eight-page amendment to the original memorandum in support of his motion for new trial. Specifically, Judge Toomey's February, 28, 1997 order stated that, "Defendant's memorandumshall not exceed 60 pages including items of appendix, addendumand copies of documents as to which Defendant makes reference in the memo."
The defendant filed a petition for relief to the Supreme Judicial Court from the Superior Court order limiting his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial to 60 pages. In a decision dated July 13, 2000, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition, and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant had another available remedy and, thus, was not entitled to extraordinary relief. Elbery v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1007, 1007-1008 (2000).
he allegedlysustained by Thomas King. Following are the grounds upon which
the defendant primarily relies: ineffective assistance of trial counsel3 and
appellate counsel4, judicial misconduct5, prosecutorial misconduct6, that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (insufficient evidence)7,
inadequate jury instructions8, inadmissible evidence admitted during trial9, and
duplicative sentencing10. For the following reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that
the defendant's motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing are
The trial transcript indicates that the jury could have reasonably found the
At the time of the incident at issue, Michael Elbery was 42 years old. He had
previously owned a bar in the city of Worcester. On the evening of September 28,
1992, he stopped by the Winner's Circle bar located on Shrewsbury Street in
Worcester. Elbery was acquainted with the bartender of that evening, Jeff
Schlener. He did not know any of the other 10-15 patrons in the bar at the time.
The Winner's Circle is a small establishment and all of the patrons were
seated at the semi-circle shaped bar. Elbery was served two beers that evening,
finishing approximately one of them before the incident occurred. He was not
intoxicated. Among the other patrons in  the bar were two off-duty doormen
3See Counts I - XV, excluding III.
4See Counts XVIII.
5See Counts IX and Count I of the amended motion.
6See Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X, XII, and XVI.
7See Counts VI and VIII.
8See Count XVII.
9See Count III.
10See Count XIV.
employed by the bar, twoyoung women who had stopped by after working a
waitressing shift at the Ground Round, and ThomasKing, an off-duty detective
for the Westborough Police Department. King had consumed approximately two
cocktails, but was not intoxicated.
An argument ensued between Elbery and Schlener. Schlener was poking fun at
the fact that Elbery had lost his bar establishment and was drinking cheap beer.
King, a friend of Schlener, came to the bartender's defense and told Elbery to
back off. Although voices rose, there was no physical confrontation at this point
and everyone returned to their seats. Approximately one half of an hour passed
and again an argument ensued. While it is not entirely clear from the record, the
jury could have reasonably found at this point that Elbery became quite upset
and smashed a beer bottle on the bar or a nearby pole. The bottle shattered and
Elbery was left holding the barrel of the bottle. A shard of glass flew and struck
Christina Mann, one of the waitresses, under her eye causing her to bleed. Mann
was assisted by another patron who happened to be a chiropractor, and was later
taken by a friend to a nearby hospital.
Within about a minute of the bottle breaking, Elbery left the bar. King yelled at
him to stop and wait for the Worcester Police to arrive as someone had been
injured inside. Elbery testified that he intended to get into his car and leave.
However, King testified that he did not see keys in Elbery's hands and did not
see Elbery reach for his pocket. Once outside the bar, King pursued Elbery down
the street. In addition to King, the two off-duty doormen and between one and
three other patrons of the bar also followed Elbery. It appears that King was in
the front of the group since he testified that he did not realize others had followed
him out of the bar. Although it is unclear exactly what happened at this point,
the jury reasonably could have found that King caught up to Elbery and an
altercation ensued. King testified that Elbery threw  multiple punches at him
and then, in response, King tackled him. As both of them were on the ground,
Elbery stuck his finger in King's eye doing serious damage. The group assisted
the injured King by holding Elbery on the ground thereby allowing King to free
himself from the altercation. Prior to the police arriving, King was brought to a
nearby hospital by two men in a passing car. The Worcester Police arrived shortly
thereafter and arrested Elbery.
Following his July 2,1993 jury trial, the defendant received a sentence of one
(1) year's imprisonment on the maiming charge and concurrent sentences of one
(1) year's probation for the other two convictions to be served after the maiming
sentence. The defendant's sentence was stayed on July 15, 1993, pending an
appeal of his convictions. With new counsel Robert C. Sheketoff, Esq.
representing him, the defendant appealed his convictions based on a prejudicial
statement made by the prosecutor during closing arguments and on improper
and incomplete jury instruction.11 On January 26, 1995, the Appeals Court
affirmed the convictions in a written decision. 12 Commonwealth v. Elberry (sic),
38 Mass. App. Ct. 912 (1995), rev, denied, 419 Mass. 1107 (1995).
I. Motion for a New Trial Standard
"The trial judge upon motion in writing may grant a new trial at any time if it
appears that justice may not have been done." Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b). The
standard is purposely broad as the disposition of a "motion for new trial is
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge." Commonwealth v. Moore, 408
Mass. 117, 125 (1990). "[O]nce the regular procedures have run their course the
presumptiontilts heavily toward finality." Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 
11The defendant was represented by Louis P. Aloise, Esq. At trial.
12The Appeals Court found that the prosecutor's statement was prejudicial but
the corrective instruction used by the trial judge was adequate. The Appeals Court also determined that the trial judge's instructions concerning the elements of the crimes were sufficient.
Mass. 618, 637 (1997). "New trials should not be granted except for substantial
reasons." Id, quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 406 (1992). "The
mere fact that, if the process were redone, there might be a different outcome, or
that some lingering doubt about the first outcome may remain, cannot be a
sufficient reason to reopen what society has a right to consider closed." Id.
II. Waiver of Claims
As mentioned previously, this motion for a new trial comes after the conviction
has already been affirmed on direct appeal. Consequently, "[t]he concern for
finality demands that a defendant present every claim and argument he might
fairly have had available to him the first time around." Amirault, 424 Mass. at
639. Therefore, "absent extraordinary circumstances... the defendant who had a
fair opportunity to raise [an issue] may not belatedly invoke that right to
reopen a proceeding that has already run its course." Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, "if [the defendant] had an opportunity to invoke the right and
failed to avail himself of it, the claim is waived and may not be raised for the first
time on collateral attack." Id. "The test for waiver is whether the 'theory on which
his argument is premised has been sufficiently developed to put him on notice
that the issue is a live issue."' Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the doctrine of
waiver "'applies equally to constitutional claims which could have been raised,
but were not raised' on direct appeal or in a prior motion for a new trial."
Commonwealth v. Watson, 409 Mass. 110, 112 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v.
Deeran, 397 Mass. 136, 139 (1986).
The "motion judge's discretion under Rule 30(c)(2) to grant relief from such a
waiver is limited if the conviction has already received appellate review."
Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 n.5 (1999). If the issue has been
waived, the judge may not consider it, unless in the exercise of discretion the
judge determines there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage of  justice. See id.
at 173-174. The judge's discretion in granting relief from waiver should not be
exercised lightly, and should only be exercised if "upon sober reflection, it
appears that a miscarriage of justice might otherwise result." Commonwealth v.
Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 565 (1994), cert. denied,513 U.S. 1091 (1995). Here,
the defendant's claims of judicial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (insufficient evidence),
inadequate jury instructions, inadmissible evidence admitted during trial, and
duplicative sentencing were all areas of the law that were sufficiently developed at
the time of his appeal to put the defendant on notice that these issues were
live issues. Consequently, all of the above claims could have been raised on direct
appeal but were not. Therefore, the above issues are waived.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
The defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are also subject to the
waiver rule. See Lefave, 430 Mass. at 17 1-173; see also Commonwealth v.
Evardo, 426 Mass. 48, 49,50 (1997). In situations where the defendant has been
represented by the same attorney at trial and on direct appeal, that defendant
may seek review of the trial counsel's performance, even though no ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was asserted on direct appeal. See Egardo, 426 Mass.
at 49. The reasoning behind this exception to the waiver rule is "that it would be
'unrealistic to expect [the defendant's] first attorney to have raised a claim calling
his own competence into question."' Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 409
Mass. 1, 3-4 (1990). In situations where the defendant has had new appellate
counsel, the defendant's "first opportunity" to raise the issue of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness would be on direct appeal. See Egardo, 426 Mass. at 49-50
("[b]ecause trial and appellate counsel were associates in the practice of criminal
law, the second attorney thus furnished the defendant his 'first opportunity' to
raise the issue of  trial counsel's effectiveness"); see also Breese v.
Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 249, 250 n. 1 (1993).
In this case, the defendant's first opportunity to raise an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel was on direct appeal since the defendant had different
representation at that time. Therefore, the defendant's ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim is waived. However, the defendant also claims that his
appellate counsel was ineffective because he
failed to argue on appeal that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
This is the defendant's first opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Therefore, the question of whether the defendant's appellate
counsel was ineffective necessarily depends on whether he actually received
ineffective assistance at his trial. See Breese, 415 Mass. at 252; Commonwealth v.
Van Zant, 1999 WL 823745 n.6 (Super. Ct. 1999) (Neel, J.). Consequently, this
Court has reviewed the trial transcript to determine whether the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial which, in turn, would also
answer whether or not the defendant's appellate counsel was ineffective by
failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct appeal.
The defendant bears a heavy burden in establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel such that a new trial is required. See Commonwealth v. Brookins, 33
Mass. App. Ct. 626, 631 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 416 Mass. 97 (1993). In
order to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel falling
"measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer"
and that such inadequacies "likely deprived [the defendant] of an otherwise
available, substantial ground of defense." Commonwealth v. Clark, 44 Mass. App.
Ct. 502, 512 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).
To succeed on a claim of  ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show that better work by trial counsel might have accomplished something
material for the defense. See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115
(1977). Counsel's tactical judgments must be "manifestly unreasonable" to
constitute ineffective assistance. See Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass.
266, 273 (1991). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential, 'indulg[ing] a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Commonwealth v.
Florentino, 396 Mass. 689, 690 (1986) (citation omitted).
At bar, there is no evidence that trial counsel's performance was ineffective nor
that it deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of
defense. The trial counsel's performance fell well within the realm of what may be
expected from an ordinary fallible attorney. In his 115-page memorandum of fact
and law in support of his motion for new trial, Elbery claims multiple instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of his attorney at trial, Louis P.
Aloise. The defendant makes a series of allegations which either are not grounded
in the record or do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally,
Elbery claims that Aloise conspired with the prosecution to withhold the truth
about the evidence upon which he was convicted. However, there is no evidence
of any conspiracy. Most of Elbery's contentions arise from strategic decisions on
thepart of his trial counsel that did not impact the strong case the Commonwealth
had against him. Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408, 413 (1979)
(strategic trial decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless
they are "manifestly unreasonable"). See also Commonwealth v. Finstein, 426
Mass. 200, 203 (1997); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 423 Mass. 17, 20 (1996). The
following issues are being raised solely for the purpose of determining whether a
new trial is warranted based upon  ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
A. Failure to Introduce Evidence
There is no evidence that Aloise conspired to withhold pertinent information from
the jury. Elbery alleges that Aloise conspired with the prosecution to withhold
from the jury the true cause of King's eye injuries. There is no evidence that this
occurred. Aloise described King's eye injury in a manner advantageous to Elbery
by noting that the injury was a "superficial abrasion" (Tr. Vol. V/ 122513) and
that if the facts occurred as King described them, "Mr. King would not have his
eye in the head today." Tr. Vol.V/ 1224. Elbery also alleges that his trial counsel
failed to highlight to the jury the fact that there was no police investigation, and
that he was attacked by a "gang of six." Contrary to this contention, in his
opening statement, Aloise questioned whether an adequate investigation had
been conducted because it essentially consisted of a dispatch. Tr. Vol. 1/127. In
addition, in his closing statement, Aloise stated that Elbery was being chased by
six or seven individuals. Tr. Vol. V/1218.
Elbery also claims that Aloise was ineffective because he failed to call certain
witnesses which would have assisted his case. However, there is no merit to this
contention. There is no evidence that calling Dr. Stephen Sawyer as a witness
would have provided Elbery with a substantial ground of defense because he
would not lie on the stand and thus upset the alleged conspiracy between Aloise
and the prosecution. There is also no evidence that calling Alice Arsenault (a
friend of Mann), Don Wynne, or Assistant District Attorney Michael Salloum as
witnesses would have provided a material defense for Elbery. See Commonwealth
v. Epsom, 422 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1996) (at hearing on motion for new trial
based on ineffective assistance of counsel where lawyer failed to call witness
providing evidence of self- defense, court required  defendant to show: (1)
witness was available at time of trial; (2) the testimony would have been sufficient
to raise the issue of self-defense; and (3) that testimony would likely have
13Citations to the Trial Transcript references are indicated as "Tr. vol," followed by the volume and page number.
made a material difference in the trial).
Elbery alleges that King testified at the probablecause hearing at the Worcester
District Court on January 20, 1993, that there was no assault with a beer bottle
and that Aloise failed to introduce this evidence to the jury. However, King did in
fact testify during the proceedings that there was an assault with a beer bottle. In
response to Assistant District Attorney Todd Mathieson's direct examination of
King, King stated that "Mr. Elbery was holding the neck of the bottle in a
threatening gesture, yelling."14 Moreover, Aloise did raise doubt during the trial
as to whether there was a breaking of a beer bottle at all ("Mr. Taraskiewicz didn't
see the bottle break. Nobody saw the bottle break" (Tr. Vol. V/ 1217); "Mr.
Schlener said that he didn't see the bottle break, he heard it...he said he lied to
the police in that he was assaulted with that beer bottle" (Tr. Vol. V/12 19)).
Elbery claims that Aloise was also ineffective because he failed to admit
Elbery's medical records regarding his injuries and evidence regarding the
clothing he wore during the incident. However, Aloise did admit Elbery's medical
records from Hahnemann Hospital as Exhibit 23. Tr. Vol. V/1196. Further, Aloise
introduced photographs B, C, D, and E for identification which pictured Elbery's
alleged injuries on the event in question. Tr. Vol. IV/812-816. Elbery also claims
Aloise was ineffective because there was an illegal citizen's arrest by King which
Aloise failed to make clear to the jury. However, there was not an illegal citizen's
arrest. Aloise did, in his cross-examination of King, elucidate the fact that King
was off-duty and acting in the capacity of a private citizen that night.15 For these
reasons, it was also  unnecessary for Aloise to file a motion to suppress
14Worcester District Court Proceedings, January 20, 1993, page 9.
15Worcester District Court Proceedings, January 20, 1993, page 39.
evidence from the alleged illegal citizen's arrest ofElbery.
Elbery claims that Aloise failed to subpoena Mann's medical records which
Elbery believes would show the true nature of her injuries. However, the extent of
Mann's injuries were not at issue in this case since Elbery's convictions related to
the injuries inflicted on King. Elbery alleges that Aloise also failed to subpoena
evidence from the Westborough Police Department regarding King's demotion
and drinking on duty which he believes created a motive for King to lie. There is
no evidence that this created a motive to lie nor that it deprived Elbery of a
substantial ground of defense. Compare Commonwealth v. Juzba, 46 Mass. App.
Ct. 319, 322-323 (1999) (although counsel's failure to obtain police chemist's
report and/or police chemist's testimony regarding the absence of sperm or
seminal fluid in a rape case did fall below what was expected from an ordinary
fallible lawyer, it did not deprive the defendant of a substantial, available defense
where it corroborated the defendant's testimony).
B. Failure to Object
Elbery alleges that Aloise failed to object to certain evidence which was
prejudicial. However, there is no evidence that Aloise's alleged failures to object
deprived Elbery of a material ground of defense. Elbery contends that Aloise
failed to object to the admission of King's medical report which he asserts was
inadmissible due to its references to liability as well as illegible and
hyper-technical content. See G.L. c. 233, §79. However, there is no evidence that
the medical report suffered from this condition. Any references to liability in the
medical report do not necessitate retrial because they do not add anything
to the testimonies at trial. See Commonwealth v. Brattman, 10 Mass. App. Ct.
579, 586 (1980).
Elbery claims that Aloise failed to object to Assistant District Attorney Ball
expressing  his own opinion and misstating facts and testimony in his
opening and closing arguments. There is no evidence that Assistant District
Attorney Ball's opening and closing arguments contained such errors. The
prosecutor may comment on evidence developed at trial and draw inferences from
such evidence. See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 275 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 713 (1993). The prosecutor may also
make a fair response to an attack on the credibility of a government witness.
Chavis, 415 Mass. at 713, citing Commonwealth v. Simmons, 20 Mass. App. Ct.
366, 371 (1985); see Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7 (1989). The judge
also provided curative instructions in stating that "[t]he opening statements
and the closing statements that we just heard from counsel are not a substitute
for evidence. They are only intended to assist you in understanding the
evidence and the contentions of the parties." Tr. Vol.V/ 1257-58.
Elbery also states that Aloise failed to object to various inappropriate
instructions or to the fact that certain instructions were absent. Again, there is no
evidence that the instructions were improper or deficient. Among other things,
the trial judge instructed the jurors on their role as fact-finders and the
importance of focusing solely on the evidence, the difference between direct and
circumstantial evidence, inferences, the Commonwealth's burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, consciousness of guilt, disorderly conduct, assault
and battery, assault with intent to maim, intoxication, and self-defense. (Tr.
Vol. V/ 1251-1294). There was nothing improper about the instructions to the
jury. See Commonwealth v. Melton, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905 (1999) (counsel's
failure to request a more forceful curative instruction concerning opinion
testimony did not amount to error). Since there was no reason to object, Aloise's
failure to object was justified. Compare Commonwealth v. Nunes, 430 Mass. 1, 7
(1999) (failure to object to three infractions by the Commonwealth on cross of
defendant, although improper,  would not have affected jury verdict and,
therefore, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel).
C. Conflicts of Interest
Although Elbery alleges that there are various conflicts of interest which
deprived him of a fair trial, there is no substantiation on the record for his
allegations. For instance, he alleges that Aloise's secretary is "best friends" with
bartender Schlener 's wife and that Aloise was ineffective because he failed to
stop Aloise 's secretary from passing along confidential information to her friend's
husband, Schlener. However, there is no evidence on the record that any such
conflict of interest existed nor that any such acts occurred. Elbery also alleges
that because Aloise asked Elbery to take a lie detector test it shows that Aloise
had a conflict of interest because he was repeatedly reinforcing the prosecution's
arguments. Again, there is no such evidence. Aloise represented Elbery effectively
and countered the prosecution's version of the facts in terms of describing the
events as a mere "barroom fight" (Tr. Vol. V/ 1229), downplaying King's injuries
as a "superficial abrasion" (Tr. Vol. V/ 1225), and arguing that Elbery was acting
in self-defense (Tr. Vol. V/ 1221-22). There is also no conflict of interest merely
because the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney Ball may have been a
former police officer.
D. Misleading Use of Terms
Elbery contends that Aloise used certain incorrect terms and failed to object to
certain terms that allegedly confused the jury. Elbery claims that Aloise
adopted the prosecution's facts and theory of the case by using terms such as
"right, "am I right," and other expressions during cross-examination of the
Commonwealth's witnesses which misrepresented Elbery and made the jury put
Elbery in a bad light. These allegations are not valid since phrases such as
"right" and  "am I rights," especially with leading questions during
cross-examination, are typical trial practice techniques.
Elbery also claims that the judge's use of the phrase "moral certainty" in his
jury instructions obscured for the jurors the defendant's standard for proving his
case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, case law has determined that use of
the phrase does not render the instructions improper. In Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1, 14 (1994), cert. denied, Calderon v. Sandoval, 122 S.Ct. 322 (2001), the
Supreme Court decided that although "'moral certainty,' standing alone, might
not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for 'proof beyond a
reasonable doubt'.. .it does not necessarily follow that the...instruction is
unconstitutional." Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the "moral certainty
language [could] not be sequestered from its surroundings." Id. at 16. Thus,
Aloise was not ineffective for failing to object to the judge's use of the term "moral
certainty." He was also not ineffective for failing to object to the judge's use of the
phrases "whether or not" and "basic fact" in the jury instructions, because those
terms are also proper.
Elbery also alleges various other instances of ineffective assistance of counsel
which are unfounded. For instance, Elbery claims that Aloise failed to impeach
witnesses with perjurious prior inconsistent statements and aided the prosecution
with false testimony. However, Aloise did point to discrepancies in the testimonies
of the Commonwealth's witnesses and repeatedly called the Commonwealth's
rendition of the facts of the case" patently absurd." (Tr. Vol. V/ 122 1-24). 
In addition, Elbery alleges that Aloise failed to argue double jeopardy with
Elbery's convictions of assault and battery and assault with intent to maim.
Elbery believes that assault and assault and battery are the lesser included
offenses of assault with intent to maim. There is no double jeopardy with regard to
Elbery's convictions. Double jeopardy refers to the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against a "being prosecuted twice for substantially the same offense. Black's Law
Dictionary 506 (7th ed. 1999); see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519. In the instant
case, Elbery was convicted of three distinct charges with distinct elements:
assault and battery (G.L. c. 265, §13A)16, assault with intent to maim (G.L. c. 265,
§15)17, and being a disorderly person (G.L. c. 272, §53) 18.
16G.L. c. 265, §13A states:
Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery upon another shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than two and one half years in a house of correction or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
17G.L. c. 265, §15 states:
Whoever assaults another with intent to commit murder, or to maim or disfigure his person in any way described in the preceding section, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine Of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two and one half years.
18G.L. c. 272, §53 states:
Common night walkers, common street walkers, both male and female, common railers and brawlers, persons who with offensive and disorderly acts or language accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons in speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons, disturbers of the peace, keepers of noisy and disorderly houses, and persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by imprisonment in jail or house of correction for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Contrary to Elbery's allegations, assault and assault and battery are not the lesser included offenses of assault with intent to maim. Elbery also claims that he was sentenced  to one year for being a disorderly person when the maximum sentence is only six months. However, Elbery was sentenced to serve one year for the assault with intent to maim charge and one year probation for the assault and
battery and disorderly conduct convictions which were to run concurrently. His probation was to begin after his release from jail. Thus, Elbery was not sentenced for longer than his convictions mandated.
Also, contrary to Elbery's contentions, there is no evidence that Aloise sponsored Assistant District Attorney Ball to lie about the bottle assault, nor that Perma (a fellow cop), De Pasquale (an acquaintance of King) or Mann lied on the stand as witnesses. There is also no evidence that the pictures admitted at trial were falsified or duplicative. Nor did Aloise have the responsibility, nor the capacity, to file criminal charges against King for the injuries he allegedly caused Elbery. There is also no evidence that Aloise abandoned his client.
For the aforementioned reasons, the defendant has failed to show that trial counsel's representation was seriously deficient and that he was deprived of an
otherwise available material ground of defense. Since there was competent representation by the trial attorney, appellate counsel was not ineffective for
failing to argue on appeal that the defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See Breese,415 Mass. at 252.
IV. Evidentiary Hearing Not Warranted
In addition to his request for a new trial, the defendant requests an evidentiary
hearing and further discovery. A judge has broad discretion to deny a motion for
new trial upon review of the motion and affidavits without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Rice, 427 Mass. 203, 207 (1998);
see also Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 663 (1998).  "[T]he judge
may decide a rule 30(b) motion based solely on affidavits; may discredit
untrustworthy affidavits; and need only proceed to evidentiary hearing 'where a
substantial issue is raised [by the motion or affidavitsl and is supported
by a substantial evidentiary showing."' Lopez, 426 Mass. at 663, citing
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 260 (1981); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(3)
("[the judge may rule on the issue or issues presented by such motion on the
basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further hearing if no substantial
issue is raised by the motion or affidavits"). The court need only hold an
evidentiary hearing if a substantial issue is raised by the motion and affidavits
and is supported by a substantial evidentiary showing. Id. In determining whether
the defendant has raised a 'substantial issue' meriting an evidentiary hearing
under Rule 30, the court looks at the seriousness of the issue asserted and to the
adequacy of the defendant's showing on the issue raised. Commonwealth v.
DeVincent, 421 Mass. 64, 67 (1995). Further, the defendant must show that an
evidentiary hearing is necessary to provide the judge with additional information
not already contained in affidavits. See id. at 68. Here, the defendant has not
demonstrated that substantial issue exists which would require additional
information not already contained in the defendant's submission or the
record. Consequently, the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing is
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion
for a New Trial and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing are DENIED.
Timothy S. Hillman
Justice of the Superior Court
DATED: December 21, 2001
DEC 26 2001
ATTEST: /s/ CLERK 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Worcester SS Worcester Superior Ct.
Commonwealth of Mass.
DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The defendant moves the court, pursuant to Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure-rule 30(b), that he be granted a new trial, as justice was not done by the trial of the above criminal case.
The grounds upon which this motion is based is the conduct of the trial, the trial verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and over two dozen U.S. Constitutional errors or violations. This defendant's conviction of the above captioned case was a miscarriage justice. The conviction was obtained in violation of law and was manifestly unjust, as is proved in the supporting memorandum all the prosecution's evidence was fabricated.
The defendant further requests discovery, as allowed by Rule 30, on the injuries allegedly sustained by alleged victim, Tom King, and prosecution witness Mann. See claims I, II, III, IV of the Memo relating to Mann and King. The defendant requests discovery regarding the issues in claim VII of the Memo, King's demotion and whereabouts on 9-28-92. Specifically, this defendant requests discovery on the following:
1. The negatives of the pictures Tom King presented at trial, exhibits 1, 2, 3 at trial, relating to his eye injuries of 9-29-92. So there can be a comparison by an expert to the actual pictures at trial as in #2.
2. The pictures submitted by King, exhibits 1, 2, 3 at trial, relating to his eye injuries.
3. All medical reports relating to the alleged injuries of King and Mann as claimed at trial.
4. All documents of payments for the medical treatment by medical insurance companies for the activity described in #3.
5. The subpoena Louis P. Aloise sent the Westboro Police regarding the above docketed action and the demotion of Thomas King. This subpoena is itemized in claim VII.
6. All demotion documents from the Westboro Police regarding the demotion of Thomas King.
7. A deposition of Dr. Arinella, R.N. Grenier (the medical people who treated King) and the alleged physician that treated Mann.
8. A physical viewing of Christina Mann's face for scaring that should have resulted from the alleged glass cutting her face above and below her eye.
The defendant also requests an evidentiary hearing on the claims as per the accompanying Memorandum of Fact and Law.
This defendant motions for a new trial, as the law requires, as well as, discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the claims per the Memorandum of Fact and Law.
Worcester SS Worcester Superior Ct.
Commonwealth of Mass. #93-0135
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S, ELBERY, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER MASS. RULE 30b OF THE M.R.C.P.
The APPENDIX OF
THE APPEAL OF THAT MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Motion for New Trial & Discovery & Evidentiary Hearing
Procedural Background Memo (required in Appendix of Appeal)
I. THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED INJURY-ALOISE'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1
II. KING’S EYE INJURY-THE PROSECUTION fabricates the big lie. 16
III. King’s medical report was inadmissible evidence. 27
IV. CHRISTINA MANN’S CUT FACE – Fabricated cause for citizen’s arrest 30
V. CITIZEN’S ARREST – there was no felony committed by Elbery prior to King’s citizen’s arrest. 39
VI. The Broken Beer Bottle Assault-Deadly Weapon – more fabricated attempt to justify King’s citizen arrest. 46
VII. King’s Motive to Lie – the Jury did not know the alleged victim/witness had something to hide. 58
VIII. GRAND JURY – Impairment by the Worcester D.A.’s Office 65
IX. Clerk-John O'Connor Caused a Biased Proceeding-Continued Failure by Aloise. 71
X. Prior Inconsistent Statements – Failure of Aloise to Impeach Witnesses 73
XI. More Ineffectiveness by Aloise Opening Statement, argument, adopts-confirms prosecutions theory of case. 89
XII. ADA Morris A. Bergman Incident – Why was this district court prosecutor at trial everyday? – so that he could get caught lying under oath. 96
XIII. Aloise fails to callWitnesses 98
XIV. Double Jeopardy and More Deficiency by Aloise 100
XV. Miscellaneous Aloise Deficiencies 102
XVI. Illegal Prosecutorial Statements – Aloise No Objection 107
XVII. Judge’s Instructions 111
XVIII. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel – Attorney Bobby Sheketoff from the rear 114
Certificate of Service…1 page
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial & Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing, Com. v. Elbery 93-0135,…... 2 pages.
Defendant’s Memorandum of Procedural Background, Com. v. Elbery 93-0135,...3 pages.
Defendant’s Affidavits in Support of Motion For New Trial Under Rule 30, Com. v. Elbery 93-0135...... 6 pages.
Memorandum of Fact and Law in Support of Defendant’s , Elbery, Motion for New Trial,…......115 pages.
Exhibit A- Tom King’s medical report from Medical Center of Central Mass. for treatment on 9-29-92,…5 pages.
Exhibit B- Investigation and readable deciphering of King’s medical records of Exhibit A…5 pages.
Exhibit C- Dr. Hull’s affidavit in support of Defendant’s New Trial- A medical experts opinion of Tom King’s eye injury as per the medical records in Exhibit A…. 3 pages.
Exhibit D-Worcester Police Incident Report regarding the Incident of 9-29-92 on Shrewsbury St., near the Winner’s Circle Bar and arrest of Michael Elbery, plus Supplement Report…2 pages each. See also Amended WPD Report
Exhibit E-Letter from ADA Michael Salloum to Attorney Louis P. Aloise dated 11-30-92…1 page.
Exhibit F-Complaint at Worcester District Court of 9-29-92 against Michael Elbery for mayhem etc.,…1 page.
Exhibit G-1-21-92 article Worcester T&G, Judge raps Cop…1 page.
Exhibit H-The Bolton Report, Reporting Westboro P.D. officer Tom King,…4 pages.
Exhibit I-Defendant’s Potential Witness List, …2 pages.
Exhibit J-Footnote 1- Tom King’s Injuries…5 pages.
Exhibit K-Footnote 3-Mann’s Injuries…3 pages.
Exhibit L-Footnote 4-Bottle Incident transcript citings…9 pages.
Exhibit M-Docket activity thru 3-22-94, Com. v. Elbery 93-0135…3 pages.
Exhibit N-Eviction Notice/Legal Documents – Celularo v. Elbery…2 page.
Exhibit O- ADA Morris Bergman Note…1 page.
Exhibit P-Transcript pages from Deposition of Elbery v. Hester…2 pages.
Exhibit Q-Elbery’s Medical Reports…3 pages.
Exhibit R-Com. v. Elbery 93-0135, Motion 25-2-b…9 pages.
Trial Transcript of Com. v. Elbery 93-0135, 5 volumes, 1302 pages.
Grand Jury Transcript Com. v. Elbery, March 3, 1993, 10 pages.
Probable Cause Hearing Transcript, Com. v. Elbery, NO. 9262CR10017-January 20, 1993 1 volume, 266 pages.
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Ex.=Exhibit, PC=Probable Cause Hearing Transcript, TR=Trial Transcript, Aff.=affidavit, O/S=Opening Statement, GJ=Grand Jury Transcript
Worcester SS Worcester Superior Ct.
Commonwealth of Mass. #93-0135
MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S, ELBERY, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER MASS. RULE 30b OF THE M.R.C.P.
A. Prosecution witness-in-chief, Thomas King, lied at the trial about all his eye injuries, treatment received for his injuries and the cause of his injuries.
B. Attorney Louis P. Aloise was deficient in his performance and conspired with the prosecution, regarding the alleged victim’s, Tom King, eye injury at trial resulting in prejudice to the defendant.
1. Failure to investigate or call as witnesses the medical professionals who treated alleged victim, Thomas King, or any medical professionals regarding King's injury.
2. Failure to apprise the jury of King's actual injury and treatment knowingly allowing King to testify falsely about his injuries and treatment.
3. Failure to apprise the jury of King's cause of injury while knowingly allowing King to testify falsely about his cause of injury.
4. The effect on the prosecution's closing argument and instructions to the jury.
C. Prejudice resulting in the denial of Elbery's right to Due Process, effective assistance of counsel and Compulsory Process as is guaranteed by the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as, Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
1. At trial prosecution witness-in-chief and alleged victim, Thomas King, lied about his eye injuries and related treatment. King testified at trial that defendant Michael Elbery caused him to have the following severe serious eye injuries:
a. A cut eyeball, T. R. 204-1, 2; 468-9.
b. A lacerated eyeball, T. R. 203-24, 385-12, 440-15, 479-3.
c. Bleeding from his eyeball, blood coming out of his eye, T. R. 202-24, 203-1, 468-14-16.
d. Vitreous fluid leaking from his eye, T. R. 202-24, 203-1.
e. Permanent eye damage, T. R. 204-3, 204-3-10.
f. Repeated testimony about almost losing his eye, T. R. 203 - 9, 469-17-19; 468-24, 405-15.
g. Eye blind-203-3, 426-9, 468-11, 381-5-7, 202-2, 383-23, 437-10.
Additionally, before the grand jury, regarding this instant case, King testified he had muscle damage to his eye, G. J. 8-13, and at the probable cause hearing he testified he was at the hospital for four hours, PC 16-21.
King testified at trial that he had the following medical treatment to his eyes as a result of Elbery's alleged assault:
h. Freezing and numbing of the eye, T. R. 203-20.
i. Each eye covered by a patch, T. R. 203-21, 383-22, 406-1, 468-5-9.
This testimony by King was corroborated at trial by prosecution witnesses O'Connor, Schlener, Traskiewicz, as well as, defense witnesses Perma and DePasquale. All these witnesses were friends of King. See footnote 1 – Ex. J for transcript citings of all these witnesses' testimonies regarding King's injuries.
Particularly prejudicial to the defendant was the testimony of Dennis O'Connor, who claimed to be a medical professional, TR 747 20-24. O'Connor testified that King's lower auricle was full of blood, T. R. 756-14. Auricle means earlobe. O'Connor implied that the auricle was part of King's eye, thus misleading the jury.
None of these eye injuries or treatment occurred as was discovered by Michael Elbery via the investigation of King's medical report of 9-29-92 after Elbery's conviction of 7-2-93. King and his friends/witnesses lied about King's eye injuries and treatment.
The medical personnel who observed and treated King only minutes after the incident on 9-29-92, document, by-way of the medical/hospital report, Exhibit A, injuries and treatment entirely different from that testified to by King and his friends. See Exhibit A and Exhibit B for King's medical/hospital report and readable interpretation, respectively.
Per Exhibit A-1 R.N. Judith Grenier, who first observed King at 2:10 a.m. only minutes after the incident occurred outside the Winner's Circle Bar on 9-29-92, documents an absence of a bleeding eye or leaking vitreous fluid. Grenier observed no cut eyeball, no lacerated eyeball, she did not freeze or numb King's eye nor did she apply two eye patches, only one eyeshield. R.N. Grenier treated King for a minor injury to the eye and possible infection to the eye. Her report was highly technical yet legible. See Dr. Hull's affidavit, Exhibit C, for review of Exhibit A and explanation of King's injuries and medical treatment received.
Dr. Arinella observed and treated King after Grenier. Arinella documents, per his medical report A-2, none of the serious eye injuries enumerated by King at trial. Dr. Arinella observed King to have a superficial abrasion to the eyelid and swelling to the left eyelid and a blood shot eye. Arinella's diagnosis states King had a conjunctival laceration. The conjunctiva being the outermost mucous membrane covering the eyeball. Arinella treated King for minor injuries to the superficial covering of the eye, see Dr. Hull's affidavit, Exhibit C. See Ex. B-3 for readable form of Arinella’s report.
Two other doctors observed King in the emergency room that night, Dr. O'Connell and Dr. Lemmon's as documented by the medical report, yet neither made any written documentation regarding King's eye.
Nowhere is there any concern, per Exhibit A, about King losing his eye or having permanent eye damage or muscle damage. King was in the hospital for one-hour and 25 minutes, Exhibit A-1., including the time it took Dr. Arinella to arrive on call
The medical reports by Dr. Arinella and R.N. Grenier each contained an interview section where they recorded a statement by King as to how he got injured. See Exhibit A-1 under "chief complaint" and Exhibit A-2 under "history and subjective" for the recording of King's interview by R.N. Grenier and Dr. Arinella respectively. See Ex. B-3 for readable form of Arinella’s interview.
King told Arinella he "got a finger in the left eye". Similarly, he told R.N. Grenier "someone poked his fingernail through my eyeball leaking vitreous fluid". There is no need to comment on King's statement to Grenier regarding vitreous fluid and a fingernail going through his eyeball, these did not happen per medical documentation, Exhibit A, Exhibit B-3 and Exhibit C.
Both interviews are void of the words, gouging, or any description of pushing in harder and harder by thumbing or two occasions of thumbing to the side and almost behind the eyeball. King testified at trial, T. R. 201-17, 20, He (Elbery) took his thumb and jammed into my eye. On the outside of my eye he jammed it in almost behind the eye and kept pushing the thumb in real hard. He... (2nd thumbing) jammed that thumb back into my eye on the inside of my eye and kept pushing the thumb into my eye.
King lied at trial with his testimony of two occasions of thumbing to the side and almost behind the eye. King's statement to the medical people, only minutes after his eye injury, are clear-he got poked in the left eye by a finger. This is, coincidentally, what he told defense witness Hayes, per Hayes testimony, "I must have got poked in the eye". "I think I got poked in the eye", T. R. 918-16. Hayes was told this by King while driving King to the hospital on 9-29-92 immediately following his bump in the eye or injury, that resulted in this defendant being sentenced to 10 years in the state prison.
B. Defense Attorney Louis P. Aloise was deficient in his performance and conspired with the prosecution, regarding the alleged victim -Tom King's eye injury, at trial, resulting in prejudice to the defendant.
1. Aloise failed to investigate or call as a witness the medical professionals who treated alleged victim Tom King or any other medical professionals regarding King's injuries. Defense Attorney Aloise failed to interview or investigate or call as witnesses the medical professionals R.N. Grenier, Dr. Arinella, Dr. Lemmon's or Dr. O. Connell who observed and treated alleged victim King. Aloise presented no other expert witnesses nor did he talk to any other medical people with respect to King's medical report and injuries, see affidavit #1.
Because Aloise did not investigate or call as witnesses the treating medical professionals or any medical witnesses the jury did not learn the truth about King's eye injury, instead they only heard the prosecution's falsification regarding these injuries of King's, as itemized in section A of this claim I. Aloise did not challenge the prosecution's falsified claim of King's injury as a result the jury could believe nothing else. The jury was left to believe, because there was no other evidence at trial, that King suffered serious eye injuries the equivalent of mayhem and that King was the victim of deadly force.
Had Aloise investigated and called as witnesses the various medical professionals who treated and observed King they would have been committed to testify as is documented per their report of 9-29-92, Exhibit A. Their testimonies, substantive evidence, regarding King's injury would be irrefutable and totally in opposite to the prosecution's description regarding King's eye injury. The effect would be to erase the prosecution's false evidence regarding King's eye injury, treatment and cause and to expose the prosecution witness-in-chief, King, was committing perjury. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the other testifying friends of King, two defense witness, De Pasquale and Perma, would be similarly categorized as perjurious due to the medically documented proven falsity of their testimonies regarding King's injuries.
Because Aloise did not investigate and call as witnesses the medical professionals who treated King or any medical expert witnesses the jury was not informed that a finger in the eye was consistent with King's minor injuries documented per King's medical reports, Exhibit A, and also Dr. Hull's affidavit, Exhibit C. The jury was not informed that had Elbery gouged King twice with the thumb to "the side in almost behind the eyeball" that King's injuries would have been far greater than as documented by the physician registered nurse. The jury was not informed that it would be physically impossible to get thumbed twice as King described at trial and come away with only minor injuries to the eye, per Exhibit A and Exhibit C.
King, it should have been emphasized by Aloise, used two lies, the injury and cause of injury, to complement each other. Aloise at trial never challenged either.
Failure by Aloise to investigate, interview or call any medical personnel to testify on behalf of the defendant, Michael Elbery, not only deprived Elbery of the very best sort of witness-a neutral witness with excellent opportunity to observe and no apparent bias or motive to palter or mislead, but in so doing deprived Elbery of effective assistance of counsel and the right to compulsory process as is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution, as well as by Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.Com. v. Brookins 33 Mass. App.Ct. 626, ’92, (new trial ordered for this error by defense counsel). The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 states that the defense counsel has a duty to conduct prompt investigation into the circumstances of the case. Per Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 690, (’84), 80 L Ed 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, the defense counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes the particular investigation unnecessary. This deficiency, not calling the medical witnesses, deprived the defendant, Elbery, of a defense that King was not the victim of the excessive force or deadly force the Worcester D. A.’s Office pretended. It also adversely effected Elbery’s defense of self-defense. Better work by Aloise, as above, would have produced something material for the defense. This satisfies the standard set by the Mass. S.J.C. for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial. Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, (’74), 315 N.E. 2d 878.
Attorney Aloise understood the importance of witnesses for the defense as he states during trial sidebar, TR 273-12, because I want to know as many people that can be named as potential witnesses.
Here are three federal cases and three Massachusetts case which were reversed due to counsel's failure to investigate or call witnesses, Harris v. Reed 894 F2d 871, 878 (7th Cir. ’90); Chambers v. Armontrout 907 F2d. 825, 831 (8th Cir. ’90); Sims v. Livesay 970 F2d 1575 (6th Cir. ’92); Com. v. Haggerty 400 Mass. 437,438, 509 N.E. 2d 1163, 1164 (’87), Com. v. Aviles 31 Mass. Appeals Ct. 244, 246, (’91), Com. v. Licata 412 Mass. 654, 656 (’92), 591 N.E. 2d. 672, 676.
Aloise did not call or investigate the medical witnesses because the prosecution's case would be destroyed, the truth revealed. How would the jury react to a red eyeball and treatment consistent with a minor injury and catching a finger in the eye? See below, Aloise new the truth about King’s injuries, treatment and cause, but in conspiracy with the prosecution he concealed the true evidence in order to help the cop-King and falsely convict and imprison his client, Elbery.
2. Attorney Aloise failed to present the real evidence of King's actual eye injury and treatment of that injury to the jury. Aloise instead sat on this exculpatory evidence to the defendant knowingly allowing King to testify falsely about his injuries, committing conspiracy with Tom King and the Worcester D.A.’s Office.
Attorney Aloise knew exactly what King's medical records disclosed in terms of King's eye injuries. Aloise stated during trial sidebar, "well I have read this before and reviewed it now. It appears to be an appropriate certified copy of the medical records pursuant to the statute", T. R. 446-19. Aloise had possession of King's medical report well before trial. Aloise would not allow Elbery to see King's medical evidence, see affidavit # 2. Aloise also knew, as he documents, King had only "superficial eye injuries", T. R. 479-1, (closing argument not evidence). See also, the 25-b-2 motion, Ex. R-page 5, Aloise authored regarding this case which clearly states that he knew King only had a "superficial abrasion of the eye". However, Aloise allowed King to avoid any cross-examination and prevented any evidence of this issue to reach the jury. Aloise made no challenge to the prosecution's falsification of King's eye injury during trial.
The jury did not learn of King's actual minor eye injuries and treatment for those minor injuries but instead was led to believe King suffered far greater injuries as itemized in section A, above. Aloise deliberately concealing this highly exculpatory evidence, to the defendant, was committing conspiracy with the Worcester DA’s Office and Tom King. This concealment of evidence in conspiracy by Aloise allowed the jury to convict on the very serious mayhem charge and contaminated the entire trial with constitutional error making it all the more easy for the jury to convict on the two misdemeanor charges.
This is a breakdown of the adversarial process required for a fair trial; the verdict cannot be relied on. This is the definition of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 698, ‘84, 80 LEd2d 674, 692, 104 S. CT. 2052.
The Supreme Court of the U.S. held that Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364,90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed2d 368' 70. In Mullaney vs. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-698, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L Ed 2d. 508 (’75),the Supreme Court made unmistakably clear that this principle applies not only to facts which if not proved would wholly exonerated defendant, but also to those facts which mitigate the degree of criminal culpability. Com. v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583,590, 374 N.E. 2d 87,93 ’87. The concealment by Aloise of the real evidence of King’s eye injury caused a violation of both the Due Process theories, as in the above two Supreme Court cases. Elbery’s defenses of self-defense and no use of deadly force, excessive force, or specific intent were also adversely effected in violation of Due Process of the U.S. Constitution.
3. Attorney Aloise failed to present the real evidence of King's cause of injury while knowingly allowing King to testify falsely about his cause of injuries.
As itemized in section A-2 of this claim King lied about how he received his eye injuries or the cause of his eye injuries. King unchallenged during trial on this issue of cause was allowed to say Elbery thumbed him on two separate occasions to the side and almost behind the eye, T. R. 201-17, 20 and kept pushing the thumb into my eye, T.R. 202-12. This testimony with the falsified injuries misled the jury to convict Elbery of assault with intent to main via specific intent using deadly force.
The truth as to how King got injured was documented on King's medical report, Exhibit A, when the medical professionals, a doctor and a registered nurse, recorded King's interview statement as to how he got injured. King stated that he got a finger in the eye, this only minutes after the incident and independently to the nurse and doctor.
At trial the jury never knew this, Aloise had this information per the medical report, Exhibit A.
Aloise should have cross-examined King regarding these prior statements about the cause of his eye injury and then presented direct testimony via the treating medical professionals on this evidence of injury cause. Both methods would have produced substantive evidence regarding the truth of this matter, and impeachment of King's credibility. Statements made by a patient to a physician or a physician's agent for the purpose of describing the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment are hearsay exceptions of Mass. law via Massachusetts Evidentiary Standard 803-4-a and are allowed as substantive evidence, see also Rolanti v. Boston Edison Corp. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 526 (’92)(expressions made to a physician are admissible under our practice) and P.J. Liacos, Mass. Evidence 346, 5th ED. ’81(physician may testify about statements made
by declarant for purpose of diagnosis and treatment). King’s spontaneous exclamation regarding the cause of his eye injury to Hayes and the medical professionals only minutes after it occurred would also qualify as res gestae and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. Com. v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 229 (1986), Barron’s Law Dictionary 3d. Ed. P.415, (such written or oral statements are admissable as "excited utterances", declarations as to present bodily conditions and present sense emotions).
Aloise should have underscored, to the jury, that this was King's instant account of his cause of injury. Aloise should have emphasized that the medical professionals documented this immediately on their official medical/hospital report. Aloise should have pointed out that King claimed a finger in the eye was the cause of his minor eye injury and King repeated this three times to three independent people, the medical professionals and Hayes.
Aloise should have informed the jury that the doctor and nurse were the very best third party witnesses, that they were disinterested parties at the time of the recording of King's medical interview. See Com. v. Brookins 33 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 635, ’92. (similar witness not being called to testify results in reversal), Com. v. Aviles 576 31 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 246 (defense counsel ineffective for not calling independent third party witness) Com. v. Satterfield 373 Mass. 109,115, (’77), 364 N.E.2d 1260, Com. v. Licata 412 Mass. 654, 656 (’92), 591 N.E. 2d. 672, 676, (S.J.C. rules defense counsel ineffective for failure to call witnesses). This deficiency by Aloise, in this claim I-B-3, deprived Elbery of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense and better work, by producing the above evidence of the cause of King’s eye injury, would have produced something material for the defendant. Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, (’74), 315 N.E. 2d 878 (Mass. standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial).
The jury was never allowed to know that King told the treating medical professionals that he got a finger in the eye, and that was how he got his minor eye injury.
Had Aloise presented King's hospital report, Exhibit A, and real evidence (section B-2 and A-1 of this motion) of King's eye injury (a bump resulting in a red eyeball) the only evidence that would remain as to the charge of intent to maim would be King's testimonial description of the cause of his injury, by two occasions of thumbing and gouging to the side and almost behind the eye.
Had Aloise done as required of a defense attorney, presented the medical evidence via the hospital report, Exhibit A, the jury would have been informed that King per interview with R. N. Grenier and Dr. Arinella had described the cause of his eye injury entirely different than at trial. The jury would have been informed that immediately, minutes, following the incident on Shrewsbury Street King told both these medical people independently, that he got a finger in the eye, same as he told defense witness John Hayes, T. R. 918-16-19, while driving to the hospital.
Here are three federal cases where various U.S. appeals courts ruled that a defense attorney was ineffective for failure to introduce prior inconsistent statements of witnesses, Moffet v. Kolb 930 F2d. 1156, (7th Cir.’91); Nixon v. Newsome 888 F2d 112, (11th Cir. ’89); U.S. v. Tucker 716 F2d 576, (9th Cir. ’83). These all requiring new trials due to defense attorney’s errors.
King's account at trial of two thumbed gouging's almost behind his eye, unchallenged by Aloise, left the jury with no other account of events making it all the more likely for them to believe that Elbery was guilty of attempted mayhem and assault. This deficient performance by Aloise, not presenting to the jury King's original claim as to cause of his eye injury satisfies the Mass. S. J.C's test for ineffective assistance of counsel. That is, Elbery was deprived of a substantial defense due to Aloise's deficient performance and better work by Aloise would have produced something material for the defendant. Com. v. Street 388 Mass. 281, 285, (’83), 446 N.E. 2d 670, 672.
4. The prosecutor’s closing argument and Court’s jury instructions amplified the prejudice to the defendant caused by Aloise's failures/deficiencies regarding King's medical evidence and injuries.
The prosecutor argued in closing that the defendant, Elbery, used deadly force. The defendant digs his finger into King's eye and tries to put out, T. R. 1239-22. Consider the extent of force... it is deadly in the sense that deadly force which the judge will tell you about is determined by -- it is likely to cause serious bodily injury, TR 1240.
The Court gave an instruction on deadly force. I define for you deadly force as force which intended or likely to kill, or to seriously injure somebody, T. R. 1287-9.
This closing argument and instruction could only occur because of Aloise's failures surrounding the evidence of King's eye injury as described in this claim. This closing prosecutorial argument and Court’s instruction completed and amplified the prejudice to Elbery as a result of Aloise's ineffective assistance of counsel regarding King's eye injury and eliminated any defense of self-defense. In Com. v. Haggerty 400 Mass. 437, 442, 509 N.E. 2d 1163,1166 (‘87), the Mass. S. J. C. reversed on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel leaving the defendant void of any defense against the charge. Better work by Aloise might have produced something material for the defense. Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89,96 (test for ineffective assistance of counsel-Massachusetts).
C. Reasonable probability the verdict would have been different-prejudice resulting in the denial of Elbery's right to Due Process, effective assistance of counsel, compulsory process as is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 12 of the Mass. Declaration of Rights.
The evidence of attempted mayhem against Elbery was comprised entirely of King’s say-so and pointing finger, all perjury. There was contributing false evidence presented by other witnesses per footnote 1 – Exhibit J, as discussed in section A-1 of this claim. King was allowed by Aloise and the prosecutor to be witness-in-chief and sole medical expert at trial. All the evidence presented by King about the charge of attempted mayhem was a medically documented lie. The evidence given by King about his eye injury and treatment to his eye at trial would disappear with the presentation of King's medical reports, Exhibit A, and the testimonies of the treating physician and registered nurse. This if Aloise had done his job.
King's friends who testified at trial, as listed in section A-1, would not go along with any of the two occasions of thumb gouging described by King, although they acknowledged being present during all contact between Elbery and King. None of the witnesses-friends were questioned about these 2 thumb gougings by either the prosecutor or Aloise. Although they were willing to go along with many of King's falsifications i.e., the bleeding eye.
The jury would have been left, in relation to the charge of assault with intent to maim evidence of a red eyeball and a swollen eyelid medically categorized as minor and superficial had Aloise done his job.
As to the cause of injury, had Aloise done his job, the jury would have been left with King's interview statement per the medical report, Exhibit A, provided by the testimony of the medical professionals. The jury would have before them the testimony of defense witness Hayes. All three witnesses would testify as documented, that King claimed he got a finger in the eye. The jury would have had before them via cross-examination, had Aloise done his job, the impeachment of King by-way of the introduction of his prior inconsistent statement to the medical professionals claiming his injury was a result of a finger, accidentally in the eye. Also there would be the testimony of prosecution witness, and friend of King's, Traskiewicz, saying Elbery's finger went into King's eye when Elbery was on his back in the street with King on top of him, T. R. 501-6, (of course Aloise failed to pursue this conflicting prosecutorial testimony by Traskiewicz).
The jury would have to compare this evidence of cause of King’s eye injury, via documented third party medical evidence and related medical professional’s testimonies and Hayes testimony, to the discredited prosecution witness-in-chief's claim of two thumbed gouging's enlarged with all its other perjured details. In fact, with this factual claim alone, had an average lawyer advocated the defense, King would have been shamed in front of the jury, notwithstanding, that his credibility would be even worse if the jury had the opportunity to consider the facts presented in the other claims in this motion.
The jury would have understood why King's eye looked fine at trial, why there was no mention of surgery for the extensive eye injuries depicted by King. The jury would have understood, if Aloise had disclosed such, why King was in and out of the emergency room in one-hour and twenty minutes, see Exhibit A, including the time it took Dr. Arinella to arrive on call. The jury would have understood that the answer lay in the only and best defense to all King’s say-so and finger-pointing, it never happened and Tom King in conspiracy with ADA Mike Ball, the prosecution, and defense attorney Louis P. Aloise fabricated all the inculpatory evidence against Elbery.
The S. J. C. in Commonwealth vs. Stokes 374 Mass. 583, 590, stated that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime which is charged. In Mullaney vs. Wilbur 421 U.S. at 697-698, 955 S. Ct. 1881 the U.S. Supreme Court made it unmistakably clear that this principle applies not only to the facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerated the defendant, but also those facts which mitigate the degree of criminal culpability. The prosecution used the falsified facts of King's injury, treatment and cause of injury to convict Elbery. The Due Process requirement that every fact necessary to constitute a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as a result, was violated. Exposing that the prosecution's claim of injury, treatment and cause of King's eye injury was a lie would also qualify as mitigating facts as to criminal culpability, or self-defense and no deadly force or excessive force or specific intent by Elbery.
The jury would have been left, had Aloise done his job, with no evidence to convict on regarding the mayhem charge and no prosecution credibility on the two misdemeanor charges, this point would be reached without the jury even knowing about the other errors at trial contained in this motion. Prosecution witness-in-chief, Tom King, would be, to the jury, a complete liar.
None of this concealment of the prosecution's falsification of King's injury could have been accomplished without the cooperation and blatant conspiracy of defense attorney Louis P. Aloise. Had Aloise even hinted at advocating his clients cause by way of the medical evidence the prosecution would have been forced to drop the outrageous charge of assault with intent to maim or look ridiculous to the jury. The prosecution's falsification of King's eye injury insured convictions of the two misdemeanor charges (disorderly person and assault & battery) as well as the attempted mayhem charge.
The jury was misled by the false evidence surrounding King's eye injury and their verdict was not just influenced but mandated by this false evidence. This being a miscarriage of justice, see Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564, (’67)(this being the Mass. S. J. C.'s definition of a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial-if not for this error the verdict would have been different).
The errors or conspiratorial acts made by Aloise just regarding King's eye injury and related medical evidence alone have such a pervasive effect on the evidence at trial that it changes the entire evidentiary picture of the trial and case against Elbery. There was a total breakdown of the adversarial system due to Aloise's conspiracy in handling of the medical evidence (concealment). This change in evidence and breakdown of the adversarial system at trial due to Aloise's ineffective assistance of counsel and conspiracy, surrounding King’s eye injury, creates a verdict that cannot be relied on and a trial that was unfair. This fulfills the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for determining a defense attorney to be constitutionally ineffective in his assistance of counsel, the deficiency prong replete in this claim, requiring a new trial. Washington vs. Strickland 466 U.S. at 698-699.
Attorney Aloise was advocating King's best interests, ineffectiveness is presumed when counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cuyler vs. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,350, 64 LEDs 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (' 80), United States vs. Cronic 466 U. S. 648, 661, n. 28, 80 LEDs 2d 657, 669, n. 28, (' 84).
Further, Aloise failed to call the most important witnesses of the case, the doctor and nurse, violating Elbery's right to Compulsory Process, per B-1. U.S. v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F. 3d 1002, 1012-13 (C.A. 1 (Puerto Rico) 1995), Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415, 108 S.Ct. 646, 656, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).
All this resulting in the denial of Elbery's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
A. The prosecution knowingly allows and makes use of false and perjured evidence regarding King’s eye injury.
B. ADA Mike Ball produces, procures/solicits and offers false evidence regarding King’s eye injury. In conspiracy to violate and in violation of Elbery's Due Process Rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The prosecution knowingly allows and makes use of false evidence regarding King’s eye injury.
Factual claim I-A of this instant motion establishes, via third party medical documentation, that prosecution witness-in-chief Tom King and five other witnesses, all friends of King, presented false evidence regarding King’s eye injury, see footnote 1 – Exhibit J. The prosecution had possession of King’s medical report, Exhibit A, well before trial. King’s medical report clearly documents that King had minor injuries and was medically treated for minor injuries, see section A of Claim I. The prosecution, via King and his testifying friends, presented evidence that King had very serious eye injuries consistent with mayhem, see claim I-A.
The prosecution knowingly allowed false evidence to be presented to the jury regarding King’s eye injury as to extent, treatment and cause of injury. The prosecution knowingly allowed the various witnesses at trial to perjure themselves regarding King’s eye injury. Thus the prosecution, specifically, ADA Mike Ball and the Worcester DA's office was in violation of Brady and Giglio, Gilday vs. Callahan 59 F3d 257, 267 (1st Cir.’95) (U.S. Supreme Court makes it clear that knowing use by the prosecution of false evidence requires a new trial).
The Supreme Court of the United States made it clear years ago that deliberate deception of the court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with "the rudimentary demands of justice", Money v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (’35); Pyle v. Kansas 317 U.S. 213 (’42). The Mass. S. J. C. quotes the same two cases in related principles of law in Commonwealth vs. Collins 386 Mass. 1, 14, 434 N. E. 2d 964, 972 (‘ 82).
A conviction obtained through the use of false evidence known to be by the representatives of the state, must fall under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the same result obtains when the state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears, Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L ED 2d 1217, 1221; Gilday vs. Callahan 59 F3d. 257, 267 (1st Cir. ’95). Under the Due Process Clause, the prosecution’s suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of the prosecution's good or bad faith; whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the prosecutor’s responsibility, Giglio v. U.S. 405 U.S. 150, 154, 3 L ED2d 104, 109 (' 72). The prosecutor is responsible for all evidence at trial that he knew or should have known to be perjury, U.S. vs. Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 103 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L. Ed.2d 342, (' 76); Commonwealth vs.Tucceri 412 Mass. 401,405, 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1219, (' 92).
The evidence of King’s eye injury that ADA Ball failed to disclose to the jury was false, was the same evidence that Aloise per claim I-B decided to conceal from the jury. Both Ball and Aloise had possession and knowledge of the truth as to King’s eye injury, treatment and cause but Ball sat on the evidence, in conspiracy with Aloise, see Exhibit A. The omissions of a defense counsel do not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, Commonwealth vs.Tucceri 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1221.
It is hard to believe, with the unlimited resources of the government, that the prosecution does not know of far more exculpatory evidence than this defendant has uncovered. All the prosecution had to do is read R. N. Grenier’s medical report to be alerted that King wasn't even close in his testimony concerning the eye injury, treatment and cause. Officer Perma and the "team" of Worcester police officers, PC 161-14, (their
identities never disclosed except Collins and Quinn) who decided to press charges against Elbery including mayhem (not the later reduced charge of attempted mayhem) had to have some information regarding King’s real injury. Could this be more obvious conspiracy or is this how a "team" of Worcester police would reasonably act? Perma observed King at the hospital, yet he claimed to see King with a bleeding eye, TR 995-24, 996-2. King claimed he had a patch over each eye by the time Perma saw him at the hospital, TR 468-5. King’s employer, the Westborough police, must have had knowledge of his actual injuries; he took three days off from work. The Westborough police also had a demotion hearing for King as a result of his activity that night, see claim VII. Surely, some of these people, above, must have wanted details and known the truth. The false medical evidence given by King, unopposed by Aloise, was the most damaging inculpatory evidence at trial.
King with all his bleeding must have had some bloody clothes. What happened to them? He has made a federal case out of everything else with his crying isn’t it strange he didn’t produce his bloody clothes as evidence.
The investigation-Worcester PD and the Worcester County DA's Office-
When the police and Worcester District Attorney’s office knew the evidence did not correspond to the false charges against Elbery they would just stop investigating. This is true of King’s medical evidence but also many other evidentiary matters that are documented were in the hands and knowledge of the police and DA's office, see claims III through X.
ADA Mike Ball does a good job of revealing the investigation of this case at sidebar during trial.
T. R. 274-22 (Court) somebody must have been an investigating officer.
T. R. 275-9 (Ball) there is no indication that anybody actually investigated this case.
T. R. 275-21 (Court) it is almost a given there had to be an investigating officer in the case.
T. R. 274-24 (Ball) there was not... this was not the subject of the investigation. Officer Perma was a responding officer.
Other choice Ball comments-no investigation
T.R. 1002-20 (Ball) It wasn’t referred to anybody because it was pretty much and open and shut ---thing about the people.
T.R. 1004-16 (Ball) Isn’t it true that the reason it was not referred to the detective bureau was because the defendant, the witnesses , were all named and known, and there was no need to have and investigation done by or a lengthy investigation done by detectives of the Worcester Police Department who are probably investigating hundreds of other cases, correct? A. This is true.
There was an investigation by both the DA's office and the police. They had King’s medical evidence, there was a probable cause hearing, the police report Exhibit D., ADA Michael Salloum investigated per Exhibit E. Evidence was produced from all the sources that all the charges against Elbery were phony not just the charge of mayhem, taking out King’s eye, which was later reduced to assault with intent to maim (attempted mayhem), see Exhibit F. It is obvious from the facts and evidence that Ball did not want anybody to know there was an investigation because of the Brady violations, via exculpatory evidence to the defendant, that this motion shows Ball and prosecution were concealing along with Aloise. No doubt Ball also knows about 42 U.S.C. s. 1983.
Failure of the Worcester DA's office to investigate and call as witnesses the medical professionals was only due to the fact that they wanted to avoid the truth and not destroy their false case against Elbery. The Worcester DA's office targeting Elbery for years along with the Worcester Police Department and the Worcester License Commission due to his outspoken criticism of these bureaucracies was not able to convict Elbery via 12 different false criminal charges over a period of seven years. The Worcester DA's office never in the past had any problem using the most unsavory witness in their attempt to convict Elbery.
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to avoid pursuit of evidence because he believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused. Mass S. J. C. rule 3:08, P. F. 7; U.S. vs. Kelly, 543 F. Supp. 1303, 1312, (' 82 1st circuit). The government may not avoid discovery by failing to inform itself as to its case, but must seek out material from the police and investigative agencies, 22A C. J. S. p. 71, 1989.
Even without medical evidence to document the truth the Worcester DA's office should have known King was lying about his eye injury, treatment and cause. How could they not suspect something did not make sense? After all, King said he got gouged twice and as a result his eye was bleeding, cut, lacerated, and
leaking vitreous fluid, yet it was plainly written on R. N. Grenier's medical report, Exhibit A, he was only in the hospital a little over an hour resulting in a big band-aid put over one eye. There was nothing wrong with King's eye at the probable cause hearing or at trial, affidavit # 2a. There was no major medical treatment or surgery for a cut, lacerated and bleeding eyeball that was leaking vitreous fluid and was almost out of his head! The numbing and freezing treatment perjured by King was not enough for such injuries. The obvious truth was something other than what King and the prosecution were claiming about King’s eye and this was obvious from the circumstances even without the medical evidence. Knowing use by the prosecutor of perjury and falsified evidence requires a new trial and the prosecutor is responsible for all evidence he knew or should have known to be perjured or falsified. U.S. v. Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct 2392, 2397, and Com.v. Tucceri 412 Mass. 401, 405, n. 3.
Aloise’s ineffectiveness – the investigation
And of course Louise P. Aloise was deficient, again, because he did not highlight to the jury that a lack of police investigation undermines the prosecution’s evidence. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,446, 131 L Ed 2d 490, 514, (‘1995).
King's statement to the medical professionals as to the cause of his eye injury.
As is discussed in factual claim I King testified as to the cause of his injury a cause entirely different than was his instant statement to Dr. Arinella & R. N. Grenier per the medical reports, Exhibit A, and defense witness John Hayes. These narration sections written by Grenier and Arinella were the only legible and understandable sections of King's medical report. Instead of telling the jury he got a finger in the eye, as he told these medical people and Hayes, King testified that on two occasions Elbery put his thumb to the side and almost behind King’s eye, T. R. 201-20,202-12. This is more perjury by King; he knowingly misrepresented material evidence to the jury. The Mass. S. J. C. ruled in Commonwealth vs. Giles 213 N.E.2d 476, 484, 350 Mass. 102, 112, (' 66), that knowledge of the testimony being false may be inferred by the trier of fact from the circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to show that knowledge existed. In perjury cases such knowledge may be inferred from the falsity of the statement itself, at least if considered in relation to the facts relating to the defendant's opportunity to have knowledge.
Although four of King's friends testified they witnessed all contact between Elbery and King none would go along with the thumbing/gouging King describes at trial, see I-A-2. Neither Ball or Aloise at trial questioned any prosecution or defense witnesses about this alleged gouging to King’s eye. This was clear at the probable cause hearing so the Worcester DA's office got rid of the other witnesses and only allowed King to testify before the grand jury.
The prosecution is responsible for evidence that they knew or should have known was perjured, they have a duty to correct such perjury, Kyles vs. Whitley 514 U.S. 419,434 (’95), 131 L ED2d 490, 505,115 S. Ct. 1555,1565. Ball knowing what was on King's medical report, the interview sections being readable and understandable had a duty to correct King's perjury as to his cause of injury. A new trial is required id.
ADA Michael Ball made full use of the false evidence of King's eye injury, treatment and cause in order to bolster the prosecution's case against Elbery, for reasons already stated in this claim II and stated below in footnote #2. The Mass. S. J. C. held in Commonwealth vs. Collins 386, Mass. 1, 7 (’82) where the DA's choice to mislead the jury appears to have been deliberate and an attempt by the prosecution to bolster the prosecution's case artificially it warrants a new trial.
ADA Mike Ball was a major contributor, originator and innovator of fabricated evidence regarding the extent of King's injury, treatment and cause above and beyond what was falsely donated by the various trial witnesses. Mike Ball was guilty, via procurement, of the most lucid and outrageous perjury of the entire trial, see footnote #2 below. As a conductor of an orchestration of perjury he was truly prolific. Ball is guilty, as itemized below, footnote #2, of subornation of perjury and fraud on the American justice system.
The following is a partial list of instances during trial of prosecutor, Mike Ball, fabricating evidence pertaining to King’s injuries, via his opening statement, leading questions to his own witnesses, and closing argument, some transcript excerpts are followed by a brief factual and, or legal comment by this moveant/defendant.
T. R. 113-17 (0/S) King's eye is bleeding terribly.
T. R. 113-17-21 (0/S) He says the defendant reached up a second time and grabbed his eyeball again, this time his fingernail is on the other side of the same eye, and he is trying to dig out the eye.
T. R. 115-20 (0/S) and he tried to take out King's eye on two occasions.
Not even King committed perjury as bold as this. Nowhere at trial does any witness make claims of grabbing and digging out an eye or specifically trying to take out King's eye. Ball knew from the medical reports, Exhibit A, this was perjury.
T. R. 203-24 (King) A. I got a laceration on the eyeball.
T. R. 204-1 (Ball) Q. Is that a cut?
-2 (King) A. Yes.
-3 (Ball) Q. As a result of that, were you able to see as well as you had in the past?
-5 (King) A. No, sir.
-6 (Ball) Q. Are you having any problems seeing?
-7 (King) A. Yes I am having a problem with the eye.
-8 (Ball) Q. Are you still having difficulty; is that right?
-10 (King) A. Yes.
T. R. 440-15 (Ball) Q. And it shows a laceration in your eye? A. Yes.
While leading his own witness, unobjected by Aloise, Ball leads the jury to believe King's eye is cut, having permanent eye damage, and lacerated. Ball must suborn such perjury otherwise there is no case against Elbery for any of the charges, especially the assault charges. 468-5 (Ball) Q. Now there was also questions about injuries to the defendant. Both of your eyes were covered right? (King) A. (No response).
Ball through leading questions to his own witness, unobjected by Aloise, suborns the perjurious theory that King had "two patches", therefore he saw nothing because both eyes were blind. This is the "two patch conspiracy". See also TR 302-18 where King claims he had a patch put over each eye.
T. R. 469-5 (Ball) Q. Because in fact your eye was not taken out; is that right?
-7 (King) A. Yes.
-8 (Ball) Q. But it is fair to say, isn't it that it appeared as if your eye was taken out that night, didn't it?
-17 (Ball) Q. But your eye -- fortunately your eye was not taken out right?
Ball through, unobjected to, leading questions to his own witnesses communicates to the jury King's eye was almost taken out of his head. This subornation of perjury compounds the bleeding/cut eye, digging and grabbing perjury by Ball; further misleading the jury with knowingly false evidence.
T. R. 569-17 (Ball/Traskiewicz) Q. And that technique was digging his finger into King's eye, correct?
T. R. 571-7 (Ball/Traskiewicz) Q. When King came back that eye was bleeding right? A. Correct.
T. R. 821-16 (Ball/O'Connor) -- After you turned and saw Mr. King's eye was bleeding badly, you approached Mr. Elbery, correct?
More unobjected leading questions by Ball, reinforcing the digging and bleeding perjury. The witnesses knew just what lie to tell with the lead of Mike Ball.
T. R. 936-21 (Ball/Hayes) Q. You didn't know that he had just almost had his eye dug out of his head, right?
T. R. 994-9-13 (Ball/Perma) Q. Or at least charged him with mayhem was that at the time you had information that Mr. King had lost his eye; is that right? There was some talks about his eye being popped out? A. (Worcester police officer-Perma) Yes.
T. R. 1125-7 (Ball/Elbery) Q. At no point did you stick your thumb into Tommy King’s eye and try to put it out, did you?
Repeated falsification by Ball about King almost losing his eye which was especially damaging with the confirmation of the highly believable, to the jury, investigating police officer and defense witness Perma. Also here Ball employs the cross-exam technique of asking questions that he knows will be answered, by defense witnesses, in the negative and which have no factual foundation (knowingly false) and are highly prejudicial to the defense. And of course defense attorney Louis P. Aloise makes no objection to these illegal tactics of Ball’s, this being another deficiency.
T. R. 1239-22 (Ball/closing) Defendant gets one free, digs his finger into King's eye and tries to put it out.
T. R. 1240-8 (Ball/closing) Consider the extent of force... it is deadly in the sense that deadly force which the judge will tell you about is determined by -- it is likely to cause serious bodily injury.
T. R. 1242-16 (Ball/closing) This defendant tried to take out Mr. King's eye.
ADA Ball successfully utilizes the false evidence of King's eye injury and cause of injury defining it as deadly and tying his definition in with the Courts definition/instruction, destroying a defense theory of self defense further misleading the jury.
This claim II shows the prosecutor, A.D.A. Mike Ball, not only knowingly using false and perjured evidence to convict Elbery but he couples or compounds those falsifications in his closing argument blatantly misrepresenting the evidence to the jury. The S.J.C. of Massachusetts held in Com. v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 8, (’82), 434 N.E. 2d 964, 969, that this type of abuse by the prosecutor results in an inescapable conclusion and that is that the conviction can not stand.
Particularly damaging to the defense and the truth finding function of the trial was ADA Mike Ball's perpetuation of he and King’s conspiracy of perjury that King had a patch over each eye, as applied by the medical professionals, TR 468-5, TR 203-18, TR 383-21. The medical reports, Exhibit A, document that King had only one eye covered, one eye shield was applied by R. N. Grenier.
The prosecution needed "two patches" in order to claim that both King’s eyes were so obscured/blind that he could see nothing after contact with Elbery. Therefore, King could avoid answering any questions during trial as to how Elbery was hospitalized after having been beaten and taken off the street by the Worcester police, TR 381-5, 426-17, 468-5-8. At the probable cause hearing King testified he had only one eye patch, PC 17-9. At trial King repeatedly testified that he saw nothing because he was blinded as was indicated by the "two patches applied", T. R. 203-18.
Was Tom King sophisticated enough to change his testimony regarding the two patches in order to disclaim any knowledge as to how Elbery ended up face down on Shrewsbury Street or was he coached by others? He certainly did taylor (perjury) his testimony in order to accommodate this anticipated problem.
Tom King and the prosecution did everything possible to make the jury believe that King acted on his own, TR 371-19, when he chased Elbery 100 yards down Shrewsbury St., T.R. 199-1, (Q. So it was just you chasing Elbery) A. Yes, Sir. T.R. 402-5 (Q. So you are telling the jury is that it wasn’t six or seven on one?) A. That’s Correct.
Mike Ball did everything within the imagination to maintain and aggrandize the prosecution's perjurious/false theory of the incident on Shrewsbury Street and in the Winner's Circle Bar on 9-29-92. However, Ball disclosed he knew exactly what went on that night. T. R. 468-1 Q. So he (Elbery) was running from one person, yet on Shrewsbury Street he turned around to face what? Six or 7 people? Did you know those six or seven people were there? A. (King) No sir.
At trial King testified, TR 376-8-20, that Elbery was running and turning around running backwards, as Elbery described it "packed peddling", T. R. 376-14, 376-20. Ball knew why Elbery was running; it was because of the danger from the "gang of six".
Since Ball knew Elbery was chased by a bar room " gang of six" or even seven he had an obligation to correct the rest of the prosecution’s claim of events that King acted alone. At trial's length the prosecution witnesses refused to concede that Elbery was outnumbered by such odds and that he was running because of this reason. The prosecution refused to admit that Elbery was defending himself against a barroom "gang of six". This is another count of knowing use of perjury and falsification of evidence by the prosecutor, Ball. The defendant, Elbery, was further prejudiced by the Judge’s instruction to the jury of "consciousness of guilt", TR 1267-1269.
Aloise fails to highlight to the jury this evidence of a "gang of six"
Aloise failed to cross-examine on this obvious point, a gang was involved not just King, and bring it to the jury’s attention in the opening statement and closing argument- this is another deficiency by Aloise. Aloise could have brought out this evidence of a gang chasing Elbery via the inconsistencies among the various witnesses regarding the flight of Elbery and the bar emptying out, and also the discrepancies among the witnesses about the contact between Elbery and King.
The prosecutor is responsible for the knowing use of perjury and falsification of evidence and has a duty to correct such. If the prosecutor fails to correct the false evidence a new trial is required. Commonwealth vs. Tucceri, 412 Mass.401, 405, (’92), 589 N.E. 2d 1216, 1219, U.S. v. Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed. 2d. 342, (’76). This claim II, as above, is the ultimate violation of this rule of law.
As is itemized in this instant claim II ADA Mike Ball committed subornation of perjury all in conspiracy to violate Elbery's Constitutional Due Process Rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as, Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requiring a new trial. The violations in this claim II are also a violation of the 6th Amendment, as it deprived Elbery of a fair trial.
This claim II shows further deficiencies by defense attorney Louise P. Aloise, as he failed to object to the prosecutor’s continued and repeated illegal direct exam and cross-exam techniques, as above. This is another example at this trial of the breakdown of the adversarial system resulting in a trial that was unfair and verdict that cannot be relied on satisfying the definition of constitutional ineffective assistance of council requiring a new trial. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 685-688, 80 L.Ed 2d. 674,691-693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Better work by Aloise would have produced something material for the defendant, this requiring a new trial. Com. v. Street, 388 Mass. 281,285, (1983), 446 N.E. 2d 670, 672.
Attorney Louis P. Aloise fails to object making him further deficient rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. This resulting in the jury being misled requiring a new trial due to a miscarriage justice.
The Mass. Statute on medical evidence GL 231 S. 79 allows presentation of all evidence pertinent to treatment and medical history but excludes anything within the hospital report which makes reference to the question of liability.
King’s hospital report, See Exhibit A, contained two interview sections, the first labeled "chief complaint ", on Exhibit A-1, taken by R. N. Grenier and the other by Dr. Arinella, Exhibit A-2, labeled "history and subjective". Both these interview sections, per GL 231 S. 79, should have been excluded as evidence. Both of these interview sections are narrations by alleged victim-witness, King, as to his story of how his injuries occurred. See Exhibit B-3 in order to read Arinella’s report Exhibit A-2.
Narration of circumstances or the patient's story of how the injuries were suffered are strictly prohibited from being admitted into evidence. P.T. Liacos, Handbook of Mass. Evidence p. 512 (' 94); Commonwealth vs. Howard, 355 Mass. 526, 529.Inangelo v. Petterson 236 Mass. 439, 440 (' 20) explains this issue specifically; a distinction, is therefore, to be made between entries which record details or diagnosis, treatment and prognosis with mention of facts helpful to understanding of the medical or surgical case (in this case King said he got a finger in the eye per claim I-B-3), and those which narrate events or state facts connected with the patient or the occasion for his resort to the hospital, but having no reference to his treatment or medical history in the hospital.
Making these narrations of King’s via the hospital report interview sections even more prejudicial to defendant, Elbery, is that they contain information that is undisputedly false (the underlined words and sections 1 and 2 are false) as follows:
1. R.N. Grenier's-"chief complaint"-Exhibit A-1-"someone poked his fingernail through my eyeball-leaking vitreous fluid."
2. Dr. Arinella-"history subjective"-ExhibitA-2-"states someone assaulted patron. Felt blood and fluid come out of eye.
Even assuming that vitreous fluid and assault were stricken from Arinella's interview section as was directed by the judge, T. R. 450-7, the remaining narration including the false portions thereof were prejudicial to the defendant, Elbery. Per copy of this trial exhibit 18, Exhibit A-1 this motion, obtained from the Worcester Court’s file on this instant case by this moveant, these words, vitreous fluid and assault were never stricken from King’s medical report.
Admission of these interview sections corroborated King’s perjury as to his injury. The jury reasonably could have believed, especially since these interview sections were the only legible and understandable sections of the report, that this was medical fact, not King’s story. The jury being exposed to this false evidence created an injustice to the defendant, as the jury reasonably could have believed this false story by King to be highly reliable medical evidence from independent medical professionals.
King’s medical report, Exhibit A, was exhibit 18 at trial. The jury could not read or understand the hospital records relating to King’s injury. Dr. Arinella's report was absolutely illegible, both Arinella's and Grenier's reports were too technical to be understood by a layman. The jury could come to no conclusion as to King’s eye injury unless they could fully read and understand both Arinella's and Grenier's reports.
Massachusetts law excludes illegible hospital reports, admitted under GL 233 S. 79, to be admitted as evidence, Commonwealth vs. Baldwin 24 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 203, (’87); Commonwealth vs. Brattman 10 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 586, (’80); Commonwealth vs. Haraldstad 16 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 573 (’83).
Massachusetts law also excludes evidence which is very technical medical language and is unintelligible to jury, this situation per Massachusetts law requires an expert to testify to the technical medical language. Commonwealth vs. Ennis 2 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 865, ('74); Commonwealth vs. Copland 375 Mass. 438, 442, (‘78).
The only parts of Kings medical/hospital report that could be understood by the jury was the narration of circumstances, by King, leading to his injury which is also inadmissible, see section A above.
Although King’s medical reports, Exhibit A, were an evidentiary exhibit at trial and submitted to the jury the reports are void of any evidentiary value both as a matter of law or practicality. If the jury cannot read and, or understand the medical report it should not have been given to the jury as evidence. The jury must have assumed that the unreadable/unintelligible medical documentation, Exhibit A, contained exactly the same information given falsely by the prosecution, in Claim I and II, since the defense attorney, Aloise, never challenged it at any time during trial. This recorded narration interview, as a result, further enhanced and corroborated the prosecution's knowing false evidence regarding King’s injury. Louis P. Aloise should have objected to the admission to the jury of this medical report as evidence.
The trial attorney was ruled by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts to be ineffective in his assistance of counsel for his failure to object to inadmissible evidence and his inaction and apparent failure to recognize important evidentiary principles. Commonwealth vs. Frisino 21 Mass. App. 551, 555, (' 86), 488 N.E.2d 51, 55 (' 86).
See U.S. vs. Tucker 716 F. 2d 576 (' 83) where, in part, the U.S. Ninth Circuit found a defense attorney ineffective in his assistance of counsel for not objecting to documentation.
"A miscarriage of justice"
The admission of King’s medical report as evidence resulting in highlighting and corroborating, to the jury, the prosecution's knowing false account of King’s injury misled the jury to the prejudice of the defendant creating a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial, Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564(' 67).
However, it is not likely that the jury reviewed any of the trial exhibits including this Ex. 18, as they only deliberated 1 hour. The jury only deliberated for 1 hour, including pit stop and travel time, because there was only one team on the field during that unlawful trial, the prosecution.
A. The prosecution knowingly produces and allows false evidence regarding injury to Mann.
making him further ineffective in his assistance of counsel.
A. The prosecution knowingly produces and allows false evidence regarding injury to Mann.
Prosecution witnesses’ and friend’s testimonies regarding Mann’s facial cutting.
At trial six witnesses gave testimony (see footnote 3 – Exhibit K), regarding Mann's facial cutting. Tom King, prosecution witness-in-chief and his friends testified that Mann’s face was cut very badly, that her eye was cut and blood was dripping down her face between her fingers, (see footnote 3 – Exhibit K). Mann testified that she went to U. Mass. Hospital immediately after leaving the bar, and that a physician puts stitches above and below her eye as a result of her face being cut. The various witnesses claimed that Mann's injuries were caused by the defendant, Elbery, breaking a bottle, the glass flying cutting her face. Mann claimed the injury occurred after she got up from her seat and was moving away from what she thought was a fight starting, she claimed to be approximately three seats away from Elbery, T. R. 166-24, (see also footnote 3 – Exhibit K) for transcript citings regarding Mann’s fictitious facial cutting).
1. There were no criminal charges brought against Elbery for this alleged injury to Mann. Whoever causes injury to another due to a wrongful act or a willful, wanton and reckless act is guilty of battery i.e., a crime. Commonwealth vs. Hawkins 157 Mass. 551, 553, (1883), Mass Practice Volume 32 s. 322 p. 238.
2. There was no medical evidence presented to support Mann's cutting and physician stitching her face.
3. There was no facial scarring to this 18-year old girl’s face, see affidavit #3.
4. Per the police report, the Worcester Police searched all area hospitals and found that nobody had gone to any area hospital for such treatment or injuries, see Exhibit D. The police searched for this girl as a result of bartender Jeff Schlener telling the police that a girl had gotten glass in her eye, cutting her, Exhibit D.
5. The prosecutor, although making full use of this evidence against Elbery, never pointed to any scarring that should have resulted from cutting requiring stitches only nine months prior to trial.
6. Defense attorney Aloise never pointed to a lack of facial scarring to Mann during cross-examination but agreed with his client in private that Mann had no scarring, affidavit #4.
7. There was absolutely no physical or third party medical evidence to support this claim of Mann’s facial cutting; there was only finger pointing and say-so by a group of King’s friends.
8. At the probable cause hearing, PC 53-6 and 52-6, King testified he didn't know what the girl’s injuries were, (there was only an unidentified girl at the time of the probable cause hearing). Compare this to King at trial testifying as to Mann’s injury, blood coming around her hand, out her hands, through her fingers down her face, T. R. 194-7.
Other evidence that should have alerted the prosecution that Mann's injuries were at least of suspicious authenticity.
9. Tom King claimed during testimony that he found Mann after the probable cause hearing about March' 93. They just coincidentally found her after losing the probable cause hearing six months after the incident.
10. Man briefly contradicted her testimony about bloody facial cuts requiring stitching, "yes, -I said I was at the hospital. I don't know if I said U Mass., "I just called to let you know I was all right and no glass is in my eye or whatever, T. R. 174-20. "I thought I saw a little bit of blood. But another guy came over and said you know your fine and everything", T. R. 144-13. Man let the truth slip out, being a witness may have been stressful especially when you can't remember your lines, see 11 below.
11. The prosecutor should have been further suspect to Mann’s claims of injuries when she, prior to trial, told ADA Mike Ball she was leaving and did not want to testify, this at the urging of her boyfriend. The prosecutor, Ball, responded by threatening to arrest her. Police officer Tom King then took her aside for over an hour and they talked, see affidavit #5.
Mann’s in court identification of Elbery-violation of Due Process because of improper pretrial identification-The Court, Aloise and Ball look the other way-King obstructs justice, tampers with witness.
One of the more outrageous highlights of the trial came while Aloise cross-examined
prosecution witness Mann.
T. R. 159-9 (Aloise) Q. You spoke of the case?
(Mann) A. Yes (with King).
(Aloise) Q. What did you speak about the case?
(Mann) A. He just -- He showed me who the defendant was.
(Aloise) Q. He (King) pointed Mr. Elbery out to you?
(Mann) A. Yes.
(Aloise) Q. Is it fair to say that before he did that, you would not have recognized Mr. Elbery?
(Mann) A. I recognized him but I could not recall the face.
(Aloise) Q. So you really did not recognize them?
(Mann) A. No not his name. No, I didn't, no.
(Aloise) Q. He pointed him out to you and he told you who he was?
(Mann) A. Yes.
The record clearly reflects Mann could not identify Elbery until King showed her who she was to finger.
Aloise was once again deficient in his performance, in that, he should have requested a voire dire to challenge Mann’s identification of Elbery. Commonwealth vs. Scott 321 N.E.2d 682, 684, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 763, 766. Aloise was deficient for not requesting a mistrial because of Mann’s admitted perjury, she falsely identified Elbery, Commonwealth vs. McLeod 394 Mass. 727, 740. Aloise should have further pursued this perjury by Mann and witness tampering by King that Aloise tripped over during
cross-examination of Mann. Instead he avoided any further issue of this matter during Mann’s cross-examination and neglected to bring it to the jury's attention in closing. Aloise was not about to make an issue out of this with King, Aloise merely avoided any controversy on this issue during King's cross-examination.
The prosecution failed to correct this perjury, once again violating Elbery's Due Process Rights under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264, 268 3 L Ed 2d 1217, 1221, 79 S. Ct.1173 (‘59). .
The U.S. Supreme Court held that in such cases due process protects the accused against the introduction of evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications, obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures. Moore vs. Illinois 434 U.S. 220, 54 LED2d 424, 98 Sup. Ct. Rpt. 458,464.
Tom King is guilty, per this documentation, of subornation of perjury, Mass. GL C. 268 S. 2 and tampering or influencing a witness, Mass. GL 268 S. 13 B.
The prosecutor's duty to know the facts of the case and investigate.
It is a prosecutor's duty to investigate, to inquire into the facts with care and accuracy, examining the available evidence, 27 C. J. S. S. 14 (1) p. 671. A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused. U.S. vs. Kelly 543 F. Supp.1303, 1310 (' 82), (quoting the ABA Ethical Consideration 7-13); The S. J.C. Rule 3:08 P. F. 7 b.
The police knew, document, from their initial and brief investigation, see Exhibit D., that a girl did not get injured. This just as bartender Schlener reported immediately following the incident on 9-29-92, per Exhibit D. The police document per, Exhibit D., they went to all area hospitals and found no such girl with facial injuries to have been treated at any of these hospitals. Obviously, Worcester police and Worcester County DA’s office investigated this case, contrary to what Ball and officer Perma claimed at trial, T. R. 275-9, T. R. 1002-12, respectively. The result of the investigation was not good for their case and objective to convict Elbery.
The prosecution chose to ignore what was right in front of them via points 1-11 above, instead they presented false evidence on the Mann issue to the jury, see footnote #3 – Exhibit K.
Further, the Mass. S. J.C. in Commonwealth vs. Lam Hue To 461 N.E.2d 776, 779, (' 84) 391 Mass. 301, 304, held that imputed to the police is the responsibility for evidence they knew or should have known. The Supreme Court per Kyles vs. Whitley 131 L. Ed2d. 490, 508, 514 U.S. 419,115 S. Ct. 1555, ('95) held a prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s case including the police, regardless of good or bad faith. The prosecution should have known, as is made obvious in this factual claim IV that Mann and her other witness friends were lying about Mann's injuries. They had to lie in order to cover-up their criminal behavior that night, the ganging-up and beating of the defendant.
Also, Tom King was part of the prosecution team, he boasted to Elbery in the courthouse that he was being paid regular police wages to testify at trial, not as a witness citizen, but as a police officer, see affidavit #6.
Of course the police and prosecution acted as if they knew Mann and the other witness friends testified falsely at trial regarding injury to Mann. They did not bring criminal charges against Elbery. Instead of further investigating or utilizing what they knew to be the truth from their investigation the prosecution chose to allow false evidence to be presented to the jury. Knowing use by the prosecution of false evidence or its equivalents requires a new trial. U.S. vs. Giglio 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed.2d.104, 108 ('72), Commonwealth vs. Tucceri 412 Mass. 401, 405 , (' 92), 589 N.E.2d 1217, 1219,n. 3 (prosecution is responsible for evidence they knew or should have known to be false, they have a duty to correct such). This in further violation of Elbery's Due Process Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This claim IV shows the prosecutor, A.D.A. Mike Ball, not only knowingly using false and perjured evidence, surrounding Mann’s fictitious injury, to convict Elbery but he couples or compounds those falsifications in his opening statement and closing argument, TR 115-16,111-8, 1237-21, blatantly misrepresenting the evidence to the jury. The S.J.C. of Massachusetts held in Com. v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 8, (’82), 434 N.E. 2d 964, 969, that this type of abuse by the prosecutor results in an inescapable conclusion and that is that the conviction can not stand.
Use by the prosecution of this perjury-the central prosecutorial theory based on lie.
The prosecution used this alleged injury to Christina Mann to justify Tom King and friends chasing the defendant, Elbery, almost a 100 yards down the street, TR 197-17, 497-22, 755-3-10, and making a citizen’s arrest and beating him. The prosecution knew from the evidence, this claim, that the evidence about Mann's injuries was false. The prosecution chose to ignore this and instead use it for their case in chief.
The prosecution portrayed King, to the jury, as a white knight heroically, and single handedly, defending this 18-year-old female victim, whose face was mutilated by Elbery. The prosecution witnesses Traskiewicz, O'Connor, King, Schlener, and defense witnesses D. Pasquale, all friends, testified they were "holding" Elbery because of Mann's injury, TR 547-19, 502-13, 757-13, 199-24 through 200-2, but Schlener claimed at trial he called the cops because of King’s alleged injury. Why didn't Schlener call the cops about Mann's injury? Could it be that in actuality there was nothing to call about in regards to Mann or a patron? Allegedly Mann was injured first.
What were the friends going to say at trial, that they got a little carried away and jumped a guy who was by himself in trying to avoid odds of six against one? Man's injury was a cover-up, a reason they made up to justify their actions. The prosecution knowing they could not use Mann’s alleged injury as the felony justifying King’s citizen’s arrest of Elbery tried to get a felony conviction on the assault with a deadly weapon charge which they knew never happened either, see claim VI, in order to satisfy the Massachusetts law on citizen’s arrest, see claim V. But it was the girl's fictitious injury that they used to gain the sympathy of
the jury even though they knew they couldn't convict Elbery on this crime because it did not exist. Knowing use by the prosecution or its equivalents requires a new trial; the prosecution has a duty to correct all perjury. Commonwealth vs.Tucceri 412 Mass. at 405, U.S. vs. Agurs 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S. Ct. at 2397.
The jury was misled at trial by this false evidence of Mann’s injuries. This being a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564 (' 67) (mislead the jury on this material evidence the trial is unfair requiring a new trial).
More prejudice resulting from the prosecution using perjury about Mann's injuries.
The introduction by the prosecution of this false evidence regarding Mann’s injury made it all the more easy for the jury to believe that if Elbery cut Mann’s face there would be little doubt that he would assault King. The false evidence of Mann's face injuries created overwhelming sympathy for King's actions and overwhelming prejudice, via the jury, against Elbery. The jury likely would have considered the cutting off Mann's face with all the testimony about dripping blood and stitching, a far worse act than the alleged assault on King, after all there was no weapon involved in the claimed assault on King and Mann was an alleged innocent bystander and defenseless female.
Compare this set of facts with Commonwealth vs. Miranda 415 Mass. 1, 7, (' 86), 610 N.E.2d 964, 967, (' 93), where the Mass. S. J.C. decided a new trial to be in order due to the prosecution introducing highly prejudicial evidence in the form of a nolle prossed indictment. The S.J.C found that the reinstatement of the nolle prossed indictment made it all the more likely that the other indictment, the other indictment being a less serious charge, would result in a conviction.
The question the S. J. C. asked in determining reversal of Miranda on the lesser charge was, "did the introduction of the nolle prossed indictment taint the trial by making a conviction on the other charge more likely"? Although, there is no nolle prossed indictment involved in this instant case the effect of the prosecution introducing the false evidence of Mann’s injuries, a crime, to the jury tainted the trial and made it all the more likely to convict Elbery on the charges at trial. The contamination of the trial by this falsified Mann-injury evidence requires a new trial. i.d.
B. Mann's injuries and Aloise's ineffective assistance of counsel-Failure to investigate-Harboring the prosecution's false presentation of evidence-deprivation of Compulsory Process-stipulation of the prosecution's false evidence. More conspiracy by Aloise.
For reasons listed in items 1-11, above in section A, the defendant, Elbery, see affidavit #7, demanded half-way through Mann’s testimony that Aloise subpoena her medical records of this alleged facial cutting and stitching at U Mass. Aloise refused three times to the demands of his client regarding Mann's medical records. This resulted not only in deficient performance by Aloise but at the same time he denied his client Compulsory Process via documentary evidence. Compulsory Process applies to documentary evidence, as well as, witnesses. Taylor v. Illinois 484 U.S. 400, 407-408 (’88), 98 L. Ed 2d 798, 108 S.Ct. 646, 652-653; U.S. v. Levy-Cordero 67 F3d 1002 (CA 1 (Puerto Rico) 1995); U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas 30, 33 (C.C. Va 1807)(No. 14, 692d); U.S. v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed 2d 1039(1974); Brahan v. State 571 P. 2d 631, , (Alaska' 77).
For reasons stated in section A items 1-11, Aloise once again knowingly allows the prosecution to falsify its case against Elbery, as well as, the paragraph above which shows Aloise harbored the prosecution's false evidence regarding Mann's facial cutting, stitching and visit to the hospital. This is a breakdown of the adversarial process required between the prosecution and defense in order to obtain the truth and a fair trial. U.S. vs. Cronic 466 U.S. 648,659, (’84) , 80 L Ed.2d. 657, 666-668, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (breakdown of the adversarial testing is a violation of the U.S. Sixth Amendment requiring effective assistance of counsel). The U.S. Supreme Court held that a deficient performance by the defense counsel is presumed to have prejudiced the claimant where there is a complete breakdown of the adversarial testing. id.
The choice, conspiracy, not to investigate Mann’s claimed injuries and physician treatment at a hospital is another count of deficient performance by Aloise. The need to investigate this evidence should have been
obvious to Aloise even without the urging of his client. Per Strickland vs. Washington 80 L. Ed.2d. 674, 694-95, (' 84), 466 U.S. 689,690, an attorney has a duty to investigate, to advocate the cause of his client; if the attorney chooses not to investigate that decision should be based on a reasonable decision. The result of a proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process and a new trial is required Strickland 80 L Ed 2d. 698,699, 466 U.S.695-696.
In order to demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel it must be shown that counsel's conduct fell below the applicable standard for performance, defined by what the lawyer knew or should have known at the time of counsel's tactical choices. U.S. vs. Oritz 23 F3d. 21,26 (1st circuit' 94).
Prejudice to the defendant is also required to demonstrate constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel id.-The prejudice to Elbery surrounding Aloise's handling of evidence of Mann’s injuries is the same as prejudice in section A of this claim.
The conspiracy by Aloise to allow the prosecution's false evidence of injury to Mann poisoned the jury against Elbery preventing any chance that he got a fair trial or a trial whose verdict could be regarded as reliable. Aloise never challenged any witness especially Mann about these alleged injuries. He never gave any indication to the jury in his closing that there was something wrong about Mann's evidence. This in violation of the Six and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requiring Due Process, effective assistance of counsel, and the right to a fair trial. Cronic 466 U.S. at 657-659, 80 L Ed 2d. at 666-668.
Stipulation by Aloise of the prosecution's false theory regarding Mann's injury.
To make matters not just worse but ridiculous Aloise in his opening statement, T. R. 129-3, And (Mann) went off the U Mass where she was treated with butterfly stitches on her cheek below her eye, advocated the prosecution's false evidence about Mann, he presented this false evidence as fact. This is by Aloise stipulation, as fact, of the prosecution's false evidence regarding Mann. Statements made by counsel in opening statement are judicial admissions binding on the party. Mass Practice volume 19 S. 518 p. 706. An attorney should know the law otherwise he (Aloise) is deficient in his performance. U.S. vs. Natanel 938 F. 2d 302, 309 (1st circuit' 91). An attorney has a duty to advocate his client’s defense, the breakdown of the adversarial trial process requires a new trial as this situation would be a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Six and Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. vs. Cronic 466 U.S. 648, 657-659, ('84), 80 L ED 2d 657, 666,668, 104 S. Ct. 2039, Washington vs. Strickland 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. ED 2d. 674, 692(' 84). (The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result).
V. Failure of Aloise to present evidence and law regarding King’s illegal citizen’s arrest. The prosecutor knowingly allowed the jury to believe King made a legal citizen's arrest.
The prosecution's central theory in their case against Elbery was that King acted legally and justifiably in chasing Elbery 100 yards down Shrewsbury Street. The prosecution claimed King was protecting the girl who allegedly got her face cut, that Elbery had committed a felony or felonies in the bar, that King was legally entitled in his actions on Shrewsbury Street because he made a citizen's arrest.
King assaults- falsely arrests-initiates all violence
King testified he arrested Elbery, T.R. 199-8, I advised him he had hurt an individual in the bar, a young lady in the bar, and he wasn’t going anywhere until the police arrived. T.R. 199-24, I said, " you’re not going anywhere. You’re going to stay here until the Worcester Police arrive.T.R. 219-15, I told him he wasn’t going anywhere until the Worcester Police arrived.
King admitted he used force in making his illegal citizen’s arrest of Elbery, T.R. 401-6, I said I had my arms out to the side, with my arms open and facing him. TR 401-16 I knocked him to the ground. I grabbed him around the arms and knocked him to the ground.
Schlener-testifies King corrals Elbery before Elbery throws a defensive punch
The prosecution produced additional evidence that King assaulted Elbery, T.R. 594-2 (Schlener), I saw Mr. King going after Elbery with his arms out saying--.T.R. 594-6 (Schlener) Like he (King) was going to tackle him. PC 87-14 King corralled Elbery then Elbery threw a few punches that didn’t land. TR 593, 630-8 King and four friends went after Elbery immediately. TR 636 King went to grab Elbery and that’s when Elbery threw a punch. King and Elbery squared-off in the street.
O’Connor, De Pasquale, Traskiewicz-consenting combat but King pursued Elbery
TR 789-1 (O’ Connor)It was a mutual touching between Elbery and King. TR 747-16 (De Pasq) They both touched each other. TR 497-11 Tommy and him were paired off. TR 498-12 (Traskiewicz) they were squared off- they weren’t throwing any punches or anything until they got down. TR 498-20 King had his arms extended and palms out. TR 536-22 Elbery right on the sidewalk when bar emptied out after Elbery. TR 537-17 There was no chase after Elbery. TR 553-5 King was squared off with Elbery in front of Harpies, TR 552-8, after the two shimmered down the street. TR 538-19 They continued to move down Shrewsbury St. At some point Elbery and King stopped. We knew there was going to be a fight. TR 564-6 It was a barroom brawl in the street.
King further admitted he was functioning as an ordinary citizen with no privileged police powers, T.R. 386-4, (Out of jurisdiction as a police officer). TR 386-8, (No police arrest powers) That’s correct. T.R. 395-22, I was a private citizen. The judge agreed there was no cop and only a citizen – King, T.R. 218-17, his status as a police officer and state of mind is immaterial.
However, King had no right to make a citizen’s arrest, there was no felony committed by Elbery in the bar or before King chased and held/arrested Elbery. The Mass. S. J.C. held that in order to have a citizen's arrest there must be a felony conviction to justify the citizen’s arrest, this is the "in fact" test. Commonwealth vs. Claiborne 423 Mass. 275,280, Commonwealth vs. Grise 398 Mass. 247, 250, ('86), 496 N.E.2d 162, 164, Commonwealth vs. Harris 415 N.E.2d 216, 220 ('81), 11Mass. App. Ct. 165, 170. The element of citizen’s arrest, that a felony was "in fact" committed was not satisfied. There was no felony committed by Elbery, see claim IV, VI, before King and his group of friends chased and beat Elbery on the street. There was no crime committed by Elbery, period.
ADA Mike Ball and the Worcester DA's Office made full use of the legal concept of citizen's arrest in protecting off-duty officer, Tom King, legally justifying King's actions on 9-29-92. The prosecutor felt he was at liberty to waffle from one alleged felony committed by Elbery to another. Ball initially used the fictitious bottle assault as the felony Elbery committed in the bar, then Ball switched the felony justifying a citizen's arrest to Mann's fictitious face cutting.
From the transcript citings below it is clear that Ball felt free to use whatever fictitious "felony" was convenient in order to justify King’s citizen’s arrest.
TR 132-21 (Ball sidebar O/S) I will be asking for instructions on arrest powers, and I guess one of those is the right of a citizen to make an arrest on a felony when that felony has been committed.
TR 133-5 (Ball sidebar O/S) I purposefully refrained from characterizing the striking of the girl in the bar as an assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, which we all know is reckless conduct, even if it wasn't directed at her.
TR 133-15 (Ball sidebar O/S) It doesn't seem there isn't a crime for that. What was done was not a felony is what I am saying. (Referring to Mann's alleged cutting).
T. R. 133-24 (Ball sidebar O/S) It was a felony when he swung the beer bottle.
T. R. 218-6 (Ball sidebar) Even a citizen, Judge, I would suspect to you if there is an assault, in this case you heard enough of an assault dangerous weapon, that is also a felony.
TR 218 - 11 (Ball sidebar) He does have the right to make an arrest an assault dangerous weapon.
Above Ball took the position that the felony inside the bar, giving justification for King's citizen arrest was the fictitious beer bottle assault. Ball was quite clear, Mann's alleged injury was not a felony, T. R. 133-15.
However, Ball realizing that the assault with a dangerous weapon charge (beer bottle) was in trouble he changes the justifying felony inside the bar to Mann's alleged facial cutting. This was initially done by Ball during cross-examination of defense witness De Pasquale who was called out of order (why not he changed his probable cause testimony in King's favor and thus Ball was cross-examining what turned out to be a prosecution witness or "friend").
T. R. 740-3 (Ball-X) Q. The fragments of that broken bottle splintered and struck the girl in the eye; is that right? A. Yes it did.
T. R. 740 - 6 (Ball-X) Q. Do you know, sir, that is an assault dangerous weapon.
T.R. 1069-22, (Ball/sidebar) Judge, I would like an instruction an assault and battery dangerous weapon. TR 1070-22 He smashed that bottle against the pole, the injury resulted to the woman, an assault and battery dangerous weapon would lie. If this defendant did, in fact, commit that act, that is a felony committed, any citizen would have a right to arrest for that felony. I am going to ask for a citizen’s arrest instruction as well.
T.R. 1073-1 (Ball/sidebar) He had a justification. A felony was committed, and apparently the felony leaving the area, and he was acting as a citizen.
Ball at closing,
T. R. 1242-18 I'm telling you a citizen has just as much right as anybody to go after someone that is caused injury to another person like they did. (Ball admitting once again that King did not act alone).
Ball attempted to change the justifying felonies because he knew by law he needed a felony to validate King's citizen arrest, otherwise King was the criminal attacking Elbery. Ball knew the charge of assault with a deadly weapon (beer bottle) was not faring well for the prosecution. In fact, that charge was directed by the judge not guilty, see Exhibit M. They did not at trial, initially attempt to use Mann as the felony because they knew it didn't happen, see claim IV, it was just a lie fabricated by Schlener given to the cops on 9-29-92 during the instant incident and investigation in order to cover for Schlener's friends. Why not? Schlener owed his friends that much, after all, Schlener made the snowballs and King and his friends threw them.
A.D.A. Ball at closing, T.R. 1242-18 above, used the fabrication, that King had a legal justification to make a citizen’s arrest, in his closing argument. This blatant misrepresentation by Ball in his closing argument to the jury coupled with falsification at trial, that King was legally justified to pursue Elbery down the street and make a citizen’s arrest, inescapably causes need for a new trial. Com. v. Collins 386 Mass. 1, 8, (’82), 434 N.E. 2d 964, 969.
The prosecution once again violated Elbery's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights as they had a duty not to mislead the jury. Giglio v. U.S. 405 U.S. 150, 153 ('72), 31 L. E. D. 2d 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 763, Napue vs. Illinois 360 U.S. 264, 270 (‘59), 3 L. Ed.2d. 1217, 1221, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The deception by the prosecution that King was legally justified in chasing Elbery in making a citizen's arrest should have been corrected. The prosecutor should have presented the law and fact to the jury, there was no "felony" to justify King's "citizen's arrest" and King acted improperly in chasing (attacking) Elbery down Shrewsbury Street. This being necessary in order to ensure Elbery's Due Process and his right to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution under these amendments requires an impartial presentation of evidence and law.
King at the probable cause hearing, PC 62-21, the grand jury, GJ 6-20 and his "Bolton Report", T. R. 415-10, used the alleged cut face of Mann as the justifying felony for his citizen's arrest. Why did King and prosecution switch felonies at trial to the "waving"/"movement" (TR 192-23 & TR 194-22) of a broken beer bottle, to wit, assault dangerous weapon, TR 218-9.
The judge-the instructions to the jury
There were no instructions given the jury about King's citizen arrest. Little doubt, the judge was in error concerning this issue, (Judge-sidebar) T. R. 1248-12, there is no violation of law in chasing anyone down the street. (Judge-sidebar) T. R. 214-19, Does not matter if it was a felony. The judge is responsible for providing the proper jury instructions, Com. v. Gladney 34 Mass. App. Ct. 151, (’93), 607 N.E. 2d 750, 755-756. There should have been instructions on the Massachusetts law regarding the right of a citizen to make an arrest and an instruction that "in fact" no felony was committed. The judge instead gave a 3-page consciousness of guilt instruction relating to Elbery running 100 yards down Shrewsbury St. and trying to escape from the gang on the street in front of Harpies Auto Parts, TR 1267 through 1269.
King by chasing Elbery down the street was assaulting Elbery; King was attacking Elbery and that is a crime/assault. Elbery, as ADA Ball knew, was running not just from the grossly overweight King, TR-468-1-3, there was a gang of six or seven overwhelming Elbery.
As above, the absence of instructions on citizen’s arrest coupled with the judge’s big instruction highlighting Elbery’s flight down the street and attempt to escape the "gang of six" as "consciousness of guilt" misled the jury causing a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564, (' 67). This is also a denial of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment as this evidence should have been suppressed due to King’s false arrest (illegal citizen’s arrest). This rendered the trial arbitrarily and fundamentally unfair by the aggregate effect of the inadmissible evidence that took place after King’s false arrest of Elbery compounded by the Court’s instruction to use such evidence in the most prejudicial manner possible. McGuire v. Estelle ’90 CA 9 Cal 902 F 2d 749.
The "in fact" test is satisfied when the alleged felony which caused the citizen’s arrest results in a felony conviction. Com. v. Harris 11 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 170, (1981), 415 N.E. 2d 216, 220. Elbery committed no felony before King chased him 100 yards down the street and made a citizen’s arrest and as a result all the evidence, although fabricated by the prosecution, against Elbery for the alleged crimes charged against him on 9-29-92 must be SUPPRESSED. Com. v. LeBlanc 407 Mass. 70, 75, 551 N.E. 2d 906,909, (1990), 32 Mass. Practice s. 24A 1998 pocket p.8. This of course would leave no evidence of any crime except for assault and battery by King and his "friends" and tortious wrongdoing by King and his "friends" via a false arrest and assault. Harris 11 Mass. at 170.
Judge Milton Raphelson at the probable cause hearing understood the law, PC 265-8, Mr. King went to stop a person who he had no right to stop, PC 266-2,and there was no felony committed by Elbery in the bar.
Aloise-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Attorney Louis P. Aloise almost understood the law, (Aloise-sidebar) T. R. 215-1, My understanding is a citizen arrest is only if a felony is committed in the presence of a citizen. As per above, Judge Raphelson already gave Aloise the answer regarding citizen’s arrest. But Aloise did nothing in terms of informing the jury that there was no legal citizen’s arrest by King and in fact King was illegally attacking Elbery in the chase down Shrewsbury Street.
This is yet another count of professional deficiency by Aloise. Aloise should have regarding the issue of citizen’s arrest done as follows:
1. Alerted the jury there was no legal citizen’s arrest by King and King not only had no right to chase Elbery down the street but that King in doing so was committing a crime, assault. Further, the jury should have been informed that King was also guilty of assault and battery on Elbery. Aloise should have alerted the jury that King at every point of the incident was the initiator of violence, see King assaults- falsely arrests-initiates all violence, above in the second paragraph of this motion.
2. Informed the jury Elbery was being assaulted by not just King but by six or seven barroom gangsters. This could have been facilitated by Aloise pursuing the various "friends" conflicting testimonies as to what happened between the time the fight started inside the bar and Elbery ended up face down on the street with three or four "friends" on top of Elbery.
3. Asked for jury instructions on citizen's arrest and tie in the closing argument with the facts of the case and citizen’s arrest law. At trial Aloise was helping the prosecution regarding citizen's arrest, as he did exactly the opposite, T.R. 1071-1, I’m strongly opposed to either a citizen’s arrest instruction….
4. Filed criminal charges against King and his friends for chasing Elbery and beating him, (assault, assault and battery, and assault and battery dangerous weapon).
5. Motioned for a dismissal of all charges against Elbery due to King's illegal behavior and the District Attorney's Office Due Process Violation surrounding the indictments and citizen’s arrest, see claim VIII.
6. Motion to suppress all evidence resulting from the illegal citizen’s arrest by King. This would result in no evidence for the prosecution regarding criminal charges against Elbery for the incident on Shrewsbury Street on 9-29-92. Com. v. LeBlanc 407 Mass. 70, 75,551 N.E. 2d 906, 909 (1990), 32 Mass. Practice s. 24A 1998 pocket p. 8. Please note well, as provided in this motion, that all the prosecution’s evidence was a fabrication to begin with.
The law was on Elbery’s side, by not allowing the jury to know the law regarding citizen’s arrest Elbery lost a defense, and had Aloise done as an average lawyer would have and presented the facts and law of citizen arrest surrounding this instant case something better would have resulted for the defendant. Aloise's deficiency regarding citizen's arrest law also prejudiced Elbery's claim of self-defense, hence another loss of defense all requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, (' 74).
If Aloise did his job the jury would have viewed King as an illegal aggressor and this would have totally changed the evidentiary picture of the trial with a reasonable probability resulting that the verdict would have been different, and a new trial is required. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 695-696, 80 L ED 2d 674,698-699 (’84), 104 S. Ct.2052.
The law in Massachusetts is all evidence must be suppressed that results from an illegal citizen’s arrest, Leblanc Com. v. LeBlanc 407 Mass. 70, 75,551 N.E. 2d 906, 909. Since King had no right to make a citizen’s arrest of Elbery all the evidence against Elbery at trial, although the evidence was fabricated, must be suppressed, id. As a result, there is a reasonable probability, because all the evidence would have been suppressed due to the illegal citizen’s arrest, that if not for Aloise’s deficiencies, as in this claim V surrounding citizen’s arrest, there would have been produced a not guilty verdict. This satisfies the standard for Constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requiring a new trial. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 695-696, 80 L ED 2d 674,698-699 (’84), 104 S. Ct.2052.
A. Prior to the Probable Cause Hearing-ADA Michael Salloum confirms there was no bottle assault.
B. The probable cause hearing-testimonies confirm there was no bottle assault.
C. Grand jury-the Worcester DA’s office sponsors King to lie regarding the alleged bottle assault-Aloise does nothing.
D. Trial-the prosecution knowingly uses King's false testimony and Aloise cooperates/conspires regarding the alleged bottle assault.
Attorney Aloise informed this moveant/defendant prior to the originally scheduled probable cause hearing of 12-3-92 that ADA Michael Salloum, then handling this case at the Worcester District Court, told Aloise that both the alleged victim-witness, King, and original complainant, Schlener, admitted that Elbery never assaulted anyone with a bottle, that he never used a bottle as a weapon i.e., the incident never happened-Schlener, the bartender, told another lie, see affidavit #8.
Not so strangely, ADA Salloum was taken off this case before it went to the probable cause hearing on 1-20-93, before Judge Milton Raphelson. But not before he sent a letter to Aloise documenting prior oral confirmations, see Exhibit E. Per this letter the charge of assault with a deadly weapon was not being considered. This letter was dated 11-30-92, prior to the probable cause. The probable cause hearing was originally scheduled for 12-3-92.
Aloise makes it clear via his questions at the probable cause hearing that Salloum confirmed there was no assault on 9-29-92 with a beer bottle by Elbery, as below.
As per Aloise cross-examination of King, PC 76-15, And do you recall telling Mr. Salloum that in fact in your opinion he did not, Mr. Elbery did not, waive the beer bottle at you to the point where you felt you were assaulted?
PC 76-19 He -- as I testified to, Mr. Elbery waving the beer bottle in everybody's direction so --
PC 76-22 Q. Right. But to you recall Mr. Salloum because he had just had a conversation with me, being concerned about the particular issue and asking you perhaps out of your presence Mr. Schlener, whether or not Mr. Elbery had assaulted you with the beer bottle and you indicated to Salloum the answer was no?
PC 77-5 A. Well, with the distance there is no way he could have got me with the beer bottle.
As per Aloise cross-examining Schlener at the PC hearing,
PC 137-18 Q. But in effect later on, you did tell ADA Salloum that it did not happen?
PC 137-21 A. Right I did tell Salloum that it was more general right?
At trial, via cross-examination of King, Aloise confirms all the more Salloum's admission, prior to trial, that there was no assault with a beer bottle,
T. R. 342-22 Q. And did you recall on that prior time before the actual hearing took place that you told the prosecutor assigned to the case that you were not assaulted by the beer bottle? (Objection sustained).
And likewise cross-examine of Schlener,
T. R. 647-17 Q. Did you tell -- do you recall telling Salloum, ADA Salloum, that it was more general, that it was not specifically directed at you?
T. R. 647-21 A. Yes, I did say that.
T. R. 648-10 Q. And do you recall when you were asked that on December 3rd 1992 by ADA Salloum, you told him King was not assaulted by Mr. Elbery with that beer bottle am I right?
T. R. 648-20 Q. And just as you have done now, you admitted then that you told Officer Perma something that wasn't so, and you corrected it with Mr. Salloum sometime before the probable cause hearing just as you have done now, right? A. Yes.
And again at PC closing, Aloise confirms that he was told by A.D.A. Salloum that the defendant’s admitted Elbery did not assault anyone with a broken beer bottle, PC 249-5, There was no indication it was specifically directed as an assault and Mr. King told the ADA that when he had the first opportunity to do so.
The Worcester District Attorney's office was put on notice during the probable cause hearing of this instant case that Elbery did not assaulted anyone with a broken beer bottle, the incident was fabrication by Schlener, the bartender, to the police on 9-29-92 in order to cover-up for his group of friends, see Exhibit D. -police report.
King at the PC hearing admits no assault.
Initially at the probable cause hearing during direct examination King testifies that Elbery made gestures with the broken bottle at Jeff Schlener, the bartender, that he "waived" it all around, however, King would not say that Elbery made even a "movement" or "waving" at him, see footnote #4, PC 9-5 through 9-17, - Exhibit L.
King during direct examination then revealed the following,
PC 21-16 Q. Sir were you placed in fear by the beer bottle that Mr. Elbery had in his hand?
A. The distance between us, no. He had thrown it down.
During cross-examination King finally admitted that Elbery did not use a bottle to assault anyone, he went right out the door.
PC 53-11 Q. Now after Mr. Elbery either broke the bottle on the side of the bar or on the pole he stood up from his seat, his stool and left via the front door? A. Yes, sir.
PC 54-1 Q. Well he already was up from his seat after smashing the bottle and he immediately went out the door didn't he? A. (King) Yes, sir.
King was allowed to waffle his testimony but the admission was documented, "he had thrown it down," "he immediately went out the door", "stood up and left via the front door." Judge Raphelson could understand English, PC 76-2 I thought he (King) said he never saw it? I thought he said he never saw it? When Raphelson was referring to the alleged bottle assault.
Schlener at the PC hearing-admits no assault.
Schlener, prosecution witness and the initiator of most of the prosecution's false case against Elbery, took an abrupt change in story during his probable cause testimony as compared to what he told police that instant report on 9-29-92, Exhibit D. Instead of saying Elbery assaulted him with a bottle, Schlener casually testifies it was a random breaking of the bottle, it was pointed at nobody, P.C. 112-3, that Elbery went right of the door after he looked at everybody, P.C. 112-9. By testifying as such Schlener admits, unwittingly, that he lied to the police on 9-29-92 about Elbery assaulting Schlener and the other patrons with a broken beer bottle. (See footnote #4 - Schlener's PC testimony – Exhibit L).
Jeff Schlener, bartender, initiated this lie as he did about King almost losing his eye, and Chris Mann having glass in her eye causing her to be cut, see Exhibit D. Per the police report, Exhibit D., Schlener told police "Elbery broke a beer bottle on the bar and "waived it" at him and the other patrons in a threatening and menacing gesture. Schlener made up these lies in order to cover-up what really happened and in order to protect his friends and incriminate Elbery, after all at the probable cause hearing Schlener admitted starting the entire incident, see claim X.
The two other witnesses and friends, Sawyer and De Pasquale also testified at the PC there was no bottle assault, see footnote #4 – Ex. L.
The Worcester District Attorney's Office was not stopped by the foregoing, documented evidence that at a minimum there was no assault with a beer bottle/deadly weapon by Elbery. Not discouraged and determined to get their conviction they went right ahead and indicted Elbery on this charge, as well as, three other indictments, see claim VIII for grand jury claim.
The Worcester DA’s office indicted Elbery on 3-20-93 on the single testimony of Tom King, excluding the other four witnesses who testified at the probable cause hearing. This avoidance of the other witnesses, at least in part, was due to the probable cause hearing finding of no probable cause on all charges, except disorderly person. These witnesses, all friends of King’s, donated all exculpatory evidence to Elbery at the probable cause hearing. For his presentation before the grand jury King made up a brand-new story regarding the bottle assault, "Elbery made jabbing motions at Jeff and then me and the other patrons", G. J. 6-4.
This grand jury testimony is totally in conflict with King's probable cause testimony and what he had previously told ADA Salloum. King committed perjury before the grand jury, he lied to the grand jury. To
find perjury it must be demonstrated that inconsistent declarations are irreconcilable such that one of the statements is necessarily false. U.S. v. Flowers 813 F. 2d 1320,1324 (U.S. 4th circuit' 87). Where it is shown that contradictory statements made under oath material to the same point in two separate proceedings, it is presumed that he did not believe both statements. 70 C. J. S. Perjury S. 40 p. 287.
To obtain this indictment the Worcester DA’s office not only encouraged King to lie but they sponsored King to lie to the grand jury. The Worcester DAs office was fully apprised there was no bottle assault by Elbery. The Mass. S. J. C. found in, Commonwealth v. Mayfield 500 N.E.2d 774, 778, 398 Mass. 615, 620, (‘86), if the Commonwealth or one of its agents knowingly uses false testimony to procure an indictment, the indictment should be dismissed and the prosecutor who learns of the use of knowingly false, material evidence, has a duty to come forward. Further, this was procurement of perjury by ADA's Paul Bolton, Todd Mathieson, and Michael Salloum in conspiracy to deprive Elbery of his constitutional Due Process Right under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Aloise fails to dismiss the indictment knowingly does nothing.
After being indicted, defendant Elbery, affidavit #9, inquired of his trusted defense counsel how it was possible to be indicted after ADA Salloum and all the probable cause witnesses said there was no such event as an assault by Elbery with a broken beer bottle.
Attorney Aloise replied he would file a "McCarthy motion" and get the beer bottle assault dismissed. At trial Aloise was an agreement once again that the bottle incident should be dismissed as he states at trial sidebar, T. R. 650-16, the grand jury was unfairly presented with evidence regarding the alleged assault with a beer bottle. The judge responds, T. R. 650-18, true, but that would have been a motion to dismiss under whatever ground. Aloise agrees, T. R. 650-22, probably, yeah.
Attorney Aloise after repeated urging by his client, affidavit #9, never made any attempt to motion for dismissal of this grand jury indictment. As a result of this deliberate omission by Aloise, he is once again deficient in his performance as a defense counsel. The prejudice from this count of deficiency resulted in the trial being infected with an illegal indictment, thus contaminating the jury with evidence of false charges. Aloise was, as a result, ineffective in his assistance of counsel satisfying the two-pronged test, deficiency and prejudice. Commonwealth v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89,96 (' 74), Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 LED 2d 674, 693 (' 84) (prejudice satisfied when counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial). This claim VI once again shows a total breakdown of the adversarial testing process at trial, due to Aloise’s deficiencies (conspiracy with the prosecution), causing a trial that is unfair and verdict that cannot be relied on id. Had Aloise done as an average attorney for the defense better work would have produced something material for the defendant, Elbery, as there would have been no evidence of this bottle assault to contaminate the jury with constitutional error. This fulfills the Massachusetts standard set in Saferian requiring a new trial. Saferian 366 Mass. at 96.
1. The prosecution.
At trial the chief prosecution witness, police officer Thomas King, being further encouraged to lie by the Worcester DA’s office, shamefully testified, T. R. 194-21-24, Elbery held off the entire bar for 30 seconds not only making jabbing threatening gestures at Schlener and he but at all the other patrons. This is an enlargement of King's perjury to the grand jury.
The prosecutor, Mike Ball, who demonstrated at trial he was extremely versed with the probable cause hearing transcript, the grand jury minutes, had a duty under the U.S. Constitution and Mass. Declaration of Rights to correct this King perjury. The prosecutor had a duty not to knowingly use false evidence against Elbery in order to convict him. This instance of unabashed effrontery to the American judicial heritage and the U.S. Constitution and everything the American justice system is supposed to represent requires a new trial, without considering any other instances in this motion of Brady violations and other violations of the Constitution/Due Process.
This claim VI shows the prosecutor, A.D.A. Mike Ball, not only knowingly using false and perjured evidence, surrounding the fictitious bottle assault, to convict Elbery but he couples or compounds those falsifications in his opening statement, TR 111-8-22, TR 115-16, blatantly misrepresenting the evidence to the jury. The S.J.C. of Massachusetts held in Com. v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 8, (’82), 434 N.E. 2d 964, 969, that this type of abuse by the prosecutor results in an inescapable conclusion and that is that the conviction can not stand.
Per U.S. vs. Bagley 473 U.S. 667, 678-80, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-83, 87 LED 2d. 481 (' 85), if the prosecution knowingly fails to disclose that testimony used to convict a defendant was false, the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury verdict. Per Commonwealth v. Giles 350 Mass. 102, 112, 213 N.E.2d 476, 484, (' 66) the Mass. S. J. C. stated, knowledge of perjury may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, which reasonably tends to show that knowledge existed.
It is noteworthy that perjury is plain from comparisons of King's testimonies under oath but also not one other witness at trial or probable cause hearing would say Elbery used a bottle as a weapon. Conspicuous by its absence, ADA Ball would not even ask some prosecution witnesses if they saw a bottle assault or even a "movement" or "waving", that would be witnesses O'Connor and Christine Mann. Only Traskiewicz said Elbery held the bottle, but in a defensive position as he exited the bar, T. R. 497-2. Schlener, at trial, denied ever telling officer Perma there was a bottle assault, T. R. 645-10, 624-8-20. Per, T. R. 648-14, Schlener admitted he lied to Perma, He knew, evidently, from his observations of the proceedings there would be no penalty for such perjury to the prosecution's witnesses.
But all the jury heard was the testimony of the man they knew as a police officer, Tom King, testify Elbery acted like mad man for 30 seconds trying to stab everyone in the bar.
a. Regarding the alleged beer bottle assault Aloise was professionally deficient at trial as follows:
1. He failed to call as a witness ADA Michael Salloum, who would have per Aloise's own documented comments, per section A of this claim VI, confirmed King was lying, there was no bottle assault and King said so. This should have been further corroborated by Salloum's letter of 11-30-92, Exhibit E., which documents Salloum was dropping the false charge of assault with a beer bottle, none of this was done by Aloise.
2. As always Aloise would not object to Ball's repeated leading questions of his prosecution witnesses regarding the bottle assault. This was done in order that Ball could direct the perjury, see footnote #4-*items – Ex. L.
3. He allowed the false bottle assault indictments, already discussed in section C., to be presented to the jury.
4. Aloise failed to disclose to the jury the evidence/ testimony admitted by King at the probable cause hearing that there was no bottle assault. Probable cause hearing testimony is substantive evidence and allowed for its full probative value. Commonwealth v. Forte 597 N.E.2d 1056,1058-1059, (' 92), 33 Mass. App. Ct. 181. See sections A. and section B. for King's admissions of no bottle assault by Elbery.
5. Aloise failed to challenge King during cross-examination at trial about King's newly fabricated testimony of Elbery holding off, menacing the entire bar for 30 seconds.
6. Aloise never pursued the conflicts of the various witnesses "all friends" of King’s who would not testify that there was such an incident as a bottle assault by Elbery. Aloise failed to highlight or bring this to the jury's attention during his questioning at trial or his closing argument.
Aloise, during trial, asked King only one question regarding his probable cause testimony where King admitted the bottle assault never happened. TR 309-3, Q. Isn't it a fact, sir, that you indicated at the probable cause hearing, that in fact Mr. Elbery after the bottle was smashed threw the bottle down on the floor? A. (King) Before he ran out the door, yes, sir.
This masquerade of defense cross-examination by Aloise did nothing but, to the jury, further corroborate King's claim of a bottle assault. Aloise allowed King to change his probable cause testimony, via TR 309-7, regarding the bottle assault with impunity.
Exclusion of cross-examination regarding King's prior admission to ADA Salloum-
that there was no bottle assault by Elbery.
However, after badgering by his client, affidavit #10, Aloise was forced during re-cross-examination of King to ask the pertinent question, T. R. 342-22, and did you recall on that prior time before the actual hearing took place that you told the prosecutor assigned to the case that you were not assaulted by the beer bottle?
ADA Mike Ball objected to this question, TR 343-2, his intent inside of the bar was not going to come into play, what King thought had occurred. Two assault is a legal term.
The judge sustained Ball's objection, T.R. 345-12, whether he (King) himself thought it was an assault is immaterial.
Neither of Ball's grounds were reasons for sustaining his objection. This objection was a manipulation of Ball and company to keep King and the prosecution from being embarrassed by King's lies and to keep the jury from hearing evidence that King had admitted, under oath, there was no such incident as a bottle assault by Elbery. This evidence would have damaged King’s credibility immensely if handled by defense counsel Aloise correctly.
Ball had anticipated this question per TR 342-22 during trial sidebar about citizen’s arrest, T. R. 216-13 through T. R. 217 - 12, where out of the clear blue Ball exclaims, if you want to stipulate that his (King's) intent was -- that intent is not an issue in this case -- what he had in his mind.
The question, per T. R. 342-22, Aloise was forced to ask by his client, see affidavit #10, simply related to the fact established before the probable close hearing, as a result of King's admissions to Salloum, that there was no such incident as Elbery assaulting anyone with a bottle.
Aloise helps the prosecution exclude the question.
Of course the exclusion of this valuable defense cross-examination was unopposed by Aloise. Instead Aloise agrees with the prosecution's manipulation of question TR 342-22 and provides input to the prosecution's theory during sidebar, T. R. 343-348, that Tom King told ADA Salloum he wasn't assaulted because he (King) wasn't put in fear. Aloise advocating the opposition’s (judge and prosecutor) position that the assault incident occurred. What would you expect? Aloise was a former prosecutor himself in Worcester and blindly supports the police. This behavior/activity of Aloise is another count of deficient performance and unequivocal breakdown of the adversarial testing required for a fair trial and verdict that can be relied on. Strickland 466 U.S. at 687.
Law-exclusion of cross-examination.
This exclusion of cross-examination by the judge is a violation of Elbery's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as, Article 12 of the Mass. Declaration of Rights. The defendant is guaranteed the right to confront witnesses against him. Implicit within this guarantee and a very heart of it is the right to cross-examination. Davis vs. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 LED 2d. 347 (' 74), Commonwealth V. Miles 648 N.E.2d 719, 723 (' 95), 420 Mass. 67, 71.
If this question had been allowed by an average defense attorney, or this pro se litigant, it could have demonstrated King was a liar. Of course, if King did not truthfully respond the attorney would have to present evidence in cross-examination, the probable cause transcripts, that in fact King did admit saying this to Salloum, there was no bottle assault. An average lawyer if allowed to ask just this one question per T. R. 342-22 could demonstrate that King was willing to lie about evidence as outrageous and prejudicial to the defense as Elbery menacing the whole bar with a broken beer bottle for 30 seconds. An average lawyer with this one question on cross-examination could have destroyed King's credibility showing that he was willing to frame the defendant. The exclusion of this cross-examination requires a new trial. Delaware vs. Van Arsdall 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (' 86), 475 U.S. 673, 684 (the correct inquiry regarding confrontation clause errors is whether assuming the damaging potential of cross-examination were fully realized a reviewing court would say it was nonetheless harmless).
As itemized in this section D. of claim VI Aloise was deficient in his defense attorney performance due to his incompetence, insufficiency, inattention, and conspiracy. Commonwealth vs. Saferian 366 Mass. 89,96 (' 74) (satisfying the S. J.C's definition of deficiency). An average lawyer could have destroyed King's credibility by using, at trial the evidence in sections A, B, C, prior inconsistent statements made under oath and all substantive evidence surrounding the alleged bottle assault, and calling ADA Salloum as a witness and presenting Exhibit E.
Instead, Aloise aided the prosecution, helping them eliminate evidence and challenging King on absolutely nothing while knowing King was lying about the bottle assault. Aloise's performance fell below the constitutional norm as a result of not exercising enough skill and knowledge to make the trial an adversarial testing process. Scarpa v. DuBois 38 F. 3d 1 (1st circuit' 94).
No similar case found for an attorney conspiring with the prosecution for the purpose and objective of imprisoning his own client. But the above deficiencies satisfy both Strickland and Saferian, as the prejudice is overwhelming. Attorney Aloise was advocating King's and the prosecution’s best interests, ineffectiveness is presumed when counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cuyler vs. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,350, 64 LEDs 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (' 80), United States vs. Cronic 466 U. S. 648, 661, n. 28, 80 LEDs 2d 657, 669, n. 28, (' 84).
b. Prejudice resulting from Aloise's deficient trial performance-regarding the alleged bottle assault.
Regardless of the directed verdict on this charge, Aloise by allowing King to testify that Elbery held off the entire bar for 30 seconds with a broken beer bottle while knowing there was no such incident created the most damaging and prejudicial evidence of the entire trial against the defense. The jury was left with the image of Elbery trying to stab everyone with a broken beer bottle. The jury was simply told, T. R. 1274-5, (Court) don't draw any inferences from the fact the indictment is no longer in front of you.
Ignore this false indictment/charge at trial the jury could not, after all, the Mass. Court of Appeals per their opinion on the direct appeal of this instant case found that the jury could have found for a half a minute Elbery menaced other people with a broken bottle. Elbery v. Com. of Mass. 38 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 912, (‘95).
With all this prejudicial false evidence presented about the bottle assault the jury had to find it much easier to convict on the other charges. After all there was no weapon involved with the other charges against Elbery. A new trial is required because the false evidence of the fictitious bottle attack tainted (contaminated and poisoned) the entire trial and made it more likely to convict on the other charges, Commonwealth vs. Miranda 415 Mass. 1, 4, (' 86) (new trial required if illegal charge made conviction more likely on the other charges).
Aloise's deficient performance and conspiracy surrounding the bottle assault caused a significant change in the evidentiary picture to the detriment of the defense, there was a breakdown of the adversarial process requiring a new trial because the trial, as a result, was unfair and its verdict is unreliable. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668,695-696, (' 84), 80 LED 2d. 674, 698-699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, U.S. vs. Cronic 466 U.S. 468,659, 80 LED 2d. 657,668,(' 84), 104 S. Ct. 2039.
The jury was misled at trial by this false evidence of the bottle assault. This being a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564 (' 67) (mislead the jury on material evidence the trial is unfair requiring a new trial).
VII. Defense attorney Louis P. Aloise fails to present evidence that King had an interest in the outcome of the trial, that he had a motive to lie. Aloise and ADA Ball knowingly allow King to lie about his demotion as a result of the incident on 9-29-92 and drinking on duty prior to the incident. Aloise fails to produce subpoenaed evidence from the Westborough P. D. regarding King's demotion.
Witness-in-chief and alleged victim, Thomas King, was demoted to patrolman from his previous position/status of detective as a result of his misconduct at the Winner's Circle Bar on 9-29-92. King's demotion took place after the probable cause hearing of 1-20-93 of this instant case and the related, adverse to King, publicity in the Worcester T&G, see Exhibit G. This information was given to defense counsel Aloise by ADA Mike Ball prior to trial. Aloise did not apprise his client, Elbery, of this information until after his conviction on 7-2-93, affidavit #11.
Furthermore, Aloise, months prior to trial told his client, Elbery, that he heard rumors King had been demoted due for his misconduct on 9-29-92, whereupon, Elbery called the Westborough P. D. and was told King was only a patrolman and not a detective, affidavit #12. King was punished for his bad behavior.
Aloise and ADA Ball allow King to lie about his demotion.
At trial Aloise asked King if he was demoted in rank at the Westborough police department as a result of the incident on 9-29-92, T. R. 220-19, where you were at the time this –(sic) - in the same status you were at the time of the incident in September of 1992? A. (King) Yes sir.
Aloise knowing King had been demoted failed to challenge King on this evidence and apprise the jury of the truth, but rather sat on this evidence of King's demotion allowing King to lie.
ADA Mike Ball had a duty to correct King's perjury regarding his job status/demotion. Mike Ball had a duty to inform the jury that King had been demoted, he did nothing but allow King to lie. Com. vs. Tucceri 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1219, 412 Mass. 401, 404, (' 93), Giglio v. United States 405 U.S. 150, 153, 31 LED 2d. 104, 108. When the "reliability of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence" nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule, id. Ball was also in violation of S. J. C. Rule 3:08 P. F. 12 which says the prosecutor must promptly withdraw false evidence upon its discovery. New trial is required, Giglio 405 U.S. at 153.
ADA Ball stipulates King drinking on duty-Aloise and Ball allow King to lie about his drinking on duty.
ADA Mike Ball stipulated at trial sidebar in the confidence of the judge and defense attorney Aloise, T. R. 452-12, the reason he (King) didn't do that (ID himself as a cop) is because he was drinking on duty. Statements made during sidebar are stipulations of fact and judicial admissions binding on the party. Mass. Practice Volume 19 S. 517, p. 706. Ball via this stipulation also reveals part of the reason King was demoted.
Aloise asked King the right question at trial, T. R. 408-20, were you drinking on duty that night, sir? A. (King) no, sir. Yet Aloise armed with this information donated by Ball, at sidebar, did nothing for the defense of his client, instead he allowed King to lie.
ADA Ball having a duty to correct perjured testimony did nothing, but instead allowed King to lie about not drinking on duty prior to the incident on Shrewsbury Street, on 9-29-92. Commonwealth vs. Tucceri 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (' 92), 412 Mass. 401, 404 (new trial required "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury). United States vs. Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 103, (' 76), 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 LED 2d. 342. King got off duty at 11:00 p.m. but arrived at the Winner’s Circle Bar at about 10:30 p.m. after he left U. Mass., T.R. 237. King left U. Mass. after picking up a rape evidence kit at 10:30 p.m., T.R. 237 – see exhibit 4 at trial, and went directly to the Winner’s Circle Bar, TR 231. Although the rape evidence kit, trial exhibit 4, documented King was done at U. Mass. at 10:30 Aloise allowed King to contradict this evidence and escape further cross-examination. Aloise allowed King to say he left U. Mass. after 12:00 a.m., T.R. 238-13, T.R. 188-9. But also see claim XIII –Nurse Berry.
The incident occurred at about 2:00 a. m. Therefore, King had been drinking in that bar over 3 hours before the incident.
Aloise failed to reveal subpoenaed documents from the Westborough P. D. containing information about King's demotion.
At trial sidebar Aloise reveals, T. R. 235-20, I subpoenaed records (plural) from the Westborough police department.
However, at trial Aloise submitted one document into evidence from the Westborough police department, the fax cover sheet, Ex. 4 at trial. Per conversation with Aloise he told Elbery on about 9-96 that he has no subpoena or subpoenaed documentation on file from the Westborough police regarding this case, affidavit #13. This pro se litigant is still trying to obtain the original subpoena sent by Aloise to the Westborough P. D. in' 92-' 93. This is a continued act of conspiracy by Aloise to conceal the truth about King's demotion.
Prejudice resulting from Aloise's deficiencies regarding King's demotion and drinking on duty and resultant motivation to lie an interest in the outcome of the trial.
As a result of defense attorney Aloise's failure to allow the jury to know King was demoted, due to his misconduct on 9-29-92, including King's drinking at the Winner’s Circle Bar while he was on duty, the jury was not informed that King had an interest in the outcome of the trial. The jury was not allowed to know King had a motive to lie and was biased beyond that of a bar room/street combatant.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives the criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with witnesses against him". The Supreme Court has held that this right includes an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. The purpose of protecting the right to cross-examine is to afford the defendant an opportunity to impeach the credibility of a witness and to explore the witnesses’ motives and biases. U.S. vs. Berrio-Londono 946 F. 2d 158 (1st circuit' 91). The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis vs. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 316-317, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (' 74), Delaware v. Van Arsdall 475 U.S. 673,680, (' 86), 89 LED 2d. 674, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435. One of the principal purposes of cross-examination is the inquiry looking toward impeachment of the witness on any of the several grounds of bias, hostility, or an interest. Mass Practice volume 19, ch. 10, S. 187 p. 201.
Had Aloise done his job he would have informed the jury that the Westboro Police Department found King guilty of misconduct during the barroom incident of 9-29-92. Had Aloise done his job for the defense he would have disclosed to the jury that King's demotion came after Elbery's exoneration at the probable cause hearing of 1-20-93 and the related adverse to King publicity, Exhibit G. Aloise should have pointed out that King sought a conviction against Elbery in order to cover up his wrongdoing. Aloise should have disclosed to the jury that if Elbery was found guilty by a jury then King's misconduct in the bar would be reversed, or at least mitigated. Aloise should have, as a result, disclosed that King had a motive to lie needing to shed guilt from himself.
Had Aloise defended his client the jury would have learned that not only had King been drinking on duty prior to 11:00 p.m. on 9-28-92 but that King was drinking for a minimum of three hours prior to the incident on Shrewsbury Street. Had Aloise done his job the jury would have learned that King's claim, T. R. 188-15, that he drank "almost two whole drinks" and that he was sober, was more King lies. The jury would have learned that the prosecution's claim at trial’s length that King was not intoxicated during the incident was also a big lie. The jury would have learned that King entered the bar prior to 11: 00 p.m., while on duty, on 9-28-92 not 12:30 a.m. on 9-29-92, see T. R. 237.
If not for Aloise's deficiencies itemized in this claim VII surrounding King's demotion/drinking the jury would have learned King was once again lying and covering up critical evidence to the defense. The jury would have learned, had Aloise done his job, that King was not the heroic cop who was, T. R. 231-4 & 277-20 & 285-21, "briefly" in the bar just say "hello", (244-5), to friends, but was a drunk involved in the barroom gang fight.
Instead of protecting King, Aloise should have pointed out to the jury the reason King did not identify himself as a police officer during the incident on 9-29-92, see T. R. 395-19-23 & 396 1-13, is he did not want Elbery to know he was a cop because King was drinking on duty prior to 11: 00 p.m., TR 452-12. Further, King was hiding his identity as a cop because he was intoxicated and wrongfully involved in a barroom gang beating of Elbery. King did not want to get in trouble with the Westborough Police Department by disclosing he was a cop.
Had Aloise done as required of the defense attorney regarding King's demotion, and drinking on duty and wrongful conduct via a gang fight, Aloise would have made it clear to the jury that King had an interest in the outcome of the trial, a bias, and a motivation to lie. Had Aloise done as required of a defense attorney regarding these issues King's credibility would be zero without considering any other claims in this motion.
The judge's instructions compounding the prejudice.
The prejudice to Elbery, due to Aloise's deficiencies surrounding King's demotion were further compounded by the judge’s instructions on bias, motive to lie, and interest in the outcome of the trial. The judge instructed, T. R. 1261-6, you may also consider the motive for testifying. Whether or not the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case. These are all things that go into the mix for you to determine credibility, TR 1262-6. The fact that a witness has an interest in the outcome of the case, doesn't mean that the witness isn't trying to tell the truth... but the witness interest in the case or the outcome of the case is a factor that you may consider along with all the other factors.
Due to Aloise's deficiencies and Ball’s violation of law regarding King's demotion due to his misconduct in the bar on 9-29-92 the jury had no idea what the witness-in-chief’s motives for testifying were, what his bias was, that King had a very big interest in the outcome of the trial. The jury only knew Elbery was the defendant and that he was the only one with an interest in the outcome of the trial. These instructions led the jury to believe Elbery was lying.
The judge's instructions, law of the case, make it plain Elbery had a right to have King's bias, motive to lie, and interest in the outcome of the trial disclosed.
The jury was misled by the judge's instructions due to Aloise's and Ball's "errors" and conspiracy in concealing King's demotion for misconduct and related interest in the outcome of the trial and motive to lie from the jury. This being a miscarriage of justice as defined by the Mass. S. J.C. requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556,564, (' 67) (jury misled material evidentiary issue new trial required). But do not forget that the judge knew King was drinking on duty, see TR 452-12, where at sidebar Ball told the Judge this.
The prosecutor argued in closing, TR 1230-21, that Elbery should not be believed-that he lied to the jury. That compounded the effect the prosecution’s concealment of King’s motive for testifying/lying had on the jury. Further, compounding this concealment of King’s motive for lying was the Judge’s instruction on motive for testifying, TR 1261-1262.TR 452-12, The judge knew, at a minimum, King was drinking. This is a violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Albright (1980 App) 98 Wis 2d. 663, 298 N.W. 2d, 26 ALR 4th 1100.
Aloise Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The evidence at trial would be radically altered, King's credibility zero, had the information in this claim regarding King been disclosed to the jury. The adversarial requirement of a defense counsel was not satisfied, resulting in a verdict which could not be relied on, therefore causing the trial to be unfair. If not for the deficiencies of the defense counsel surrounding King's demotion/drinking on duty and related motive to lie/interest in the outcome of the trial, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different making Aloise constitutionally ineffective in his assistance of counsel and depriving Elbery of due process in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U. S. 668,687, 80 LED2d. 674,693 (' 84).
Attorney Aloise was advocating King's best interests, ineffectiveness is presumed when counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cuyler vs. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,350, 64 LEDs 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (' 80), United States vs. Cronic 466 U. S. 648, 661, n. 28, 80 LEDs 2d 657, 669, n. 28, (' 84).
VIII. The Worcester DA's office sponsors police officer King to lie before the grand jury-the Worcester DA's office further impairs the grand jury process-attorney Aloise knowingly approves and participates failing to motion for dismissal.
A. The Worcester DA's Office sponsors King to lie before the grand jury.
The S. J. C. Mass. held that if the Commonwealth or one of its agents knowingly uses false testimony to procure an indictment, the indictment should be dismissed, and a prosecutor who learns of the use of the knowingly false material evidence has a duty to come forward. See Commonwealth vs. Salman 387 Mass. 160, 166-67, 439 N.E.2d 245 (' 82); Commonwealth vs. Mayfield 398 Mass. 615, 620, 500 N.E.2d 774,778, (1986).
The Worcester DA's office sponsored Westborough police officer Thomas King to lie to the grand jury in order to gain indictments against Elbery on 3-20-93, categorized as follows:
1. King testified falsely about the extent and type of his eye injuries and as to how the injuries occurred, this as is itemized in claim I of this instant motion, as King's testimony at trial and the grand jury were substantially the same regarding this issue.
2. At the probable cause hearing King testified that he was not assaulted by Elbery with a beer bottle just as he told ADA Salloum prior to the probable cause hearing. Before the grand jury King went ahead and boldly said he was assaulted with a bottle by Elbery, see claim VI of this motion, as the perjury committed by King at trial was substantially the same as before the grand jury regarding the alleged bottle assault.
3. At the probable cause hearing King said he did not know what the girls injuries were, PC- 52-6. Yet, two months later at the grand jury, King testified a girl's face had been cut so badly that blood was coming out from under her hand as she covered her face, G. J.- 5-25. For the reasons stated in claim IV - of this motion, Mann’s alleged injuries, King committed perjury, as his trial and grand jury testimony were substantially the same regarding this factual issue.
The Worcester DA's office having full knowledge of the above perjury and falsification of evidence by King before the grand jury, via the probable cause hearing, had a legal duty and obligation to come forward and tell the truth in order to have the indictments dismissed. See Commonwealth vs. Mayfield infra. Since the Worcester DA's office chose to sponsor King to lie and encouraged King to lie, they violated this defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution via procedural and substantive due process violations.
The S. J. C. held that the grand jury should be told of known exculpatory evidence that would greatly undermine the credibility of important witness. Commonwealth vs. Mayfield 398 Mass. 615, 621, 500 N.E.2d 774,778 (' 86). The Worcester DA's office had a duty to tell the grand jury that officer King had been demoted from his job at the Westborough police department as a result of his drinking on duty and other wrongdoing at the Winner's Circle Bar on 9-29-92. The Worcester DA's office knowingly kept hidden this important evidence that would have effected King's credibility before the grand jury as he had a motive to lie and an interest in seeing Elbery convicted in order to exonerate himself. See claim VII of this motion which explains the demotion of Thomas King.
The DA's office also had a duty to disclose to the grand jury that King was an obese 300 pound heart patient with a pacemaker at the date of the incident on 9-29-92. King had a heart surgery on 2-28-93 just before the indictments, T. R. - 252-21(King at sidebar). This would have been important to credibility because King claimed he acted alone while chasing Elbery 100 yards down Shrewsbury Street. King boasted to the grand jury that he subdued Elbery by "sweeping Elbery's feet from under him" and "knocking" him to the ground, G. J. - 7-14,15. This would be quite a trick as King documented to the Westborough police, Exhibit H., Elbery was 6' 2"-225 pounds and muscular. King was so impressed with Elbery he described Elbery's complexion as muscular, see Exhibit H-the Bolton report.
The Worcester DA's office being fully apprised of the probable cause hearing evidence exculpatory to Elbery decided to hide this exculpatory evidence. At the probable cause hearing there were four witnesses that testified besides King, all four donated almost entirely exculpatory evidence towards Elbery including bartender- Jeff Schlener, who was the prosecution witness.
This was not a problem, the Worcester DA's office only allowed the demoted Westborough police officer, Tom King, to testify before the grand jury and with a newly tailored testimony the product of much behind the scenes coaching.
Had the Worcester DA's office allowed the other four probable cause hearing witnesses to testify, as justice requires, their exculpatory testimonies to Elbery are summarized from the probable cause hearing as follows:
Schlener (bartender), De Pasquale (doorman), Dr. Stephen Sawyer (customer).
1. Schlener admitted he was at fault for insulting Elbery and apologized in open court, PC-81-23; 106-7; 111-7.
2. All said King stuck his nose into Elbery's and Schlener’s low-key argument and confronted Elbery who was seated on the other side of the horseshoe bar at the Winner’s Circle. (De Pasquale) PC-187-19; 189-1; 191-7; 200-18-22; (Schlener) PC 110-13; (Swayer) PC 228-8; 230-10-13.
3. King had to be re-strained by the other patrons, in particular former Winner's Circle doorman De Pasquale, who grabbed King around the waste. Schlener had to yell at King to mind his own business, (Schlener) PC 107-1-24; 82-15; (DePasquale) PC 194-13-20.
5. They admitted most of the bar emptied out after Elbery, who immediately left the bar after the bottle broke, (a minimum of five men). PC 113-1-4; 114-19 thru 118; 199-6-9; 234-23.
6. Schlener admitted no police were called because of the girl’s "injury", PC 113-1-24.
7. The fight was on the street, all said this, PC 122-15-23; 146-20; 199-21.
8. Schlener said King corralled Elbery then Elbery through a couple of punches that didn't land, PC 87-14.
9. De Pasquale strangely volunteered, without being asked, he saw no punches thrown, PC 203-5.
10. De Pasquale and Schlener saw only wrestling between King and Elbery that lasted a few seconds resulting with Elbery lying in the street and King withdrawing with an eye "injury", PC 127-7;204-3-7;204-20;207-8.
11. There were three-four men on top of Elbery holding him down, PC 146-16;205-9;212-18;236-1;147-13.
12. There was no testimony corroborating King’s story telling Elbery he wasn't going anywhere because a "girl" was injured, nor any confirming King’s story of two thumb gougings, once while King was bear-hugging Elbery and once while on top of Elbery after King had "knocked" Elbery to the ground. See King’s perjury, claim I. There was no corroboration of King sweeping Elbery’s feet from under him, as he testified to the Grand Jury, GJ 7-14.
13. PC- 120-3 & 114-1&2, Schlener testified that he exited the bar two minutes after Elbery fled the bar and that the gang was just catching up to King and Elbery, who were 75 yards down the street. Schlener further said he was able to see Elbery throw that first punch, P.C. 87-19. De Pasquale testified he left the bar five minutes after Elbery and the gang exited the bar in order to see the whole incident between King and Elbery, PC- 202-7.
A rational and alert grand jury would have found this time sequence to be doubtful as Elbery and the chasing gang, including King, would have run the 75 yards distance in much less than two minutes (closer to 10 seconds) let alone five minutes.
King at the probable cause hearing and trial described no delay in the chase. P.C. 56-5, TR 402-14.
Both Sawyer and Schlener testified Sawyer exited the bar before Schlener and Sawyer further testified that the chase and fight had been concluded by the time he got outside the bar, PC 118-16;239-19-22;240-3. De Pasquale also testified Schlener was still in the bar after he, De Pasquale, exited the bar 5 minutes after Elbery.
The grand jury if given this information could reasonably have concluded Schlener was helping his friend King by saying he witnessed Elbery throwing the "first punch". The grand jury could have reasonably concluded De Pasquale was concealing he was involved in the gang beating of Elbery. Since, Sawyer, PC 239-2, testifies DePasquale was one of the ones who went out immediately after Elbery.
Perma-Investigating Worcester Police Officer.
1. The Worcester Police Dept. found no girl at area hospitals, PC 154-17 thru 155-1, who fit the description given by Schlener per the police report of having a cut face and eye, See Exhibit D. He asked Schlener and company to come forward with information as to the identity of this "injured" girl, nobody did, PC 154-5-16.
2. Elbery was arrested on the street for disorderly person as a result of making noise while struggling under the force of several men, PC 162-23;159-7.
3. A "team" of Worcester police decided to charge Elbery with mayhem (not attempted mayhem) a 20 year prison sentence for taking out King's eyeball, PC 161-14.
The Mass. S.J.C. specifically held in Commonwealth vs. Mayfield 500 N.E.2d. 774,778, 398 Mass. 615, 621, and Commonwealth vs. O’Dell 392 Mass. 445, 448-449, 466 N.E.2d 828 (' 84) that failure to disclose known information may impair the grand jury proceedings and that intentional nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence favorable to the defendant impairs the grand jury proceedings and requires a dismissal of the indictments.
The prosecution had a duty to inform the grand jury of facts and law surrounding the case before them. Commonwealth vs. Mayfield 500 N.E.2d 774,778, 398 Mass. 615, 621. The defendant was denied Due Process of Law to a fair and impartial presentation of evidence before the grand jury through the prosecutor’s failure to instruct grand jury on Massachusetts law regarding the right of a citizen to make an arrest. Crimmins vs. Sup. Ct. Marcopa C.Y. 668 P2d. 882, 885-886 (' 83 Az.); State v. Ball 632 A. 2d 1222, 1246-1247 (Super Ct. N.J. Appellate Division ’93).
Without instruction on the law of citizen’s arrest the grand jury could not make a determination of the facts within the law. They could have thought that King was acting with the powers of a police officer as he identified himself as such before the grand jury. The grand jury should have been alerted that the law says King had no right to pursue Elbery unless a felony had been committed prior to King's action. The grand jury should have been informed there was no felony committed in the bar to justify King chasing Elbery down the street let alone assaulting Elbery. Commonwealth vs. Grise 496 N.E.2d 162,164, 398 Mass. 247, 250 ('86) (no felony committed unless "in fact" a felony was committed via a conviction)(all evidence from an illegal citizen’s arrest is suppressed).
This prosecutorial due process violation and impairment/sabotaging of the grand jury process regarding citizen’s arrest is further compounded with King's perjury presented to the grand jury as the grand jury was falsely led to believe Officer King was acting heroically, legally, and in defense of the innocent girl and public.
The misconduct by the Worcester DA's office surrounding the grand jury process as itemized in this motion claim requires a dismissal of all the indictments, as the grand jury was misled (lied to) and there has been an injustice. The sole purpose for this prosecutorial wrongdoing regarding the grand jury process was to gain indictments falsely against Elbery. The grand jury would have been left with no probable cause to indict Elbery, there would be nothing to present to the grand jury, had it not been for the perjury of King and impairment by the Worcester DA's office of the grand jury proceedings, Commonwealth vs. Mayfield 500 N.E.2d 774,778, 398 Mass. 615, 621 (Standard and test in Mass. For dismissal of indictment). All the indictments against Elbery should have been dismissed.
Due Process Violated by Worcester DA's Office.
Elbery's right to Due Process as is guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was violated due to the prosecutorial misconduct surrounding the grand jury process itemized in this motion claim VIII. Due Process of Law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to a person charged with a crime is complied with when he is regularly indicted by proper grand jury. Ker v. Illinois (1886) 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. ED2d 421, 7 S. Ct. 225. Due Process of Law means law in the regular course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and with general rules for protection of the individual rights. Hurtado vs. People of California 4 S. Ct. 111,110 U.S. 516, 28 LEDs 2d 232.
Attorney Aloise-the grand jury-ineffective assistance of counsel
Once again, Attorney Aloise was deficient in his performance. At a minimum, Aloise should have motioned to dismiss all the indictments against his client as a result of the outrageous irregularities surrounding the indictments against his client.
However, even with the urging of his client to do something about what was obviously wrong, see affidavit #14 & 14a, Aloise did nothing. Aloise was well aware that his client's rights were voided before the grand jury. The probable cause testimonies, King's hospital report, King's demotion, Judge Raphelson alerting Aloise to the law of the case regarding citizen's arrest, PC- 265-8-9; 266 1-4, were all documented and in Aloise's possession before the trial.
The prejudice is obvious; Elbery had to face false indictments. Elbery was faced with a stack of false accusations; to defend any charge was impossible due to the prejudice brought by the remaining false charges.
The test to determine ineffective assistance of counsel requires deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the defendant so that if not for the defense counsel's errors there would be a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. at 694-696. If the grand jury indictments had been dismissed it can be safely said there would have been a different verdict, thus the prejudice prong is satisfied.
Attorney Aloise was advocating King's best interests, ineffectiveness is presumed when counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cuyler vs. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,350, 64 LEDs 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (' 80), United States vs. Cronic 466 U. S. 648, 661, n. 28, 80 LEDs 2d 657, 669, n. 28, (' 84).
According to the S. J. C.'s rule 3:12 Canon 4E Clerk-Magistrate should disqualify himself from serving in an adjudicative capacity in a proceeding in which The Clerk-Magistrate's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. As defined by the S. J. C., a Clerk-magistrate is broadly defined to mean a position of clerk, register, recorder, etc., see S. J. C. rule 3: 12 Canon 1.
At the trial of this instant case, every day of trial, there was a clerk present in the courtroom named John O'Connor. His position was covered as defined above. His son was a prosecution witness, Dennis O'Connor. Dennis O'Connor also was a participant in the beating of the defendant, Michael Elbery, T. R. 756-22; 757-13. As many testimonies of this instant case would indicate Dennis O'Connor was a member of the " gang of six" who chased and beat Elbery on the street. Dennis O'Connor testified that he used physical force against Elbery, T. R. -756-22; 757-13.
Combined with the fact that there was no legal right for O'Connor and his gang to chase and beat Elbery (a crime) with the fact that Elbery claimed he was beaten by a gang on the street, O'Connor being a member of that gang, Clerk John O'Connor had a bias in the outcome of the proceedings against Elbery. Clerk and father, John O'Connor, was not impartial.
As per law directed by the S. J. C. John O'Connor had no business being present at Elbery’s trial.
Elbery had a right to an impartial trial void of clerk John O'Connor's biased influence over the Judge and proceedings. O'Connor had an obvious bias toward his son who could have been prosecuted and found guilty of assault and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, as Elbery testified at trial that O'Connor was one of the gang of seven that attacked Elbery on the street resulting in his hospitalization, T.R.- 1115-15.
Had all the evidence and truth of this case been presented, as the law requires, Dennis O'Connor would have been the object of both criminal and civil actions.
The presence of clerk, John O'Connor, was an additional injustice that the Court inflicted upon Michael Elbery at trial. Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a trial be impartial and O’ Connor’s presence during Elbery’s trial violated that Constitutional Right, Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S. 57, 61, 34 L. Ed 2d. 267, 93 S. Ct. 80, 83-84. See aff. #25.
Aloise-further ineffective in his assistance of counsel
Prior to trial defense attorney Louis P. Aloise informed his client, Elbery, that John O'Connor was the father of one of his assailants or Dennis O'Connor, see affidavit #15. Elbery protested instinctively knowing this should not be in an American courtroom and demanded John O'Connor be removed/replaced as courtroom clerk. Attorney Aloise stated "there was nothing that could be done and clerk O'Connor must remain" see affidavit #15.
Attorney Aloise should have had O'Connor removed, instead, he knowingly allowed an approved of clerk John O'Connor being present during the entire trial causing the trial to be biased. This deficiency by Aloise caused prejudice to his client Elbery, as a verdict from a bias trial is not reliable, is untrustworthy, and there is a reasonable probability had the trial not been biased the verdict may have been different. This deficiency by Aloise in this claim IX resulted in a trial that was not fair. This is the definition of constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland vs. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 684, & 694-696, 80 L. Ed 2d 674, 691, & 698-699 104 S. Ct.2052.
There were numerous very large and unaccounted for inconsistencies between the probable cause hearing testimonies of this case and the testimonies by the same witnesses, at trial. The failure of Aloise to make known to the jury the existence of these prior inconsistent statements by the witnesses who appeared at both the probable cause hearing and trial resulted in more ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of Aloise, see aff. #24. Probable cause hearing testimony is substantive evidence and allowed for its full probative value as well as impeachment of witness credibility. Commonwealth vs. Forte 33 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 185-186, 597 N.E. 1056, 1058-1059 (' 92).
Further, the prosecution had a duty to correct all perjury during trial amongst these witnesses, as the prosecution not only knew what was said at the probable cause hearing and had a transcript of the probable cause hearing, ADA Mike Ball refers to the transcript frequently at trial. These anticipated discrepancies cause Ball alarm at sidebar, T. R. 222-224. U.S. vs. Giglio 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. ED 2d 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 763 (’72)(the prosecution has a duty to correct perjury known to them). Failure by ADA Mike Ball to obey the law relating to these prior inconsistent statements, perjury, of the witnesses requires a new trial id.
Cited below are major areas of prior inconsistent statements resulting between the probable cause hearing testimony and trial testimony of this case that was not brought to the attention of the jury by Aloise or the prosecution.
Had a lawyer of average ability presented these prior inconsistent statements to the jury they could have reasonably found that the witnesses were guilty of tailoring and accommodating their testimony for King’s benefit, as well, they could have found that these witnesses were coached to testify in King’s favor, therefore, indicating a conspiracy to perjure, suborn perjury and to maliciously prosecute Elbery.
Further, a reasonable jury would have found the prosecution witnesses, King and Schlener, and 2 "friends" of King’s (De Pasquale and Officer Perma), that were used by Aloise as defense witnesses against Elbery, had no credibility at all and where big liars.
1. Description of argument in the bar,
direct exam-probable cause hearing
PC 80-15. A. Well, when Michael arrived at the Winner's Circle, he walked in and he said to me, he goes, he said, "what are you doing working here tonight? And I said: "it's Monday night, I work Monday nights, and he said, "no, you don't, you never work Monday's", and I said, "what are you doing, are you telling me my schedule now?" "I work Monday's. I always work Monday's."
So that was that, and then from there, something transpired and I said something to him, something negative. I told him I thought he was opinionated, OK, and then from there we started arguing back and forth and --
PC 81-22 Q. And were you also yelling?
A. No, not particularly, I was making -- I made a couple of statements that I probably shouldn't have. I made a couple of negative statements and he made a couple more back to me, and then we started arguing.
PC 82-11. At that point Michael was very loud, and Tommy King was on the other side of the bar, and he walked over to Michael and started telling him to calm down layoff me, wherein I said to Tom, I said "Tom, this is an argument between he and I which it was and I thought that between us we could solve our argument and things would get better, OK?
PC 82-20. As it was, Tom went back to his seat.
PC 105-8 Q. And your conversation with Mr. Elbery was between you and he alone?
PC 104-10 Q. Did he have any conversation with anyone else?
A. I don't think so.
PC 105-19 A. I made a couple of wise cracks to him; he made a couple back to me.
PC 107-6. No, I actually asked -- if you remember, I asked Tom King to sit down. I said: it's between he and I, and we can solve it.
PC 107-18. "Go back, Tom, it's between us."
PC 111-1 Q. So when King turned around and came back and sat down, did you have any conversation with Mr. Elbery?
A. No, I walked away. And I can't remember exactly what happened, but I thought we had calmed it down. You know, I think I -- I hopefully said I was sorry, I don't know if I did or not.
Clearly prosecution witness Schlener, who was the bartender and King’s friend, tells some of the truth at the probable cause hearing. He portrays a situation in which he was the initiator of the argument that involved only he and Elbery, nobody else involved. Elbery, per Schlener, had no conversation with anyone else. King was the aggressor and was told by Schlener to sit down and keep out of it. Schlener apologizes at the probable cause hearing for his insulting Elbery needlessly in public. Aloise should have pointed out to the jury that Schlener never asked Elbery to leave the bar – why would he, Schlener was having to good of a time insulting Elbery.
However, Schlener paints a whole new picture at trial about the same bar argument, tailoring his testimony to accommodate King and the prosecution's fabrication.
T. R. 582-21 He was talking to somebody I don't remember, somebody was over in the vicinity, he (Elbery) was acting up a little bit. So I walked up to him and said something I should not have said to him.
TR 583-3. I told him he was very opinionated.
T. R. 583-11. As a result he got very mad. He said, "you don't know anything about this business, your nobody, your this and that. I can buy and sell you."
T. R. 585-3. Well he got really mad and he was kind of steaming at me. And that's when King I guess became aware of the situation.
T. R. 585-10. Then he (King) got out of his chair, came within 3' or so and said, "hey buddy we don't need any of this anymore. Watch it, why don't you just leave.
T. R. 585-17 Q. At some point did you move between King and defendant? A. No.
T. R. 586-9-13. I didn't want a fight and it looked like Elbery was calming down. I said, " Tom, it looks like we are all set. Why don't you slid over."
T. R. 586-15. King went back to his seat.
T. R. 612-16-21 Q. "Some barbs exchanged but nothing requiring you to get protection?"
A. well, at that point he became menacing.
-24. Physically large man semi out of his seat kind of leaning in.
T. R. 616-13 Q. Okay. At some point did you say anything to Mr. King to attempt to dissuade him from having a confrontation with Mr. Elbery? A. no, I didn't.
T. R. 616-20 Q. Did you say to King "go back Tom, it's between us"?
A. That is what I said last hearing. Can I say what I really felt.
T. R. 617-13 Q. Did you say that at the probable cause?
A. Yes, I did.
T. R. 617-14 Q. So that then, which is closer in time to the incident and presumably when your memory would have been better than it is now, you said to the judge on that occasion, that you told King to quote, "go back, Tom, it's between us" am I right?
A. Yes I did. It's not what I'm meant to say.
At trial Schlener has Elbery causing trouble with someone else in the bar prior to Schlener being involved. He changes his testimony to include Elbery being very mad and steaming, acting in a threatening, menacing manner. Schlener, at trial, taylors his testimony to King's favor in order to make King look like a peacemaker rather than an aggressor getting involved in harmless "barbs" that were none of King's business.
Aloise missed all this with the exception of T. R. 616-20, when he asked Schlener if he had told King "go back Tom it's between us". Schlener responded, T. R. 617-17, that is not what I'm meant to say. Whereupon, Aloise allowed Schlener to act like he made an honest mistake at the probable cause hearing, resulting in no impeachment of Schlener or substantive evidence or benefit to the defense.
This deficient handling of prior inconsistent statements between the probable cause hearing and trial, as described in this section A-1 above, allowed the prosecution to change the bar argument scenario to one where Elbery became the initiator, aggressor, bothering at least one other patron before Schlener even got involved, a big uncontrollable, steaming, threatening man. This was not only prejudicial to Elbery in terms of the jury's evaluation of him but it allowed the jury to believe Tom King was needed to protect the public like a white knight, from Elbery.
2. Schlener’s testimonies regarding Elbery exiting the bar,
Probable Cause Hearing-Direct Exam
PC 85-4. He (Elbery) went out the door and went something like this. (Schlener indicating with hands).
PC 85-7 Q. Now, when you say "something like this," you're curling your two hands with your fingers?
A. Right, some kind of movement like come after me.
T. R. 590-8-13. He still had the beer bottle in his hands going like this (indicating) went out the door, backwards.
T. R. 669-18 Q. Come and get me with a broken bottle and he was just backing up as he was waving the hand around, correct?
-21. A. Yes.
Schlener changes his testimony of the probable cause hearing from Elbery curling his two hands, i.e., making them empty hands, to a trial testimony of Elbery backing out the door with a broken bottle waving it around in a menacing gesture. Aloise failed to bring this to the jury's attention. The prosecution portrayed, via fabricated evidence, Elbery as a madman assaulting everyone with a broken bottle. And once again Ball is leading his own witness with fabricated evidence and Aloise does not object.
Probable Cause Cross-exam
PC 113-8. Somebody yelled, "call the police". I unfortunately waited.
T. R. 588-14. I went to the back of the bar to go around, Tom King yelled, "call the police".
-18. He called "call the police".
T. R. 590-20. Next thing went around bar. King told me to call the police, I didn't.
T. R. 626-11. Are you absolutely certain Mr. King shouted or yelled or said call the police, are you absolutely certain of that?
-14. Yes, I am.
Schlener for the benefit of Tom King alters his testimony at trial to include Tom King as that "somebody" who yelled, "call the police". By testifying this way Schlener puts King in the position of a do-gooder and a person always conscious of the rightful procedure and authority before taking any action.
Schlener did not want to testify as he did at the probable cause hearing about this incident because the jury would see King as one eager to assault and get involved in the gang beating of Elbery. Schlener did not call the police because nobody got injured in the bar and the gang was beating Elbery in the street.
Note, King testified at the probable cause hearing, P.C. 54-19-23, he went right out after Elbery. There was no mention by King that he called for police, but see section C this claim.
4. Schlener’s testimonies regarding his exiting the bar in time for him to observe Elbery throw that "first punch" at King, and Aloise aiding the prosecution’s perjury via leading questions and summation of the prosecution’s falsified theory of the case.
PC 87-4 Q. Now you, yourself, went outside to the doorway? A. Yes, after I checked on the girl.
PC 113-23 Q. How long do you wait before anything else happens that you were involved with?
A. About two minutes maybe, at the most.
PC 114-2 Q. And during that time is when you determine that the young lady who was injured actually did not have glass in her eye? A. Right. (Schlener here admits Mann is not injured).
PC 114-10 Q. And after that two minutes, did you go outside? A. yes.
PC 118-11 A. What happened after that is we ended up going out to the doorway to the Winner's Circle.
PC 118-14 Q. now, you said, "we ended up". Beside yourself, did anyone else look out?
A. Well I think Sawyer was there at the time and whoever --
PC 120-8 Q. so now at some point after that short period of time goes by, you and I think you said Sawyer, went out onto -- outside the entrance onto Shrewsbury Street, to look to see what was -- what if anything was going on?
PC 124-5 Q. You gestured that King had his arms outstretched?
A. Like this.
Q. Like he is going to grab, right?
PC 125-15 A. Well, he threw a couple of punches.
Q. Elbery did?
A. And then they locked and they went down and the other guys were around them and I couldn't see them, you know.
PC pages 127-128. Wyne tells Schlener to call police; Schlener does 3-4 minutes after the incident started inside the bar.
At the PC Schlener is clear that he waited two minutes, after checking a girl, before exiting the bar to make observations of Elbery and King 50-100 yards down Shrewsbury Street. He is clear that Sawyer was already in the doorway. Schlener says, per the PC, it was at this point in time he saw Elbery throw a couple of punches. Next, Wyne tells Schlener, with Sawyer present, to call the police because King's eye is out and Schlener says it is 3-4 minutes after the incident started inside the bar that Schlener calls the police.
At trial Schlener, knowing his time frame was a problem and that Sawyer's testimony at the probable cause hearing, PC 239-19-21, was that Schlener exited the bar last, proved Schlener to be lying, changes his story about exiting the bar and seeing Elbery allegedly hit King first.
T. R. 591-2. Then I ran around the bar and I checked on the girl.
T. R. 593-18 Q. After you initially observed the girl where did you do go?
-20A. I went out the front entrance.
-24A. I look down the street.
T. R. 594-2 A. I saw Mr. King going after Elbery with his arms out saying...
-10 A. He (Elbery) through a punch.
-12 A. I was too far away to really see what happened. After they tangled.
T. R. 628-24 A. The whole thing was probably a minute, minute and a half maybe, before going out to observe the confrontation.
T. R. 629-11 A. He (Sawyer) stayed with Chris, and at some point he was in the hallway, out in the street with me.
-16 Q. Sawyer went out of the bar after you?
A. (King) Right.
T. R. 656-9 Q. Now do you recall that when you went outside of the bar after everybody filed out, and Elbery had left, do you recall going out with Sawyer?
-19 A. Basically I went out independently of myself. Sawyer happened to be the person next to me who I was --
T. R. 657-1 Q. But I am asking you whether or not as a matter of fact what happened was that you both went out at the same time after obviously both determining that Chris was not seriously hurt?
-5 A. Right.
T.R. 657-6 Q. And you said so at the probable cause hearing, did you not, that you went out together, right?
-9 A. (Nodding)
T. R. 658-5 A. Right that was after I called the police. Is that what we are talking about?
-7 Q. (Aloise) No I am talking about the time you first went out.
-9 A. Sawyer was with the girl, and then after the phone call the second time, that is when Sawyer was --
-12 Q. (Aloise sorting out Schlener story) So you are saying that Sawyer went out one time and you went out twice, and it was a second time that you went out, you went out either with or shortly after Sawyer?
-16 A. Right.
-17 Q. (Aloise) Am I right?
-18 A. Right.
The above comparison shows a blatant case of perjury on Schlener’s part, with the help of Aloise, all so Schlener could more comfortably and convincingly lie about Elbery "throwing the first punch".
The most potent perjury/fraud on the court or procurement of perjury is by Aloise, T. R. 658-12, when Schlener gets caught in his own lies regarding his exiting the bar. Aloise simply ignores all that was testified to at the PC hearing and invents a new perjured story in order that Schlener doesn't get caught in front of the jury lying. Schlener per, T. R. 658-16 & 18, had no choice but to accept Aloise's version of events, not even Schlener was that good of a liar. Why wouldn't Schlener agree with Aloise, he got Schlener out of a serious jam on the witness stand.
This is conspiracy to commit perjury and to maliciously prosecute, by Aloise, his own client. Further, it is conspiracy to violate Elbery's constitutional rights, the right to Due Process and assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of United States Constitution.
The only reason Aloise asked about Schlener's PC testimony was due to the insistence and badgering of his client, Elbery. See affidavit #16. This insistence was because it would have been impossible, as per Schlener's PC testimony, for Schlener to attend to a girl and get out of the bar two minutes after the incident started and still have seen the beginning of the contact between King in Elbery.
The perjury/conspiracy by Aloise, as per T. R. 658-12, allowed the prosecution to cover up the obvious truth, Schlener did not and could not have seen any contact between Elbery and King. There was not enough time. Schlener with the cooperation of Aloise covered up the discrepancies of Schlener’s PC and trial testimony regarding his exiting the bar and seeing a fight.
The jury believed, as a result, that Schlener simply did as he testified, why not, Aloise, the defense attorney, confirmed everything.
Aloise should have pointed out to the jury the discrepancies between Schlener’s PC hearing testimony and trial testimony. This should have been done by Aloise with the objective of showing the jury that Schlener was perjuring himself in order to maintain he was a legitimate witness to King's claim that Elbery threw that first punch at King.
Specifically, instead of aiding the prosecution by sorting out and fabricating Schlener's new story, Aloise should have itemized, to the jury, including the prior inconsistent statements made by Schlener under oath at the PC hearing regarding his exiting of the bar as follows:
a. At the PC hearing there was no mention of two exits by Schlener from the bar, by any witness including Schlener. Schlener testified, per the PC, he exited once and Sawyer was already outside when he allegedly saw Elbery throw the "first punch" at King.
b. Both Mann T. R. 172-9, and Dr. Sawyer, PC 239-21, testified Schlener was the last to leave the bar and any action outside especially involving King and Elbery was over. This also should have been brought out at the closing argument by Aloise. P.C. 240-3, De Pasquale also claimed Schlener was still in the bar and last to leave after he (De Pasquale) left the bar 5 minutes after the incident.
c. Schlener testified at the PC hearing he was outside the bar with Sawyer when, as a result of Wynne telling him King's eye was out to "call the cops", he went back in the bar and phoned the police. According to Schlener, PC 127 through PC 129, Wynn’s false alarm resulted in Schlener calling the cops 3-4 minutes after Elbery exited the bar, and after the fight incident was over. Schlener claimed at trial he went out initially, leaving behind Sawyer and girl, then came back in the bar and called the police, whereupon, he exited the bar a second time meeting Sawyer.
d. Schlener testified at the probable cause hearing that he waited two minutes before exiting the bar after tending to girl. At trial he trimmed his timing of exit to one minute to a minute and half in order to make it more believable that he could have been outside the bar in time to see Elbery throw "that first punch".
Both King’s and Elbery’s testimonies agree that the chase-fight activity was non-stop, they agreed there was no break in the action. Even if they disagreed on everything else. How long would it take a man to run 75 yards? Maybe a slow man would take 12 seconds. How could Schlener have gotten out of the bar in time to see the entire fight if he waited even a minute before exiting the bar?
Aloise should have highlighted to the jury that Schlener was claiming King was attacking Elbery, TR 594-2, King going after Elbery with his arms out. That was the prosecution’s evidence even if everything Schlener said at trial was a documented lie.
1. Conflict described by D. Pasquale inside the bar, the initiation of the incident.
At the probable cause hearing of this instant case defense witness De Pasquale, and friend of the prosecution witnesses’-"friends", testified that King had to be re-strained that he was one of the ones who stopped King from getting any closer to the defendant, Elbery. King was depicted by De Pasquale as the aggressor who had to be held around the waste to stop King, Elbery was not interfered with as he sat down on his own according to De Pasquale, as below,
Probable Cause Hearing-Direct Exam
PC 189-14 King walked over to where Michael was.
PC 190-3 I was one of the ones that got in between.
PC 190-9 I was one of the ones that got up to make-to try to make some peace.
PC 194-13 I stepped in front of Tommy to face him and I was holding him around a waste.
PC 194-20 "Come on Tom let's not do this, come on and sit down. Let it go." I tried to coax him back to his seat.
PC 195-1-6 No I did not have any conversation with Mr. Elbery. He sat back down.
At trial De Pasquale changed his testimony (lied) in King's favor. As per transcript below he described a much milder mannered King. De Pasquale claimed to be an off-duty bouncer at the Winner’s Circle Bar. During direct examination by Aloise, De Pasquale claimed he didn't have to do anything to King, that he stopped himself. De Pasquale testified at trial that he merely touched King on the hip section.
T. R. 700-19 Q. How close did King get to Elbery?
A. Not that close we stepped in between them.
T. R. 701-5 I didn't have to do anything. Tommy Stopped.
T. R. 701-12-18 Went in direction of Elbery after getting off stool in front of Tommy and told him to go back to his seat.
T. R. 701-24 I kind of touched him on the hip section and asked Tom to calm down and go back to his seat.
T. R. 703-13 Also said "you don't need this. Go back to your seat. We don't want any trouble.
T. R. 703-8 Q. Who stopped him (King)?
-9 A. Nobody. He stopped himself.
During cross-exam by Ball, De Pasquale made even bigger changes in his testimony (bigger lies), claiming he made some mistakes at the probable cause hearing and that he at no time grabbed King around a waste. There was no need for Ball to worry about De Pasquale's prior testimony because Aloise did not bring them to the attention of the jury. Rather on redirect Aloise gets De Pasquale to admit he put his hand on King's waste, T. R. 722-21-24, by which Aloise once again adopts the prosecution's account of events to the prejudice of his client.
T. R. 724-16-20. Didn't touch Elbery afraid of getting punched.
T. R. 728-10 Q. You still made some mistakes at the probable cause hearing? A. Yes.
T. R. 736-7 Q. You at no time grabbed King around the waste and pulled him away? A. No.
T. R. 722-21 Q. Now at any time while you were standing up between Mr. Elbery and King, did you put your hands-on Mr. Kings waste? A. Yes, I did.
1. About the girl’s alleged injuries.
PC 52-1 Q. Isn't it fair to say you don't know and didn't know at the time, certainly, how badly the female was hurt, whether or not it was just a cut on the face that bled or something more serious; Correct?
PC 53-6 Q. Now when Officer Perma's report indicates that Mr. Elbery struck a girl in the eye, you don't know that to be true, do you, from your observations?
-10 A. Right.
T. R. 194-4. (King Testifies) One of the women had her hand to her face and she was bleeding.
-7. Coming around her hand, out of her hands, through her fingers down her face.
As seen above King does a stella job of lying about a girl’s injury in order to gain approval from the jury for his actions and at the same time trying to fabricate a "felony" by Elbery. And Aloise conspires with King and covers up the true evidence. King did not know, as he testified at the PC, about any girl’s injury. This is because there were not any. Was this girl, Mann, really in the bar that night?
2. About the mysterious prison guards seated with King at the bar,
PC 30-22 (King) The prison guards are acquaintances.
T. R. 269-13 Q. Are these people, these two correctional people that you did not know before you went into the barroom that particular night?
A. (King) Yes, sir.
Aloise being forced by his client to ask about the prison guards, see affidavit #17, falls shot in his duty. Aloise allows King to say he doesn't know them after testifying at the PC that they were acquaintances. In fact, Aloise leads King to say he did not know these guards.
Aloise knew exactly who the guards were, not just King. Aloise had Mark Pinkham, one guard drinking with King and the person who drove King to the hospital, listed as a defense witness, see Exhibit I. Aloise had spoken to Pinkham many times and allowed the jury to believe that these guards drinking with King were unknown to everyone involved with the trial. Further, Aloise allowed the jury to believe there were two sets of prison guards that night during the incident. Pinkham was the same guard at the bar with King as the guard who drove King to the hospital. Aloise in conspiracy with the prosecution suborned this perjury at trial. This is also fraud upon the Court.
As my appellate lawyer, Bobby Scheketoff said, "I thought it strange that there were just, coincidentally, 2 sets of prison guards.
PC 10-22 (King) Jeff was on the phone, and it was my understanding that he had --. That he was calling the police.
Probable Cause-Cross Exam
PC 55-2 Q. (Aloise) Did you observe that Jeff Schlener called the police, or did you know that he called police after?
-5 A. I knew he was over at the phone, and I --
-9 A. I knew he had to be calling the police; yeah.
-11 Q. So you had a fair assumption at least that Mr. Schlener was on the phone to the police, and you presumed that the Worcester police would respond?
-15 A. Right.
King, at the probable cause hearing, makes no claim he yelled, "call the police".
TR 195-18 (King) I yelled to somebody to call the police. Mr. Schlener had gone to the rear of the -- -- reached around where the phone was, so I thought he was calling the police.
Aloise allows King to look like a conscientious good citizen to the jury. Allowing King to testify that he took the proper precautions and yelled for the police before taking the law into his own hands. Coincidentally, Schlener changed his story, this claim X section A-3, about the police being called in order to help King and fit his trial lie.
4. Aloise allows King to cover up the fact that the entire incident/fight took place in the street, not the sidewalk. The discrepancies are as follows:
PC 9-22. I chased him out the door.
-24. Yes, down Shrewsbury Street.
PC 10-13. Ran down Shrewsbury Street approximately 50 yards.
PC 11-4 Q. When you caught up with him on Shrewsbury Street; what did you do?
-6 A. Listen you're not going anywhere.
PC 20-13 Q. During the course of the struggle with Mr. Elbery on Shrewsbury Street, do you recall anything he said?
PC 55-24 thru 56-7. (King) No, I ran out the door, ran out into Shrewsbury Street and ran down Shrewsbury Street and I ran after him.
T. R. 198-5 Q. Did you see the defendant go into the street at all?
-7 A. No, sir. Not at all.
King and the prosecution had good reason to change the case scenario to the sidewalk, the jury may have found it even more difficult to believe that Elbery came to a screeching halt in the middle of a main street, as King testified, TR 197-22. This is more prosecution lying ignored by Aloise.
By ignoring these discrepancies about the street and Elbery’s route in fleeing from the bar, Aloise allowed the jury to more easily believe that Elbery was not in fear and not fleeing from King’s assault and that of the "gang of six". It would have been hard for the jury to believe that Elbery came to a screeching halt in the middle of the street as opposed to what King said, T.R. 377-7,8, TR 386-15 thru 21, TR 197-22, He came to a stop on the sidewalk.
6. About the amount of time spent in the hospital by King. Clearly, Aloise read King's medical report.
Probable Cause Hearing-Direct
PC 16-21 Q. How long were you in the hospital?
A.(King) four hours.
T.R. 478-18 Q. Your arrival was 2:10 a.m. and the time of your discharge was 3:35 a.m., am I write? (Aloise reading from Ex. A-King’s medical report).
-23 A. Yes.
Aloise clearly read King's medical report, but did not tell the jury that not only was King at the hospital for a mere 1:25 minutes but this included the time King waited for Arinella to arrive on call. Aloise did not inform the jury that King lied at the probable cause hearing and grand jury in order to make his red eye worse, saying he was in the hospital for four hours, PC-16-21.
Aloise should have underscored, to the jury, that this brief time in the hospital, 1 hour and 25 minutes, to be examined by a nurse and doctor, including the time it took the Dr. to arrive on call was indicative of King’s minor/superficial injuries or red eye.
Constitutional Violations-Aloise and Ball
For the above failures enumerated in this claim X Louis P. Aloise was ineffective in his assistance of counsel, Aloise suborned perjury, conspired with the prosecution to maliciously convict Elbery, fabricated evidence for the prosecution’s benefit against his client, committed perjury/fraud on the court, advocated the prosecution's perjured story working to the prejudice of his client, failed to apprise the jury of a landslide of prior inconsistent statements, all substantive evidence, made by various witnesses. Clearly, this claim proves there was no adversarial relation at trial, that better work may have produced something better for the defense. The failures here show that the trial was unfair and the verdict cannot be relied on, there is a reasonable probability that if Aloise handled these witness discrepancies (perjury) with the care of an average lawyer’s performance the verdict would have been different. The adversarial testing as required by the U.S. Supreme Court was not met causing a trial that was unfair and a verdict that can not be relied on. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 684-685, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,691-692, 104 S. Ct.2052.
Aloise as a result violated Elbery's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, and a fair trial, as provided by the Due Process Clause.
Attorney Aloise, regarding this evidence in this claim X, was advocating King's best interests, ineffectiveness is presumed when counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cuyler vs. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,350, 64 LEDs 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (' 80), United States vs. Cronic 466 U. S. 648, 661, n. 28, 80 LEDs 2d 657, 669, n. 28, (' 84).
ADA Mike Ball knowingly allowed the above discrepancies amongst the three itemized witnesses knowing that under oath at the probable cause hearing they had presented evidence which exonerated Elbery. Ball and the DA's office in Worcester are guilty of conspiracy to violate Elbery's constitutional rights. Ball and company knowingly allowed this perjury, as itemized in this claim, and made use of it without making the required correction in order to maliciously convict Elbery. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. ED 2d 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 763 (’72). (the prosecution cannot knowingly use perjury to convict and they have a duty to correct all perjury); Commonwealth vs. Tucceri 589 N.E. 2d. 1216, 1219, 412 Mass. 401, 405, (’93), (new trial required when prosecution knowingly uses perjury). Knowing use by the prosecution of fabricated evidence, as is abundant in this claim X, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This claim X alone is of sufficient constitutional error to require a new trial for Elbery and convict numerous members of the Worcester DA's office and Aloise of various criminal counts. As a matter of law a new trial is required id.
XI. More ineffectiveness by Aloise during opening statement, argument, directing cross-examination-Aloise adopts, confirms and presents the prosecution's theory of the case-Aloise presents prejudicial evidence about his defendant/client.
Elbery owned/lost the infamous Mulcahy's Bar
TR 121-1 (0/S Aloise) Fulfill a lifelong dream of becoming an owner of a barroom.
TR 121-5 (0/S Aloise) He owned a local Tavern known as Mulcahy's cafe at Webster Square in Worcester.
TR 121-7 (0/S Aloise) As a result of factors beyond Elbery's control, sometime before 9-29-92, Mr. Elbery lost the bar. Went out of business, and was sensitive and affected adversely by the fact he lost his business.
The only object to this information to the jury by Aloise was to insult and discredit Elbery. Attorney Aloise represented this defendant during the eviction proceedings that caused this defendant to terminate business at his bar, in '92, see Ex. N. The defendant, as Aloise well knew, went out of business because he lost his lease. The landlord and his daughters now run a bar at that location. Mulcahy's was a well-known biker bar in Worcester. Aloise via these opening statements gave the impression to the jury that Elbery had done something wrong. Aloise needlessly associated Elbery with an "alleged" outlaw bar, Mulcahy's. Further, Aloise made Elbery look foolish by saying "owning a bar was a lifelong dream". Elbery never told Aloise any such thing; in fact Elbery told Aloise he hated many elements surrounding the running of the bar and wanted to do something else, see aff. #44. Elbery told Aloise years before '93-'92 that he could not stand the bar anymore.
TR 122-20 (O/S Aloise) Mr. King... took it upon himself to get up and tell Mr. Elbery in no uncertain terms to shut up and not bother Mr. Schlener.
TR 292-13 Q. (Aloise) And in substance, you told him you wanted him to quiet down and be quiet; am I right?
A. (King) Yes.
TR 292-16 Q. (Aloise) Did you use those words or did you use more harsh language than that?
A. (King) I told him I asked him to quiet down.
TR 294-2 Q. (Aloise) Now when you said or asked or told what ever it was Mr. Elbery to quiet down, he responded to you in no uncertain terms basically to mind your own business, Right?
TR 294-9 A. (King) He asked me to step outside.
-10 Q. (Aloise) Right. Did you are ask him "okay, let's go outside"?
-12 A. (King) No. I said, "I wouldn't waste my time." I turned around, walked around sat down.
-14Q. (Aloise) Your response was, "I wouldn't waste my time". Is that right?
-16A. (King) That's correct sir.
In these above transcript citings regarding the confrontation in the bar Aloise adopts and confirms the prosecution's theory of the case. He continually agrees with and highlights the prosecution's theory of the case with the use of right after King presents his version of the facts. Aloise in opening statement presents King a concerned citizen trying to shut-up an out of control Elbery. This is not what Elbery told Aloise, Elbery's version of the facts were totally different, see TR-1032 through 1040. And of course, Aloise did no cross-examination on how the incident precipitated in order to present his client's version of the facts. Elbery's version of the facts was also that described at the probable cause hearing by King's friends.
The "touching" by De Pasquale
TR 486-2 Q. (Aloise) I ask you... whether or not Mr. D. Pasquale grabbed you around waste. You said no. You said he touched my stomach, right?
-6 A. (King) Yes.
TR 486-7 (Aloise) Okay.
TR 486-18 Q. (Aloise) look, are you telling us that you never went by where Mr. De Pasquale was sitting?
-20 A. (King) That's correct.
-21 Q. (Aloise) All right.
Aloise questioning King about him going by De Pasquale during the bar confrontation and having to be restrained, as was the evidence at the probable cause hearing via numerous witnesses allows King to say the opposite. Aloise with the use of "all right", "Okay" and "right" confirms King's perjurious testimony. The evidence at the p.c. hearing was that De Pasquale and others had to restrain King and Elbery stayed at his bar stool, see claim X-B-1.
Regarding the chase down Shrewsbury Street
TR 125-22 (0/S Aloise) And he was running with Mr. King directly behind him, and the other four directly behind King.
TR 126-13 (0/S Aloise) In any event (King) tackled Mr. Elbery. Tackled him, put him to the ground, rolled him out into the Street over the berm or over the curb into Shrewsbury Street.
TR 377-7 Q. (Aloise) Mr. Elbery abruptly stopped; am I right?
TR 377-19 Q. (Aloise) So that it is clear that one you chased him two, he abruptly and without explanation, that is without telling you anything or saying anything to you stopped, just stopped dead in his tracks; am I right?
TR 380-6 (Aloise)Q. Did you tackle him thereby causing him to stop?
A. (King) No.
TR 386-15 Q. (Aloise) You also testified that after you chased Mr. Elbery and after he abruptly stopped and after you were face-to-face with him, that you told him that he wasn't going to go anywhere until the Worcester police arrived; Am I right?
-21 A. (King) Correct.
TR 401-2 (Aloise) Q. Do you recall testifying at the PC hearing that you said you moved your arms in an outstretched position? Do you remember saying that?
-6 A. (King) I said I had my arms out to the side, with my arms open and facing him.
-8 Q. (Aloise) Show us exactly what you did?
TR 401-10 Q. (Aloise) Now when you said you grabbed onto Mr. Elbery, you testified at the PC hearing that you tackled him. You testified here today, if I understand you correctly, that you swept him or you took his legs out from under him?
TR 401-16 A. (King) I knocked him to the ground. I grabbed him around the arms and knocked him to the ground.
-18 Q. (Aloise) You grabbed him around what? The waste?
-19 A. (King) The upper torso. He is about my height.
-23 Q. (Aloise) While you are still facing him, right?
A. (King) Yes.
TR 403-1 A. (King) He threw several punches at me as I have testified.
-3 Q. (Aloise) I understand that.
TR 404-20 A. (Aloise) So, you deny, I take it, that after tackling Mr. Elbery and going to the ground, that the others jumped on top of him and beat the hell out of him as well?
TR 425-13 A. (King) I was trying to knock his hand out of my eye and take his hand out of my eye.
-15 (Aloise) Right. Q. You grabbing onto him, right? After your eye was injured you were able to grab onto him, wrestle him to the ground, roll around on Shrewsbury Street, roll into the gutter, and get you on top of him, and you've got enough control to get up and get off him; Am I right?
TR 425-22 A. (King) I knocked him on the ground. And when he landed, I was on top of him.
-24 (Aloise) Right.
TR 426-1 A. (King) Okay. I rolled off him onto the ground and was helped up when I yelled for somebody to help me.
TR 427-15 Q. (Aloise) So that the fact that earlier in your testimony you said you never heard anybody say anything, you never heard anybody behind you, you did, in fact, hear footsteps?
-20 A. (King) After I was on the ground, yes.
-21 Q. (Aloise) But before --
-22 A. (King) As I have testified.
-23 Q. (Aloise) But before you heard nothing, right?
TR 428-18 Q. (Aloise) There is no question that when you rolled off of Mr. Elbery and Mr. Elbery is down on the ground, Wynne is there and the others are there, right?
TR 432-17 Q. (Aloise) When you were struck in the eye the first time, do you have a recollection of moving your head away, at least turning away from?
-18 A. (King) I was trying to get his thumb out, yes.
TR 433-12 (Aloise) When the thumb is in the eye, you grab his hand, you get it away, he try to get it away, you grab him, you go down to the ground, right? All that is taken a very short period of time; Am I right?
-17 A. (King) That's correct.
TR 435-16 Q. (Aloise) after you had got poked in the eye the first time, sir, and were able to get Mr. Elbery's hand away, could you tell us what at that point you didn't simply turn around and get away to avoid any further injury as opposed to continuing to hold onto Mr. Elbery and tackling him to the ground as you indicated that you did?
TR 436-2 Q. (Aloise) Well, you were there having no initial intention, it was your testimony, to physically assaulted, no intention of holding him, right?
TR 436-8 Q. (Aloise) When you got injured in the eye that you have indicated in the manner that you did, why didn't you just get away once you got Mr. Elbery's hand away from your face and leave?
T R 482-18 Q. (Aloise recross) Now despite the injury you receive to your eye after you say Mr. Elbery first poked you, you were able blind to continue or to get Mr. Elbery's hand out of your eye, to hold onto him, to tackle him to the ground, to get on top of him and to get off of him, all the time in which you had suffered an eye injury that ran did you in your testimony blind; Am I right?
484-2 Q. (Aloise allowed question after objection) Do you recall that question? Is that your answer yes?
A. (King) Yes.
Once again Aloise crusades the prosecution's version of the facts with the constant use of "right" and I understand that after King testifies prejudicially and the opposite to what Elbery testifies to. Elbery gave Aloise a whole different version, (including backpeddling while defending himself against the two prison guards, TR 1046-6, and a gang chasing Elbery down the street, T.R. 1045-5), of facts but Aloise refused to do any impeachment of King or present his clients facts of the event through cross-examination. As above, Aloise agrees and confirms/adopts King's entire chase-fight scenario.
Elbery testified that De Pasquale tackled him around the ankles football style when he was going between two cars onto Shrewsbury St., that he was defending against several attackers as he was trying to escape overwhelming odds while running 100 yards down Shrewsbury St.. Elbery testified there was no statement by King or verbal confrontation, but rather King jumped on top of Elbery after he was already football tackled by attackers on Shrewsbury Street. King claimed Elbery just stopped on the sidewalk for no reason, this is totally the opposite of what Elbery said. See T.R. 1043 through 1049 for Elbery's testimony.
Worst of all, Aloise repeatedly confirms and adopts King's claim of eye injury and cause.
That King was waiting for the police
TR 437-2 Q. (Aloise) You also knew, or reasonably assumed anyway that the police were called, right?
-4 A. (King) Yes, sir.
TR 386-22 Q. (Aloise) and even though you didn't see Mr. Schlener make any phone call or hear him express that he was going to make the phone call, you, as you testified earlier, assumed that was what he was doing? A, because a young woman appeared to be hurt, and B, because you saw him go in the direction where you knew the phone was, right?
387-6 A. (King) Yes.
-7 Q. (Aloise) So it is reasonable to conclude then that you, as you were chasing Mr. Elbery down the street, assumed that the police would be on the way?
-11 A. (King) Yes, sir.
Aloise advocates King's cause and the prosecution's theory that King wasn't a cowardly mean spirited bum and part of the barroom "gang of six" that rushed out after Elbery to gang up on him. Rather Aloise portrays King, contrary to the probable cause hearing, as an individual conscious of the right thing to do via the police. See claim - X-C-3. The deficiency here, claim XI, by Aloise shows that he again was not representing his client's best interests and the adversarial process required to have a fair trial failed. This satisfies the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 LED 2d. 674, 693, ('84). Better work by Aloise just on this issue may have produced something material for the defense, as above, thus these deficiencies in this claim satisfy the Massachusetts standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial, Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, ('84).
The jury was misled at trial by this false evidence as presented in this claim XI. This being a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. Commonwealth vs. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564 (' 67) (mislead the jury on material evidence the trial is unfair requiring a new trial).
XII. ADA Morris A. Bergman takes the witness stand and gets caught lying-the DA's office tries to trigger a mistrial-Attorney Aloise refuses the judge's invitation to a mistrial over the defendant's strongest objection.
During initial direct examination of defense witness John Hayes the court officer reported to the judge that the jury foreperson claimed Hayes was in the court room the day before, therefore violating sequestration, TR 861-1. The foreperson claimed, per the court officer, a couple of jurors had seen him (Hayes) in the courtroom the day before listening to testimony, TR 862-2.
The judge held a voire dire, TR 862, and concludes with the two other lawyers that Hayes was not in the courtroom the day before, TR 868-10. The judge instructs the jury they were mistaken about seeing Hayes the day before, T. R. 874-3.
Little did the judge know but he was correct, as the jury informs the court that they had only seen Hayes in the morning not the day before, T. R. 876-3-10. The court officer got the information wrong on TR 861-1, above, that Hayes was in the court that day before.
Nobody, the defendant (see aff. #26), the court officers, the ADA Ball, Aloise, or the judge had seen Hayes in the courtroom the day before. Further, and most important, the jury was not claiming he was in the courtroom the day before. The jury was claiming (and court officer got it wrong) Hayes was in the court room a little before lunch just as Hayes admitted, TR 864-20. ADA Morris Bergman did not know this; he out smarted himself. Bergman submitted a note, (T.R. 885-11-Ex. F at trial, see Exhibit O), prior to realizing the jury was misrepresented by the court officer. The note, as read by the judge TR 882-23, made claim that Bergman had seen Hayes in the courtroom the day before, TR 885-15. Further, Bergman testified he saw Hayes and courtroom on two prior days, TR 887-8. Bergman claimed that upon observing Hayes on the two previous days he questioned himself as to what Hayes relationship was to the defendant, TR 889-21. (Sure).
Morris Bergman clearly got caught up in the court officers mistake and subsequent confusion orchestrated by the judge that the jury was claiming Hayes was in the court room the day before, hence violating sequestration. Moe Bergman lied, he got caught. This was more wrongdoing by the Worcester DA's office towards Elbery their long time target and critic. Bergman being a long time adversary of Elbery (due to Bergman's extreme political beliefs and hatred of Elbery) was in the courtroom (Superior Court) everyday and saw this alleged sequestration problem with Hayes as an opportunity to damage Elbery and his case. Problem was the Court Officer, (efficiency not being a requirement of his government job) got everything wrong and the only one left claiming Hayes was in the courtroom the previous day or days was Bergman. Bergman, as is documented here, is a monument to the kind of viciousness that Elbery has had to endure at the hands of the "Worcester authorities". ADA Morris Bergman, as documented here, is an unscrupulous liar willing to do anything for his agenda.
Why was Bergman at Elbery's trial everyday? See aff. # 35. Bergman worked in the District Court, yet he was representing the DA's office, TR 363-10, when Judge Toomey jailed Elbery on the second day of trial because Toomey "thought" Elbery was "about to get out of control", T.R. 363-14. Although the record reflects Elbery saying or doing nothing prior to the jailing.
Moe Bergman tried to trigger or goad a mistrial, as well as, eliminate a very important defense witness. The attempted triggering of a mistrial by the prosecution requires a dismissal of the indictments, Com. v. Lam Hue To 391 Mass. 301, 310-311, 461 N.E. 2d. 776 '84, (prosecutor's conduct of goading the defendant into moving for a mistrial results in dismissal of the indictments and defendant may raise a bar to further prosecution via double jeopardy). The knowing use by Bergman of perjury relating to defense witness-Hayes also requires a new trial, U.S. v. Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 103 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed 2d. 342, ('76), Com. v. Tucceri 412 Mass. 401, 404, 589 N.E. 2d 1216, 1219, ('92).
The judge acknowledged the possible prejudice to the defense due to a juror, Mr. Audet, TR 875-24, excusing himself, as a result, allegedly, of Hayes being in the courtroom earlier that day and hearing about one hour of prosecution witness, O'Connor's, testimony. The judge was concerned the effect Audet and the entire incident could have on the remaining jurors towards the defense. Was that the real reason Audet left? I doubt it.
Aloise refuses mistrial over Elbery's objection
The judge, as a result, asked Aloise twice, TR 879-20, if the defense wanted a mistrial. You are not asking me to do anything, (judge) T. R. 879-20. Again on TR 896-20 the judge not only gives Aloise the option of a mistrial but comments he is impressed, TR 896-10, with Aloise resisting a mistrial because of the damaging effect this information might have on Aloise's client. Fact of the matter was that Aloise's client, Elbery, demanded that Aloise request or accept a mistrial. This in conference between Aloise and Elbery, see affidavit #21. What was bothering Aloise about another trial? Was it the same reason he did not ask in the alternative for a new trial when he filed the 25-b-2 motion after the jury's verdict? See Exhibit R This is further
deficient performance by Aloise and shows that he never wanted to see another lawyer work on this case. The deficiency here, claim XII, by Aloise shows that he again was not representing his client's best interests and the adversarial process required to have a fair trial was violated. This satisfies the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 LED 2d. 674, 693, ('84). Better work by Aloise just on this mistrial issue may have produced something material for the defense, as above, thus these deficiencies in this claim satisfy the Massachusetts standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial, Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, ('84).
Dr. Stephen Sawyer
Dr. Stephen Sawyer, who was present in the Winner's Circle Bar that 9-29-92, testified at the probable cause hearing for the defense. His probable cause testimony was beneficial/exculpatory to the defense for the following reasons:
1. Sawyer testified Elbery never used a broken beer bottle as a weapon. PC 234-12 (Sawyer) The glass went flying and all hell broke lose, I guess. People were flying up from chairs, and I know that he (Elbery) backed out or went out through the door.
2. Sawyer testified that King started the argument between he and Elbery and pursued and approach Elbery from the other side of the bar. PC 288-8 (Sawyer) Jeff and Mike may have been having words, nothing loud. PC 231-11 I know that Tom got up from his seat at the far side of the bar and made his way around to the side where Mike was sitting.
3. Sawyer testified to facts at the probable cause hearing that would make Jeff Schlener's trial testimony concerning his exiting the bar twice in time to see Elbery throw that first punch a lie/perjury. PC 239-14 (Sawyer) Schlener came out of the bar after I had exited with two girls.
4. Sawyer testified that when he left the bar, PC 235-20, Mike was on the ground with three or four people holding him down. PC 236-9, King was walking up the sidewalk. PC 240-3 he, Sawyer, made these observations before Schlener came out of the bar.
Therefore, as also described and documented in claim X-A, it was perjury for Jeff Schlener to testify, T.R. 594-10, He (Elbery) through a punch. It was perjury because Schlener was still inside the bar. This is of course consistent with Christina Mann's trial testimony, T. R. 172-6, that Jeff Schlener was still inside the bar after she left which was 10 minutes after the incident started.
5. At the probable cause hearing Sawyer observes King walking up the sidewalk but makes no mention of King having a bleeding eye, or vitreous fluid leaking from King's, or any noticeable damage to King's eye. Strange, he didn't see any of King's claimed injuries, as Sawyer was a health care professional.
Louis P. Aloise in his opening statement, TR 128-20, promised the jury that Dr. Sawyer would testify at trial. Not calling Sawyer is another deficiency by Aloise, Harris v. Reed 894 F2d 871, 878 (7th Cir. '90)(failure to produce promised witness in opening statement is a "speaking silence "that is prejudicial as a matter of law). Dr. Sawyer was not called as a witness because he was not going to lie and his testimony would have upset the conspiracy between Aloise and the prosecution. The defendant, Elbery, demanded that Sawyer testify, that he was Elbery's best witness. Aloise refused to call Sawyer saying the jury would get mad because Sawyer would carry the trial into the long weekend of the 4th of July, see aff #23.
An average lawyer could have done great damage to the prosecution at trial with the testimony of Dr. Sawyer, as itemized above. Dr. Sawyer would have been a very credible witness in the eyes of the jury. See claim I-B-1 for cases where an attorney is ineffective in his assistance of counsel for failure to call defense witnesses. This deficiency, Claim XIII, by Aloise is a further breakdown in the adversarial process required for a fair trial; the verdict can not be relied on. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 686-687, '84, 80 L Ed. 2d. 674, 692-693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Better work by Aloise by calling defense witness Dr. Sawyer may have produced something material for the defense thus Aloise was ineffective in his assistance of counsel requiring a new trial, Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96 ('74), 315 N.E. 2d. 878.
Sawyer was a friend of the prosecution witnesses and De Pasquale not Elbery, PC 222-21.
Aloise never made any attempt to interview or call as witness this nurse who sent the rape kit fax that was signed by King at 10:30, see TR 237-238. This would have provided evidence that King was drinking on duty, as he testified he went to the Winner's Circle Bar, which is a few minutes from U. Mass., after conducting police business at U. Mass.
Don Wynn and Alice Arsenault
This girl, Arsenault, was never contacted by Aloise or used as a witness. She, per Mann's trial testimony, was at the Winner's Circle Bar with Mann. This girl, according to Aloise, had worked for Aloise during the previous summer. Aloise told Elbery that Arsenault got caught selling drugs to cops while she was on working hours for Aloise's law firm. Aloise knew where she was and knew her personally. See aff.# 42, #43.
Since, Mann's testimony was so outrageous and had so many holes in it, see Claim IV, bringing in Arsenault might have made a difference to the defense. She may have told the truth thus destroying the whole conspiracy. She had no reason to take up King's lies. That explains why the prosecution did not call her.
Don Wynne was a long time personal friend of King's. Aloise claimed he could never reach Wynne. Wynne, according to all the other witnesses at trial, including Elbery, was present during the entire incident. Wynne was named as a prosecution witness, see Ex. I page 2. Ball was willing to arrest Mann because she did not want to testify. Could it be Wynne threatened to tell the truth if put on the witness stand? See aff. #43.
Count these two potential witnesses as two more deficiencies, Aloise should have known if they were friend or foe, but he probably did know.
The defendant, Elbery, was convicted of two crimes that resulted from the same incident or alleged offense. This via the trial of 6-28-93 through 7-2-93 of the above docketed action. These two convictions were assault and battery (Mass. C. 265.13A) and assault with intent to maim (Mass. C. 265.15), but see exhibit M. This is double jeopardy or multiple punishments for the same offense.
Multiple punishments for the same offense is a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Massachusetts common law rule. Commonwealth vs. Arriaga 44 Mass. App. Ct. 382, 691 N.E.2d 585, 587 (quoting North Carolina vs. Pearce 395 U.S. 711,717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d. 656 (1969). Luke vs. Commonwealth 421 Mass. 415,419,658 N.E.2d 664 (1995).
Elbery was given consecutive sentences for these two offenses (or from and after sentences), see exhibit M.
At trial the judge correctly instructed that assault (Mass. C. 265.13A) is a lesser-included offense of assault with intent to maim (Mass. 265.15).
Assault and battery is the same crime or 265.13A under Massachusetts law as assault which is also C. 265.13A. If the jury had convicted Elbery of the lesser-included charge, assault C. 265.13, instead of the greater charge, C. 265.15, the lesser-included conviction would have been merged as one conviction with the assault & battery conviction. There would not have been two C. 265.13A convictions because there was only a single act or incident, allegedly, by Elbery.
Further, assault and battery should be a lesser-included offense of assault with intent to maim where there is no weapon involved. There is no way a trier of fact could find that the defendant intended to maim, while not using a weapon, unless there was contact or a battery on the alleged victim. Since there has never been a conviction of record, in Massachusetts judicial history, of assault with intent to maim where no weapon is involved it is reasonable that this issue has never been addressed.
Neither the judge nor the prosecutor isolated for the jury which acts could constitute assault battery and which acts could constitute assault with intent to maim in order to ensure no duplication charges against Elbery. Commonwealth vs. Sanchez 405 Mass. 369,540 N.E.2d 1316 (1989).
The lesser charge assault and battery, Mass. C. 265.13A must fall.
Deficiency by Aloise.
Failure by defense counsel Louis P. Aloise to argue that these charges constitute double jeopardy is another count of deficiency against him. The prejudice is plain the defendant was convicted and served an on and after sentence needlessly and illegally. This is the definition of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 685-688, '84, 80 LED 2d 674, 692-693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. As above, something material for the defense may have been produced. Thus, Aloise was ineffective, again, as per Com. v. Saferian 366 Mass. 89, 96, ('94), 315 N.E. 2d. 878 (Mass. standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new trial).
Illegal Sentence- Disorderly Person
Elbery was sentenced to a from and after sentence of 1 year for disorderly person, see Ex. M, yet the maximum sentence for this offense is 6 months. Compensation must be made.
The following is a potpourri of deficiencies that further contributed to the sum total of Aloise's ineffectiveness of the above docketed trial.
Louis P. Aloise failed via the 25-b-2 motion to ask the judge, as the law allows via 25-b-2, for a new trial. A new trial should have been requested in the alternative via this motion 25-b-2 and Aloise deliberately did not ask for a new trial, see exhibit R. Aloise is deficient for not requesting a new trial since the weight of the evidence required a new trial.
The judge denied the motion in March of '94 although the denial is dated July '93. See affidavit #39.
Aloise failed to appeal the denial of that motion. Commonwealth vs. Cardenuto 406 Mass. 450, 452-53, 548 N.E.2d 864,' 90, (failure of counsel to appeal denial of motion for required finding of not guilty is ineffective assistance of counsel).
Aloise advised Elbery to apologize at the sentencing
At the sentencing hearing regarding this case Aloise advised Elbery to apologize to the judge and he would get a smaller sentence. See affidavit #31. Elbery refused stating he was innocent and that he got railroaded.
Aloise deficient regarding King's pictures presented at trial.
At trial King and the prosecution submitted three pictures of King's alleged eye injury. These pictures were produced at the PC hearing. They were exhibits 1,2, 3, at trial. Elbery told Aloise the pictures did not look real and that color did not look natural. Elbery told Aloise that he felt the pictures were falsified and that tests should be done on these pictures. Aloise would do nothing, see affidavit #40.
At a federal deposition held by this defendant of Tom King it was learned that the Westborough police produced those pictures from negatives, see exhibit P. This moveant has asked for discovery regarding these pictures and negatives.
Further, the admission of these three pictures by the prosecution of the same alleged eye injury of King's is more deficiency by Aloise regarding this case. These pictures were duplicates and cumulative and only one should have been admitted as evidence. Commonwealth vs. Adams 416 Mass. 55,60, 617 N.E.2d 594,597 (1993), Romero vs. Lynaugh 884 F. 2d 871 (CA 5 Texas 1989). Attorney failed to object to inadmissible evidence found ineffective in his assistance of counsel. Commonwealth vs. Gillette 33 Mass. App. Ct. before 427,432, (' 93).
Aloise's secretary-Disqualification required by Aloise due to this Conflict of Interest
Upon being released from jail on bail after conviction Elbery went to Aloise's office via appointment. His secretary, Sharon, chastised Elbery and made quite clear that she was adverse to him. Sharon stated she was best friends with the bartender's (Jeff Schlener) wife. See affidavit #22. This caused bias via Aloise and his office towards Elbery.
The Worcester Police Department booking video and Elbery's bloody clothes.
As per affidavit #18 Elbery demanded that Aloise subpoena the booking video that was taken when Elbery was arrested on 9-29-92 as result of the Winners Circle incident. This would have provided evidence of the extent of injuries Elbery sustained on 9-29-92 prior to being treated and cleaned up at the hospital.
Further, Elbery brought to trial the same ripped and bloody clothes that he had on that 9-29-92. Aloise told Elbery that the jury would not like that type of evidence and it was never presented by Aloise. See affidavit's #18, #36.
Documented medical evidence of Elbery's injuries.
The court officers contaminate the witnesses against Elbery.
Before the trial started two Court bailiffs told several witnesses they would be sued by Elbery for the gang beating of him on Shrewsbury Street, see affidavit #20. Aloise was present during this whole episode and did nothing. Aloise's loyalty is to the Court and its personnel-this is more conflict of interest.
More bias by Aloise and the lie detector.
During an appointment with Aloise several weeks before trial he expressed bias in favor of the police and Tom King against Elbery, see affidavit #34.
Aloise wanted Elbery to take a lie detector test which would be administered by the Mass. State police at a cost to him of over $1,000, see affidavit #37. Aloise wanted Elbery to take the lie detector test so the DA's office would know he was telling the truth and it would show, according to Aloise, that Elbery was cooperative. Aloise demonstrates more conflict of interest as his loyalty is to the police and the D.A.'s Office.
Aloise tries to abandon his client.
After Elbery was convicted on 7-2-93, Aloise went to the Worcester Superior Court lockup and told Elbery he wanted nothing more to do with the case and that Elbery was on his own for sentencing. Elbery replied he should not be in jail for defending himself against a gang of drunks while trying to escape one hundred yards down Shrewsbury Street. Elbery further told Aloise that he was paid handsomely for his services and that Aloise better get him out of jail. See affidavit #38.
Aloise refuses to present the defendants evidence, again, -Elbery attempts to do Aloise's job.
The defendant, Elbery, was so frustrated by the end of trial when he testified that he had to present his case without the help of his attorney. See Elbery's testimony. Elbery's answers through direct testimony were continuously ruled excluded and instructed as such by the judge TR 1256-24. It is demonstrated through the direct testimony of the defendant, Elbery, that Elbery is attempting to produce evidence that Aloise is not willing to question him about.
Even though Elbery had asked Aloise to present this evidence Aloise would not ask the requisite questions in order to produce the evidence that Elbery was trying to give to the jury. Wouldn't you think that after hearing what Elbery was trying to donate to the jury, via his answers during direct testimony, Aloise would have asked the correct question in order to obtain that same evidence? Aloise did not.
Aloise should not have used Perma and De Pasquale for the Defense
As is obvious from this motion and review of the trial transcript, Perma and De Pasquale testified and lied in favor of the prosecution. De Pasquale was an acquaintance of King’s and Perma a fellow cop. Aloise had a duty to know what they would testify about prior to trial and if they did not testify as interviewed Aloise had a duty to impeach. Aloise did none of this making him once again deficient.
Aloise should have objected to Ball prosecuting the case due to Ball’s bias – a former cop
ADA Mike Ball was a former cop and this may explain some of his outrageous conduct/bias towards Elbery at trial. A defendant has a right to an unbiased prosecutor under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Aloise failed to highlight the variances amongst all the witnesses surrounding the chase fight scenario.
There was not 2 witnesses that told the same story concerning Elbery’s exiting the bar and what followed until he was arrested. The prosecution witnesses’ story varied from a waltz or shimmer down Shrewsbury St. to King chasing Elbery all by himself. All the prosecution witnesses (except King) and friends (De Pasquale) that testified admitted that a gang immediately followed Elbery out the bar with King. None would testify, as King, that there was 2 thumb gougings, only Traskiewicz saw a finger go in King’s eye while King was on top of Elbery on the street. As in Claim V, they described King as the aggressor.
Aloise failed to highlight this ridiculous variance in testimonies at trial in both his direct exam of De Pasquale, cross-exam of the prosecution witnesses and in his closing. This makes Aloise deficient as this is an
indication the witnesses, all friends of King’s, were trying to hide their participation of the beating of Elbery and were lying for King.
The above 13 deficiencies by defense Attorney Louie Aloise contribute to the only conclusion you can have about his performance regarding the defense of Michael Elbery of the above docketed case; he was ineffective in his assistance of counsel. Had Aloise not done as per these deficiencies something material may have been produced for the defense. Saferian 366 Mass. at 96.
The conflict of interest that is documented in some of the above 13 deficiencies in this Count XV is more constitutional ineffective assistance by Aloise in violation of the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 12 of the Mass. Declaration of Rights, Com. v. Hodge 386 Mass. 165, 434 N.E. 2d. 1246 ('82)(Once a genuine conflict of interest is shown there is no additional requirement that prejudice be proved for the defense counsel to be in violation of Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights which guarantees effective assistance of counsel)(the Mass. Declaration of Rights provides greater rights concerning this issue).
Concerning Aloise's secretary - the protection for client's is a direct responsibility of lawyers to supervise their employees. Aloise's secretary possessed confidential information material to the defense of Elbery, yet she was adverse to Elbery and in close relation/contact with the prosecution witness who was instrumental in falsely putting Elbery behind bars for 10 years. This person is the bartender- Jeff Schlener. The remedy is that Aloise, due to his secretaries conflict of interest, should have disqualified himself from representing Elbery, Mallet & Smith, Legal Malpractice, Ch. 16 - Fiducial Obligations s. 16.18.
During trial ADA Mike Ball made the following illegal statements in violation of M.R.C.P. -Rule 24 and due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. This claim includes only illegalities by Ball during closing argument and opening statement. Ball's other illegalities under Rule 24 during trial are highlighted in claims II, IV, V, and VI, VII.
Closing Argument - Ball
TR 1230-21 Do you really believe that everyone of these people that were in that bar that night, with the exception of the defendant, came in here... into court under oath and lie to you.
Ball is expressing his personal opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses and calling the defendant a liar without any evidence from trial to support his argument this is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Volume 30A s. 1860 p.254-256.
TR 1234-18 Remember when he (Elbery) said he gouged King's eye?
Here, Ball misstates and misquotes evidence of the trial. This is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Volume 30A s.1867 p.259.
TR 1236-10 That speaks volumes of the defendant's attitude and everyone else's impression of the defendant's attitude when he was in that bar that night.
Here, Ball gives his personal opinion about the defendant and the other witnesses' attitude towards him. Ball is also arguing facts not in evidence which is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1860 & 1865 p.253 & 257.
TR 1238-6 Who instinctively runs out after him? Police officer, the off-duty police officer. What do we expect? That is the type of individual a police officer is. That is why a lot of them are police officers.
Here, Ball is illegally vouching for the victim witness this is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1852 p. 247. Also, Ball misstates fact and law by calling King a police officer and thus giving the jury, contrary to law, the impression he was legally justified in chasing Elbery. This is more violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1867 p. 259.
TR 1239-10 What happened was he turned around and saw that the one-person he saw in the bar and he said, "hey, step outside with me," that is the only person that is right up to him.
Here, Ball lies to the jury, as Ball already disclosed he knew more than one person was chasing Elbery, see TR 468-1, T.R. 1242-18. This is a violation of Rule 24 because it is illegal for the prosecutor to misstate evidence, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1867 p. 259.
TR 1241-10 Mr. King was doing what we all hope a police officer would do.
Here, Ball misstates law and fact of the case by calling King a police officer, King was only a citizen. In addition he is vouching for King and played impermissibly on the jury’s emotions- pandering to the jury with "we all hope a police officer would do". . This is more violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1867 p. 259 and
TR 1241-12 what is that business that he was drinking off-duty? T. R. 1241-16 we didn't hear anybody saying, "well, King, obviously was drinking on duty. He wasn't at the police station".
Here, Ball lies to the jury, as at trial sidebar, TR 452-12, Ball stipulated, as fact, that King was drinking on duty per claim VII. This is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1876 p. 259. Ball is also, in violation of Rule 24 by arguing evidence not introduced at trial, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1865 p. 257.
TI 1242-4 The other thing is, to believe, to even suggest that those people were instigators were, the initial -- that is absurd.
Here, Ball, once again, expresses his personal opinion. This in violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1860 p. 253-254.
TR 1242-10 Well, two more witnesses, hey, bring them on and they would be saying the same story, and they support that story, too.
Here, Ball is illegally eluding to his, alleged, knowledge of evidence not presented to the jury and telling the jury what the evidence would be that these missing witnesses would present. This is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s.1858 p.25, United States v. Cresta, 825 F. 2d 538 (1st Cir. 1987), Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s.1860 p.121.
TI 1242-18 I'm telling you that a citizen has just is much right as anybody to go after someone that is caused injury to another person like they did. Mr. King should be commended.
Here, Ball misstates the law on citizen's arrest, see Count V, and he vouches for King. This is a violation of Rule 24, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s. 1868 p.259 and s. 1852 p.247.
Also, Ball admits that King did not act alone, as he uses the word they.
Opening statement - the prosecutor - Ball
T.R. 111-8 The beer bottle went into one of the young woman's eyes, her name is Christina Mann, she is here today. You will hear that the glass went around her eye and she was cut very badly.
Per the evidence in Claim IV of this motion this alleged cutting never happened to Mann. Here, Ball knew or should have known this was false. Mann also testified that no glass got in her eyes.
T.R. 111-22 He is waving this beer bottle at all of the people in the bar.
Per the evidence in Claim VI Elbery did not "waive" the bottle at anybody, let alone use it as a weapon. Here Ball knowingly misstates facts of the case.
T.R. 113- 16 King's eye is bleeding terribly.
Here, Ball knowingly lies to the jury, Ball had the medical evidence well before trial and conspired with Aloise and the prosecution witnesses to hide the documented real evidence about King's eye in Claim I.
T.R. 114-17 They had no police involvement really on the case except if you want to say where Thomas King being an off duty officer he was involved as a police officer.
Here, Ball misstates fact and law of the case. He tells the jury that King could be considered as a police officer instead of what the law demands just a citizen.
T.R. 115-16 the defendant did in fact swing that broken beer bottle, not only at the girl, King is named as a victim where the bottle was swung at him.
The girl, Mann, testified that Elbery never used the bottle as a weapon or even "waived" it at her, T.R. 178-14. As per the probable cause hearing it was already established via all witnesses that Elbery never used a bottle as a weapon or even "waived" it, see Claim VI, of this motion.
T.R. 115-20 and he also tried to take out King's eye on two separate occasions.
Ball points his finger in Elbery's face and Aloise and the Judge condone it.
The first thing the jury saw during this trial of Elbery's was ADA Mike Ball sticking his finger in Elbery's face while he claimed Elbery tried to gouge out King's eye. Ball was allowed, by Aloise and the judge, to abuse and disrespect Elbery with this finger in your face technique and set the tempo for the entire trial. This was done by Ball at the beginning of the prosecution's opening statement. See aff. #41, #32.
Elbery did not remain stoned faced while Ball insulted him with his index finger pointing in his face in front of the jury and judge Dan Toomey took that opportunity to criticize Elbery at trial's length for making "grimaces", TR 137-7 thru 14. Toomey threatened to hold Elbery in contempt of court because Toomey claimed Elbery was making faces, as a result of Ball's finger pointing.
The above misconduct by Prosecutor - Ball is a violation of Rule 24 of the M.R.C.P.
these opening statements and argument where so prejudicial (to an extreme) individually and collectively that Ball caused a miscarriage of justice, Mass. Practice Vol. 30A s.1839 p.102. These deliberate violations by
Ball influenced/contributed to the jury's verdict. Com. v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 232, 588 N.E. 2d. 643, 649 (1992). These illegalities by Ball went to the heart of the case and require a reversal of the jury's verdict, Com. v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, 271, 629 N.E. 2d 999, 1002 (1994).
Even if the Judge tells the jury that arguments are not evidence, the case may still be reversed if the prosecutor's argument is prejudicial to the extreme, Com. v. Hoppin, 387 Mass. 25 438 N.E. 2d 820 (1982).
Louie Aloise - deficient as is his custom, again.
Defense counsel, Louie Aloise, refused to say a word. He should have objected to all these illegalities by Ball and demanded a mistrial. Add this deficiency to the existing tally to equate a total ineffective assistance of counsel.
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The prosecutor, Mike Ball, was engaged during Elbery's trial in persistent and pronounced misconduct as per his statements and arguments itemized above. The prosecutor Mike Ball deliberately mislead the jury. This misconduct deprived the defendant of a trial that was fair and violated his right to Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Berger v. United States 295 US 78, 79 L Ed 1314, 55 S. Ct. 629, (1935); 40 L Ed 2d 886, at 891.
The following is a criticism of the judge's instructions at trial not raised during direct appeal of this case.
A. Accident Instruction
There should have been an instruction on accident, because at trial both Elbery and the prosecution witnesses gave testimony that there was contact between King and Elbery but that it was only a few seconds in duration and that King was on top of Elbery in the street and then King retreated with an eye injury. Later the real evidence was that King got a bump in the eye consistent with an accident. Com. v. Ferguson 571 N.E. 2d 411, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 580 (’91)(where evidence raises the possibility, the defendant is as a matter of Due Process entitled to a jury instruction that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not an accident).
B. Self-defense instruction
The judge defined maim, T.R. 1281-27, "wildly" as meaning a wound. This instruction defeated the self-defense instruction, since the jury could reasonably have determined that King had a "wound" and they could have reasonably concluded that if Elbery maimed King, via a wound, then Elbery used deadly force and not self-defense. The jury would have reasonably concluded that if main = wound, as per the judge's instructions, then because every juror would consider maiming a serious injury that Elbery must have used "deadly force". The judge defined "deadly force" as that that causes serious injury. The judge further instructed, TR 1286-14, the question as to how far the defendant could go in defending himself is for you to decide. TR 1287-14, if you conclude that the self-defender did use deadly force, you must next determine whether that deadly force was justified in the circumstances.
The definition of maim does not include to wound, Com. v. Robinson 26 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 529 N.E. 2d 156 (1988).
A defendant has a right to a proper self-defense instruction when evidence of self-defense has been raised at trial, Com. v. Stokes 374 Mass. 583, 374 N.E. 2d 87, 93 (1978)(quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975).
C. Self-defense Instruction - "Whether or not"
TR 1291-14 & 1285-17, If you have a reasonable doubt about whether or not he acted on self-defense, your verdict must be not guilty. The use by the judge of "whether or not" caused confusion to the jury and made the self-defense instruction meaningless. Whether or not are opposite events and could not result in the same determination by the jury. Jury instructions are constitutionally illegal when they lead the jury to misinterpret the Constitution. Victor v. Nebraska 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994). A defendant has a right to a proper self-defense instruction when evidence of self-defense has been raised at trial, Com. v. Stokes 374 Mass. 583, 374 N.E. 2d 87, 93 (1978)(quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975).
To suppose that two contrary demonstrations can exist, is to suppose that the same proposition is both true and false: which manifestly is absurd, Victor v. Nebraska at 1245.
D. Reasonable Doubt Instruction illegal - use of to a "Moral Certainty"
TR 1273-10, 1272-16,19, the judge used moral certainty to define reasonable doubt. The use of moral certainty suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard, Com. v. Therrien 428 Mass. 607, (1998). The use of moral certainty was not used with language which lends content and meaning to the phrase. Victor v. Nebraska 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L. Ed. 2d. 583 (’94).
The instructions are constitutionally illegal when they lead the jury to misinterpret the Constitution, id. The defendant had a right to a proper instruction on reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (’70)(the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged).
Thus the judge’s incorrect reasonable doubt instruction violated Elbery’s Right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
E. Consciousness of Guilt Instruction
Concerning this instruction the judge instructed, TR 1268-17, I am just telling you that is the basic fact which there is some evidence of. The judge referring to the clerk’s son’s testimony that the defendant wanted to leave the area, Harpies, where he got ganged-up and beaten.
By telling the jury what is a "basic fact" supported by evidence the judge was instructing, highlighting, them on fact and invading the province of the jury, Mass. Practice 30A s.1871 p. 262.
F. Earlier statements not proof of fact, TR 1263-10.
Here the judge incorrectly instructed the jury concerning prior inconsistent statements. Earlier statements at the probable cause hearing or grand jury are to be considered as substantive evidence to be used for the full probative value or proof of a fact. Com. v. Forte 597 N.E. 2d 1056, 1058-59, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 181 (’92). Although Aloise deliberately avoided use of the witnesses prior inconsistent statements to defend his client a few mistakenly got to the ears of the jury. All were the result of prior testimony and hence could be used as evidence.
G. You may not speculate about what the real facts may or may not have been, TR 1263-10.
This instruction is characteristic of the whole trial. The judge here is telling the jury not to go any further in determining a verdict than the foolishness they were presented by the prosecution in conspiracy with Aloise. Maybe some of the jurors realized that certain evidence at trial was bogus, as per this motion. This instruction invaded the province of the jury, Mass. Practice 30A s. 1871 p. 262. One of the jurors, Audet, resigned from the jury because he could see what the real facts were and what was going on with forelady, Rita Downey, who was drooling to convict via numerous comments during trial.
H. Citizen’s Arrest and Provocation Instruction – None
There was no instruction on citizen’s arrest or provocation. The judge has a duty to instruct the jury as to the law pertinent to the issues of the case. As per Claim V of this motion citizen’s arrest was an issue.
Per Com. v. Stokes 374 N.E. 2d. 87 an instruction must be given on provocation if there is evidence of such and per Mullaney v. Wilbur 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d. 508 (’75) the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not provoked. The lack of instruction on provocation is a violation of Elbery’s Right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment id.
The lack of citizen’s arrest instruction causes a constitutional deficiency in that it interferes with the defense of self-defense. The government has to disprove self-defense id. If the jury had known King and his "barroom gang of six" were not legally entitled to chase (assault) and apprehend/beat Elbery their determination about Elbery’s use of self-defense would have been different.
The above errors regarding instructions at trial create a miscarriage of justice as these errors influenced the result of the trial. Com. v. Martin 427 Mass. 816, 696 N.E. 2d. 904 (’98). A new trial is required.
Attorney Louise P. Aloise was deficient as he failed to object to the above instructions given in error or to the instructions that should have been given but were not. Aloise, as per claim V, was against an instruction on citizen’s arrest and failed to ask for an instruction on provocation.
The defendant had a right to effective representation via his appellate counsel per the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Evitts v. Lucey 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830 (’85), Gray v. Greer 800 F2d 644 ( 7th Cir.’85), as above there are numerous instances of professional deficiencies by Elbery’s appellate attorney since some of the above meritorious issues could have been raised on direct appeal. As a result, the defendant’s appellate counsel was ineffective in his assistance of counsel.
The above claims, all, constitute one giant miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial for Elbery, Com. v. Freeman 352 Mass. 556, 564, (’67). The above claims constitute a trial that was not fair and a trial that prevented Elbery from having a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees both these conditions at trial. Crane v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 685, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (’86). New trial is required.
Behold, a black horse, and he who sat on it had a pair of scales in his hand.
EXHIBITS (click on icons)
Ex. C Hull Affidavit p. 126-127
Exhibit G - Worcester T&G 1-21-1993 - No Probable Cause p.135
Exhibit H- Westboro P.D. Report/Bolton Report p.136-139
Tom King’s trial testimony
TR 201-17 He took his thumb and jammed it into my eye (indicating).
TR 201-20 On the outside of my eye he jammed it in almost behind the eye and kept pushing the thumb in real hard.
TR 202-12 He… jammed that hand, that thumb back into my eye on the inside of my eye andkept pushing the thumb into my eye.
TR 202-24 I put my hand to my eye and I had the sticky fluid, vitreous fluid from my eye, andblood on my hand coming out of my eye. I was blinded in the eye. My other eye was watering. I couldn’t see very good.
TR 203-9 I told somebody they have to get me to the hospital or I was going to lose my eye.
TR 203-18 They put some type of solution in my eye to clean it out. But also a solution under my eye to numb the eye, to freeze the eye, they put patches over both eyes.
TR 203-24 I got a laceration on the eyeball.
TR 204-1 Is that a cut? Yes.
TR 204-3 As a result of that , were you able to see as well as you had in the past?
-5 No Sir.
TR 204-6 Are you having any problems seeing?
-7 Yes, I am having a problem with the eye.
-8 You are still having difficulty; is that right? Yes, sir.
TR 204-13 How long did you have that patch?
-14 I had the patch on a couple of days, three days maybe.
TR 381-6 This eye totally blind this eye I could not see.
TR 385-12 No. It was lacerated.
-13 lacerated? Yes, sir.
TR 425-8 I don’t know exactly how long the finger was in there, sir.
TR 426-9 I didn’t see anything because I was blind .
TR 431-8 Obviously whatever hand or finger went into your eye.
-10 The thumb.
TR 432-5 Thumbnail.
TR 440-13 And it shows a laceration in your eye?
-15 Yes, sir.
TR 468-9 (Q. Ball) Both your eyes you had _ _ _ one was cut and the other one had __ _
A. One eye was totally blind. In my left eye was totally blind.
TR 468-14 It was opened but it was_ _ _ I was totally blinded. Right eye was watering, and it was so filled up with water and fluid and blood and fluid from this eye was into that eye that I couldn’t see.
TR 468-24 Q.(Ball) Taking out eye, indication mayhem, correct?
TR 469-8 But it is fair to say, isn’t it, that it appeared as if your eye was taken out that night, didn’t it?
Aloise – object, sustained (no cure)
-17 But fortunately your eye was not taken out, right?
TR 479-1 Medical records say "eye superficial abrasion"? (Aloise questioning)
-3 I was told laceration, I can’t read that (medical report).
TR 479-14 Doctor Arinello told me I had laceration, as far as my eyeball.
-19 (Aloise) Does Arinella’s medical record say superficial abrasion?
-22 I can’t read it. (medical evidence).
-23 (Aloise) All right.
TR 486-14 Both eyes blind because my right eye had vitreous fluid, and blood from left cut eye.
De Pasquale – Description of King’s eye injury.
TR 715-22 And I looked up and blood was pouring from his eye.
TR 717-8 King told me he thought he was hurt, and I saw the blood and started yellingfor someone to get an ambulance.
O’Connor – Description of King’s eye injury
TR 756-14 The lower auricle of this eye was full of blood, and there was blood coming out of the eye itself. (auricle means ear lobe).
Schlener – Description of King’s eye injury
TR 595-10 I don’t know. His eye hurt, his lost - his eye is out, you know.
-23 And could you have said the he lost his eye or and eye is out or something like that
TR 598-5 I thought his eye was popped out.
TR 640- 19 No I just remember the heap and then you know 30-45 seconds after that the guy came screaming that his eye is out.
Richard Traskiewicz – Description of King’s injuries
TR 500-20 When they went to the ground I advanced that’s when I saw Elbery put his fingerin this (King’s ) eye.
TR 501-6 This is when the fight turned around King was on top of him then when the finger wentinto his eye we jumped in to stop it. I saw blood coming out of his eye.
TR 544-10 That’s when I observed him putting his finger in this eye.
TR 549-12 When you observed Elbery put his finger in his eye, King has Elbery on his back in themiddle of Shrewsbury St.? A. Right
TR 552-1 King on top of Elbery.
TR 571-5 He stuck his finger in his eye to the point where it was bleeding.
TR 571-7 When Mr. King came back that eye was bleeding right?
TR 573-19 Elbery was on his back with King on top of him when Elbery finger went into King’s eye and face?
John Hayes – Prosecution witness
TR 913-6 Did it (the right eye) appear to be bloodshot or tearing at that point?
A. No it wasn’t.
TR 913-3 It was fine (right eye).
TR 913-16 He was doing like this and sticking his finger inside his eye and rubbingit like he had something in his eye.
TR 916-6 He (King) said all the fluids from his eye was rushing out. He was going tolose all of the fluids in his eye.
TR 916-9 Did you see any fluid dripping out of his eye? A. No I didn’t.
TR 916-11 Did you see any blood dripping out of his eye? A. No.
TR 917-10 (King’s right eye) it was open.
TR 918-16 "I must have got poked in the eye". He said "I think I got poked in the eye". (Hayes quoting King)
Cross- Exam - Ball
TR 938-6 Just looked bloodshot (left eye)
TR 954-20 It wasn’t that dark (red). (referring to the pictures of King’s eye that were developed by King’s Co-workers at the Westboro Police Dept.)
Perma (Worcester cop and defense witness)
TR 995-24 His eye was bleeding.
TR 996-1 Which eye was bleeding? A. Left eye.
Yet, King claimed he had 2 patches over his eyes, TR 202-18.
TR 113-16 King’s eye is bleeding terribly. The defendant reached up a second time andgrabbed his eyeball again, and he is trying to dig out the eye.
TR 115-20 tried to take out King’s eye on two separate occasions.
TR 1224 You look at the medical records of Mr. King you will see it was a superficial abrasion _ _ _ we are now under oath exaggerating. He was in the hospital one hour and twenty minutesnot to suggest he didn’t get injured.
TR 1225-8 There is no doubt King had bloodshot eye and maybe tearing burns severely, no doubt about that either. That is usually what happens when you get poked the eye.
What was he to do? Was he not in reasonable fear of bodily harm?
(Although he made no effort to present this evidence at trial, it is clear or documented Aloise knewthat King was lying about his injuries)(argument is not evidence at trial-well settled law).
TR 1234-18 Remember when he said he gouged King’s eye?
TR 1239-20 At that time is when the defendant gets him one arm free, digs his finger into King’s eyeand tries to put it out.
TR 1240-8 Consider the extent of the force that he exercised to use that type of deadly force that iscalled, it is not—it is likely to cause serious bodily injury. And I think all of you sitting there would look at the evidence and look at the facts someone trying to poke someones’s eye out could cause serious bodily injury.
TR 144-6 Glass flew and a little bit just cut me right here (indicating) and beer was everywhere. So I was just freaking out.
TR 144-13 I thought I saw a little bit of the blood. But another guy came over and said you knowyou are fine and everything.
TR 147-13 What happened at U. Mass. Hospital?
-15 I got butterfly stitches.
TR 147 –16 Some physician there of medical doctor, was it, attended to the cut? A. Yes.
TR 147-22 So you are indicating both above and below your eye you were cut with glassis that right? A. Yes.
TR 148-2 Did they put butterfly stitches above and below? A. Yes.
TR 174-19 I said I was at the hospital …. " I just called to let you know that I was all right and no glass is in my eye, or whatever".
TR 180-19 And you got hit in the eye, right? A. Yes.
TR 181-18 Now you said you called later in response to Mr. Aloise’s question to tell Jeff, thebartender, you were o.k. you did not have glass in your eye?
TR 181-23 That was their concern that you had glass in your eye , correct? A. Yes.
King’s testimony – Mann’s injuries
194-7 Blood coming around her hand, out her hands, thought her fingers down her face.
Schlener’s testimony - Mann’s injuries
TR 588-7 One of the girl’s yelled, "my eye it’s cut". Okay. She had a cut. She was bleedingfrom the eye.
TR 591-24 Steven Sawyer grabbed the napkin. It was then that we found out it wasn’t her eye specifically it was under her eye.
TR 625-24 And she (Mann) screamed, "my eye".
Mitchell De Pasquale’s testimony – Mann’s injuries.
Cross – Exam - Ball
TR 729-24 Did you say at the probable cause hearing she was bleeding very badly?
A. Yes, I did.
TR 740-3 the fragments of the broken bottle splintered and struck the girl in the eye right?
A. Yes, it did.
TR 740-6 Do you know that is an assault dangerous weapon?
Aloise – object – sustained – mistrial
Traskawicz Testimony – Mann’s injuries
TR 504-5 …. And all the glass flew and hit the girl below the eye, just below the eye and gaveher a puncture wound and it was bleeding.
TR 532-13 That is when I saw the girl bleeding.
Worcester Police Officer Gerald Perma’s testimony – Mann’s Injuries
TR 1000-23 So you don’t even know, do you, if a young lady testified to being the person cut hadher eye cut? A. I have no idea.
TR 980-18 In fact isn’t it true that Mr. Schlener had described her injury to you as being the fact thatshe had glass in her eye?
TR 981-5 The result of that investigation were that you found that not to be so?
A. At that time, No. But later on I believe they did find someone.
-9 Who found someone?
A. It wasn’t me.
-11 But it was another police officer ?
A. "It may have been the complaint clerk at the station" …..(but he doesn’t know)
A.D.A. Mike Ball’s Opening Statement
TR 111-9 the glass from the beer bottle went into one of the young woman’s eyes, her nameis Christina Mann.
TR 111-13 You will hear the glass went around her eye and she was cut very badly. She was bleeding.
TR 115-16 he did …swing the beer bottle , not only at the girl, King is named as the victim here the bottlewas swung at him.
Aloise’s Opening Statement
TR 124-23, 129-4 Then she went to U. Mass. hospital
where she was treated with a butterfly stitch on her cheek below her eye.
Ball’s Closing Argument
TR 1237-21 the glass breaks, it splinters into the girl’s eye.
P.C. 9-5 A.Elbery was holding the neck of the bottle in a threatening gester yelling.
P.C. 9-7 Who was he holding the bottle towards in that gesture?
P.C. 9-9 A. Well he was waving it back and forth. He waved it towards Jeff, Jeff ranover to the phone, and waved it around, and then he threw it down on the floor and ran out the door.
P.C. 9-15 A. He waived it all around. The bar is a horseshoe shaped bar.
P.C. 21-16 Sir, were you placed in fear by the beer bottle that Mr. Elbery had in his hand?
A. -20 The distance between us, no. He had thrown it down.
Cross-Exam – Aloise
P.C. 53 –11 Now after Mr. Elbery had either broken the bottle on the side of the bar oron the bar or on the pole, he stood up from his seat, his stool, and left via the front door?
A. Yes, sir.
P.C. 54-1 Well, he already was up from his seat after smashing the bottle, and he immediatelywent out the door, didn’t he?
-4 A. Yes, sir.
P.C. 54-18 I just kept my eyes on Mr. Elbery right out the door and went right after him.
P.C. 76-15 All right. And do you recall telling Mr. Salloum that in fact in your opinion he did not, Mr. Elbery did not , wave the beer bottle at you to the point where you felt you were assaulted?
P.C. 76-19 He as I testified to, Mr. Elbery waved the beer bottle in everybody’s direction so_ _
P.C. 76-22 Right. But do you recall Mr. Salloum, because he had just had a conversation with me,being concerned about that particular issue and asking you, and perhaps out of your presence Mr. Schlener, whether or not Mr. Elbery had assaulted you with the beer bottle, and you indicated to Mr. Salloum the answer was no?
77-5 Well, with the distance, there’s no way he could have got to me with the beer bottle.
G.J.- 6 Neck of bottle in his hand made jabbing motions at Jeff and then at me and other patrons.
Judge at P.C. 76-2 I thought he (king) said he never saw it? I thought he said he never saw it?
Trial Direct Exam-Ball
T.R. 192-11 He was holding it in his hand like this . (indicating).
-13* Are you indicating in front of him?
-14 In front of him, Yes.
-15 At what portion of the bottle was sticking up at the point?
-17 the broken jagged edges.
-23 He was waving it in the direction of Mr. Schlener and the rest of us patrons.
A. Approximately 30 seconds.
TR 195-3 Yes, he was making gestures towards everybody.
TR 195-8 He turned and ran out the bar and threw the neck of the beer bottle down.
-10*On the inside of the bar?
-11 I believe so, yes.
TR 308-17 …After you saw Mr. Elbery standing there with the beer bottle you indicated that hewas in there for a very short period of time, seconds, and then he went out the door; Am I right?
TR 309-3 …Isn’t it a fact, sir, that you indicated at the probable cause hearing, that in fact Mr. Elberyafter the bottle was smashed threw the bottle down to the floor?
-7 A. Before he ran out the door, yes, sir.
TR 310-2 Probably 15 feet, 20 feet (Distance between Elbery and King).
TR 310-7 You were asked by the prosecutor, Line 16, "Sir, were you placed in fear by the beer bottlethat Mr. Elbery had in his hand? Answer , "was I placed in fear?" Yes? "the distance between us, No. He had thrown it down"; Am I right?
TR 310-14 A. He threw it down when he ran out the door.
-15 I am sorry?
-16 A. He threw it down when he was running out the door. I misinterpreted his question. I thought he meant when he was down on the street.
TR 311-10 You said, "The distance between us, No. He had thrown it down." That is what you said?
TR 311-13 A. Yes, sir, that is what it says.
-14 And that was throwing it down before Mr. Elbery ever moved to go outside?He was standing next to the bar stool; Am I right?
-18 A. No. he did not throw it down while he was standing next to the bar stool.
-20 That is what you said at the probable cause hearing…
-22 A. The way I interpreted the question.
-24 A. That is the way I interpreted the question.
TR 329-1 And Mr. Elbery after he had thrown or dropped the bottle , went directly out the door, did he not?
-7 A. Threw the bottle down as he went out door.
(Aloise gives up and King gets up and King gets in the last words)
TR 340-3 You in fact were not placed in fear by Mr. Elbery, were you?
-12 A. Because it was enough distance between me and him and the broken bottle.
P.C. 82-24 Glass bouncing off me, I was 15 feet away and it was bouncing off of me at that time.
P.C. 83-11 And where…in what direction was he pointing the jagged end of the bottle?
-13 It was more or less you know in a general direction. It was not in…at any specific person I don’t think.
-18 Well, I was the one who was behind the bar, and he was pointing it kind of towards the bar area.
P.C. 112-2 It was a random breaking of a bottle.
P.C. 112-9 Well, looked at everybody like this , with bottle and …(witness indicating with body).
P.C. 112-12 Then he went out the door, right?
-13 A. Right.
P.C. 137- 2 Do you have a collection of telling Officer Perma, either directly or in conjunction with other officers being there, that Mr. Elbery broke a beer bottle and waived it at you?
-11 A. I would say yes.
-But that didn’t happen did it?
A. -Well he waived it _ _ it was not in my direction, it was _ _
P.C. 137-18 But in effect later on, you did tell A.D.A. Salloum that it did not happen?
-21 A. Right, I did tell Attorney Salloum that it was more general, right.
Direct Exam – Trial- Ball
TR 588-21 *When you say Elbery ran out, you were holding your hand in front of you. Did you notice if he had anything in his hand at the time?
-23 A. The broken beer bottle.
-24 *You saw jagged edges of the beer bottle held, and it was gripped by the neck of the bottle then?
-4 *jagged edges were pointed towards him?
-5 A. general direction.
-6 All right. General direction of whom?
-7 A. Toward me.
-9 I was the only one behind the bar. It was kind of like that (indicating)
-11Did you see him do anything else_ _ did he hold it just straight or what was he doing with it?
-14 A. Just like that (indicating) and then he went out the door.
-16 Can you describe what he was doing?
-17 A. he was waving it.
TR 590-6 Did he have anything with him as he was going out? (door)
-8 A. He still had the beer bottle in his hand.
-12 *You are indicating he was going out backwards?
-13 A. Right
-14 *And facing the people in the bar holding the beer bottle . Correct, the broken beer bottle?
-16 A. yes
-17 *And then you saw him go out the door?
-18 A. Yes.
TR 624-8 And would you tell us whether or not you initially told the police that you were assaultedby Mr. Elbery? Do you remember telling us telling the police that?
-14 A. Why would I say that? I doubt if I said that.
TR 624-20 Do you recall describing the breaking of a bottle as quote, " A random breaking of the bottle"?
-23 A. Nope.
TR 625-3 A. I know what I said. I said a random waiving of the bottle , broken bottle. (Aloise shows Schlener the P.C. transcript)
-15 I am asking you whether or not you said it?
-17 A. All right.
TR 630-1 Now. When the glass shattered initially, you saw or you described Mr. Elbery back outand then turn around and go out the entrance way onto Shrewsbury St., right?
-5 A. Yes.
TR 645-7 Do you recall telling Officer Perma that you were assaulted by Mr. Elbery with a beer bottle?
-10 A. No I don’t. I may well have said that .
TR 646-7 I am saying that is what you said, isn’t it?
-9 A. yes.
TR 646-16 And you didn’t tell Officer Perma that he waved the portion of a bottle in a general direction at noone in particular, you told him he waived it at you?
-20 A. Probably did yeah.
TR 647-17 Did you tell_ _ Do you recall telling Attorney Salloum, A.D.A. Salloum, that it was more general,that it was not specifically directed at you?
-21 A. yes. I did say that.
TR 648-3 Isn’t it a fact, sir, that you did not see Mr. King _ _ _ Mr. Elbery wave any beer bottle at Mr. King?
TR 648-10 And do you recall when you were asked that on December 3rd, 1992 by A.D.A., you told him Kingwas not assaulted by Mr. Elbery with that beer bottle; Am I right?
TR 648-20 And just as you have done now, you admitted then that you told Officer Perma something that wasn’t so,and you corrected it with Mr. Salloum sometime before the probable cause hearing just as you have done now, right?
Re-Direct Exam Ball.
TR 667-14 *Sir, You did see the defendant waiving the broken beer bottle in the barroom, correct?
-16 A. Yes.
-17 *He was waiving it in the general direction of the people in the barroom, correct?
A. It was in the general direction towards the bar where I happened to be…I was the only one in line. Not that it was specifically pointed at me.
TR 668-1 *But he was waving it around the bar, right?
-2 A. Yes
-3 *In the bar at the time also was Thomas King, correct?
-5 A. Yes.
-6 *And you never said that the defendant never waived the broken bottle at you, did you, to anybody?
-9 A. I don’t know to be honest with you.
TR 669-12 How would you describe his posture as he was backing out the door with that broken beer bottle?
-15 A. Offensive posture, like come and get me.
-19 …* As he was just backing up he was waving the hand around correct?
TR 673-22…you did tell A.D.A. Salloum that the waiving of the bottle was general, not at anybody in particular?
-23 A. yes
-24 Am I right?
-25 A. yes.
-26 _ _ After the bottle broke, Mr. Elbery almost immediately as you testified before, was backing those few feetout the door and then turn and ran?
-10 A. Yes.
RE-Direct - Ball
TR 674-17 *When you say he was waving it in general, that means he was waiving it at everybody, correct?
Object-strike allowed –leading
TR 675-1 *What do you mean by waving it in general? At whom? When you say waiving it in general, atwhom do you remember he was waving it?
-4 A. At everybody in the place.
TR 675-7 ( court) – At the time of the general waiving as the gentleman was backing out the door, wherewas Mr. King positioned?
-11 A. he was in his seat.
Taraskiewicz – Bottle Incident
TR 497-2 Well, he was standing like I said to protect himself and backing out the door we then went after him. I don’t know what happened to the bottle , but it wasn’t in his hand when we finally got to him.
Chris Mann – Bottle Incident
TR 178-10 I saw it . (breaking bottle)
TR 178-14 Didn’t see him do anything else with the bottle.
Dennis O’Connor – Bottle Incident
TR 753-20 I saw Mr. Elbery leaving the bar.
-22 A. I did not see anything in his hand. I believe not, no.
TR 754-3 A. He was on his way out the door.
TR 753-4 You didn’t see him throw the beer bottle down?
-5 A. No I didn’t.
X-Exam - Aloise
TR 781-7 Now, at what point when the glass breaks, your initial attention is drawn to the two women, or to Mr. Elbery?
-10 A. Initially to Mr. Elbery.
-11 Mr. Elbery is standing?
-12 A. Yes
-22 In what manner did he walk from his _ _ or of he did walk from his bar stool out the front dooror out the door here?
TR 782-2 Did he turn, walk, walk fast?
-3 A. he seemed to walk briskly.
-6 With his side to the bar. I believe the walked out with his _ _ front, partial front to the bar and left.
-10 Now when you got outside, obviously that took a matter of seconds, right?
-11 A. Yes.
Depasquale – Bottle Incident
P.C. 196-16 All right. What happened after the bottle smashed?
-20 A. I saw Elbery standing there. Mr. Elbery was obviously distraught or something, was yelling and screaming.
P.C. 197-8 Then what happened?
-9 A. Michael left, michael walked out.
P.C. 217-15 Did you see Mr. Elbery hold the beer bottle up. The broken beer bottle towards people?
-17 A. I didn’t see him pointing it towards people, no.
-19 What did you see him doing with it?
-20 A. By the time I turned to look at him, I saw him drop_ _he dropped it and he headed for the door.
P.C. 219-18 And what did you see Mr. Elbery doing immediately following the breaking of the bottle?
-21 A. He was already on his feet at that point, and as far as I could see, he was still holding a part of it in his hand.
P.C. 220-1 And then what?
-4 Dropping it next to him?
-5 A. Yes.
-6 And then he walked out the door?
-7 A. Yes.
Direct Exam - Aloise
TR 706-4 …After you heard the breaking glass?
-18 A. And then what happened?
-23 A. Then Mr. Elbery headed out the bar.
TR 707-2 A. In a quick walk on his way out.
-5 A. He backed up first, and then he turned and went out the door.
TR 721-17 Before he left. After the bottle _ _ you heard the glass shattering of glass. Before he went out the door, what did you see him do, if anything, with the bottle?
-21 A. He dropped the bottle
-22 Did you see him do anythingelse with it?
-23 A. No, I didn’t.
TR729-4 the defendant was standing there with the broken bottle in his hand, correct?
-6 A. yes he was.
-7 The jagged edge was pointed up, right?
-8 A. yes
-9 he was holding it in front of him?
-10 A. Yes
TR 729-11 He was facing other people in the barroom, correct?
-13 A. yes, he was.
-14 A. He was moving it back and forth , wasn’t he?
-15 A. That I didn’t see.
TR 730-11 Now when you first saw him holding the beer bottle , the broken jagged beer bottle,how far from the door was he?
-14 A. he was still at his seat. He was standing next to his seat.
TR 731-1 But you do know he still had the broken beer bottle as he was standing at the door, right?
-3 A. Yes.
-4 So he carried it at least from where he was standing back to the door, right?
Sawyer – Bottle Incident
PC 233-9 The glass went flying, and Mike , I believe he stood up at the time, kind of backingtowards the door or the entrance.
PC 234-9 And did you observe the activities of Mr. Elbery after the glass went flying?
PC 234-11 A. The glass went flying, and all hell kind of broke loose, I guess. People were flying up from Chairs, and I know that he backed out or went out through the door.
Ball - Opening Statement
TR 111-20 They saw the defendant standing there with this beer bottle, and he is waving the brokenbeer bottle now, he is waving this beer bottle at all of the people in the bar.
TR 115-17 He did swing the broken beer bottle, not only at the girl, King is named as a victim where the bottle was swung at him.
Exhibits M p.159-161
Ex. P - Deposition transcript pages p.165-166
Ex. Q - Elbery medical records p.167-169
Ex. S - Motion For A Required Not Guilty Verdict p.177-178
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Commonwealth Worcester Superior Court
# #93 -0135
FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 30 OF THE MASS RULES CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I am the defendant/moveant Michael Elbery; I live at 168 Fairfield St., Needham, Mass.
1. On or about June of 1994 Attorney Louis P. Aloise told me over the phone that he neversort or had any medical experts review King's medical report of 9-29-92 pertaining to King's superficial eye injury.
2. I was never allowed to review King's medical records pertaining to his eye injury on 9-29-92prior to my trial.
2a. I demanded prior to trial that Aloise interview and subpoena the medical people who treatedKing on 9-29-92 for his alleged injury. Aloise told me it was not necessary and that when you subpoena hospital employees no one shows up and there is nothing you can do about. At trial and at the first scheduled probable cause hearing of 11-30-92 there was absolutely nothing wrong with King's eye.
3. I saw Christina Mann at a very close distance of two or three feet on several occasions before trial.She had no marks or scares on her face or in particular around her eye.
4. I spoke to my defense attorney, Louis P. Aloise, after Mann testified at trial and Aloise agreed Mannhad no marks on her face or scarring that should have occurred as a result of her testimony and others testimonies that her face was cut by glass.
5. I witnessed in the hallway of Worcester Superior Court Christina Mann, prosecution witness, state toADA Mike Ball that she did not want testify and that she was going home. Whereupon, ADA Mike Ball threatened to arrest her if she left. I then saw alleged victim, Thomas King, take Mann aside and talk to her for about one hour.
6. Alleged victim-witness, Thomas King, boasted to me in the Worcester Superior Court hallway prior totrial that he was being paid regular police wages for testifying against me. King then mocked me because I had to pay an attorney to defend against his charges.
7. At lunch break, half way through Mann's testimony, I demanded that Louis P. Aloise obtain Mann's medicalrecords that were allegedly at U Mass. hospital. Louis P. Aloise refused to obtain through subpoena or any other method Mann's medical records. I demanded two more times the same medical records during that conversation, while pointing out to Aloise that Mann should have scares on her face and that her testimony was a lie. Aloise replied "no" each time to my demand. We actually got into a loud verbal argument about this issue, but Aloise never obtained those records.
8. Attorney Louis P. Aloise told me prior to the first scheduled probable cause hearing regarding this caseat 11-30-92, that ADA Michael Salloum informed him that Thomas King and Jeff Schlener admitted that
I never used a bottle as a weapon and that I never assaulted anyone with a bottle.
9. I asked attorney Aloise how it was possible that I was indicted for assault with a deadly weapon (a broken beer bottle) when they admitted at that the probable cause hearing and prior to the probablecause hearing that I never did such a thing and that it never happened. I repeatedly urged attorney Aloise to dismiss that particular grand jury indictment due to the evidence at the probable cause hearing, via the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, that no such incident occurred with a broken beer bottle.
10. During trial I repeatedly demanded that attorney Aloise ask Tom King if in fact he admitted to ADAMichael Salloum prior to the probable cause hearing and again during probable cause testimony that there was no such incident as Elbery using a broken bottle to assault anyone in the bar.
11. Attorney Louis P. Aloise informed me after my conviction on the above docketed action, that in fact, Thomas King had been demoted from his job at the Westborough police department resulting in a rank of patrolman from a previous rank of detective.
12. Months prior to the trial attorney Aloise informed me that he heard rumors that King had been demoted as a result of the incident on 9-29-92 and resultant adverse publicity to King via the Worcester T&G article,exhibit G, after this plaintiff's probable cause hearing victory in Worcester District Court regarding the above docketed action. I called the Westborough police department shortly after that and they informed me that King was no longer a detective but was a patrolman.
13. I tried to obtain the documentation Aloise has on this case including subpoenaed documentation fromthe Westborough police department relating to King's demotion. Attorney Louis Aloise refused to cooperate and denied there was such documentation. Aloise would not produce the subpoena he sent to the Westborough Police Department relating to the above docketed action.
14. I urged attorney Aloise to motion to dismiss the grand jury indictments against me and in particular the indictmentof assault with a deadly weapon (a broken beer bottle). Attorney Aloise assured me that he would motion to dismissthe charge of assault with a deadly weapon.
14a. I insisted that Aloise should motion to dismiss the indictments, as I knew they were obtained by perjury.
15. Attorney Aloise informed me just, before trial started, that the judge's clerk, John O'Connor, was father toprosecution witness Dennis O'Connor. I insisted that it was not fair that O'Connor should be clerk during the trial and demanded that he be removed. Attorney Aloise informed me that there was nothing that could be done and O'Connor must remain.
16. I badgered Aloise into cross examining Schlener about his exiting the bar, since Aloise and I had discussedJeff Schlener's testimony about exiting the bar in time to see contact between King and myself as impossible.Aloise did not want to cross-examine Jeff Schlener about this issue.
17. I tried to force Aloise to get King to admit that he was drinking with two prison guards at the Winner's Circleand that he knew these prison guards. This is what King testified to at the probable cause hearing. Aloise and I had numerous conversations regarding the prison guards and Aloise knew that the prison guards drinking with King inside the bar also drove him to the hospital. Aloise allowed King to lie on this issue.
18. I requested that Aloise subpoena my booking video taken 9-29-92 at the Worcester Police Dept., henever did this. It would have revealed the amount of physical damage to me prior to any medical treatment and cleanup.
19. I asked Aloise to subpoena all my medical records as a result of various treatments I received to my neckand head over the three weeks following the incident on 9-29-92. Aloise declined.
20. On the first day of trial in front of at least two prosecution witnesses two court officers told the witnessesthat I was going to sue everyone, including them, who had participated in beating me. Attorney Aloise was standing beside me and witnessed this event. The court officers were Brian (white, fat) and another officer who is known to me by face and has shot carrot colored red hair and a steroid induced physique. The witnesses hearing this were Traskiewicz, De Pasquale and O'Connor. I spoke to Aloise by phone about this on or about October of 1995 and he recalled the incident but declined to give me an affidavit. He did say, relating to this incident, that if put on the witness stand he would not lie.
21. During the last day of trial, after a juror excused himself, Judge Toomey asked the defense if it wanteda mistrial. I wanted a mistrial and told Aloise this repeatedly. Aloise replied, "no mistrial" each time. Finally,Aloise told me that if I took a mistrial he would charge me all over again, whereupon, I told him I could not afford to pay any more for justice.
22. After being convicted and released from jail on a stay of sentence pending appeal I had an appointmentat Aloise's office on approximately 7-20-93. I spoke to Aloise's new secretary known to me as Sharon. Sharon let me know that her opinion was that I was the guilty party and deserved conviction for botheringJeff Schlener. I inquired, to my shock, if she knew Jeff Schlener, the instigator of the bar room incident. Sharon replied, "you mean the blond haired bartender? He is married to my best friend Linda De Ricco". She revealed to me that she and Linda were best friends at Shrewsbury high and that Jeff and Linda Schlener were very nice people and her closest acquaintances. Sharon expressed great anger towards me.
24. After the first and during the second and third day of trial I questioned Aloise many times about his lackof cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. I insisted that the proof of my innocence was in our hands via the probable cause transcript. I argued that the witnesses who testified at the probable cause hearing were saying something totally different, and that their trial testimony was a lie, obviously coached and tailored, and inconsistent with what was said at the probable cause hearing. I insisted that Aloise, via his cross-examination, expose this.
25. Prosecution witness Dennis O'Connor's testimony under cross-examination was stopped and thejury was dismissed early at about 3 p.m. The next morning Aloise told me that O'Connor's father, the court clerk-John O'Connor, hates me because he feels I made a fool of his kid. Aloise was visibly upset by this situation. Aloise's cross-examination continued that next a.m. with a different character and O'Connor's son escaped further embarrassment, as he had looked totally unraveled and foolish the day before while under cross-examination.
26. My witness, Hayes, was not seen by me until last day of trial. I never saw him before including thepreceding Thursday, as opposed to what ADA Moe Bergman said under oath at the trial voire dire.
27. After conviction Aloise told me that I should base my appeal on his ineffective assistance of counsel,that he would get me a "free lawyer" because he had a position with a state bureau that appoints attorney'sfor appeals in Massachusetts. I told him I wanted a Boston attorney and he replied, "no Boston attorneys".
28. In July of 1993 I contacted and hired attorney Richard Egbert of Boston for a related case of intimidationof the witness of this mayhem case. In December of 1993 Egbert was hostile towards me and returned a substantial fee to me in full, no longer wanting to represent me. Egbert told me that he spoke to Aloise. Egbert said that Aloise told him I caused trouble.
29. I was, in March of 1994, represented by a new attorney, who told me that he was relaying a message,"that my appeal on the mayhem case was very trying to the Worcester community and that if I dropped my appeal the jail time I was sentenced to would be dropped". I refused, stating that I was guilty of no crime and that I was framed and railroaded and this offer just reinforces what I already know and makes my crusade for justice all the more strong. Two days later the same attorney again contacted me asking if I would reconsider dropping my appeal of the mayhem conviction. I replied in the negative.
30. On 9-7-93 attorney Louis Aloise sent me a letter stating he would no longer represent me, yet it was not until March of 1994 that he took his name off my appeal thus still representing me per the record until March 1994. This was a conflict of interest and was harmful to me. My appellate lawyer could not prepare my appeal until Aloise removed his name from my case with the appeals court. Aloise only removed his name from my appeal after I contacted the Board of Bar Overseers and contacted judge Toomey.
31. At the sentencing hearing, regarding the above docketed case, Aloise advised me to "apologize to thecourt for what you had done". I refused to do this and told Aloise that I would never admit to a crime that I didn't commit. Even before the Massachusetts Parole Board I refused to admit to any guilt regarding theabove docketed action. Aloise said if you don't this judge is going to give you 10 years in Prison.
32. During ADA Ball's opening statement at trial he walked up to where I was seated and within one footof me pointed his finger in my face accusing made of waving a broken beer bottle at the entire bar and cutting very badly a girl. Aloise was sitting next to me in the court room and did nothing to stop this. This occurred in front of the jury and was highly prejudicial.
33. ADA Mike Ball, TR 356-15, slandered me by saying that witness Christina Mann left without himsaying goodbye to her because she was afraid of the defendant. I never spoke to that girl and was inside the courtroom during and long after she left.
34. Attorney Aloise, in his office while speaking to me, said, "this is the police officer (Tom King) thatprotects my wife and children". Aloise said this after I said something should be done about this guy King and he should not be a cop anymore.
35. I saw Moe Bergman in the courtroom everyday during my trial and the sentencing hearing.
36. I brought my ripped and bloody clothes that I had on that 9-29-92 as evidence to present to the jury butAloise refused to present that evidence, Aloise said the jury would not like that evidence.
37. Aloise wanted me to take a lie detector test so the Worcester D.A.'s Office could be sure I was telling the truth. Aloise said the test would be administered by the Mass. State Police and would cost over $1,000 to me. I responded that I would take a lie detector test regarding the incident on 9-29-92if King took the test. Aloise responded King is a cop and would not have to take a lie detector. I also demanded that Schlener, the bartender, should take a lie detector because he was the one that initially gave the false police report to the cops, see Ex. D.
38. After I was convicted on 7-2-93 Aloise told me he wanted nothing to do with my case and that Iwas on my own for the sentencing hearing. I told Aloise I should not be in jail for trying to defend myself while escaping from a gang of drunks. I told Aloise he was paid through the sentencing hearing and that he'd better get me out of jail, as I was innocent.
39. After Aloise filed the 25-b-2 motion I called his office repeatedly for over a month and Aloisetold me he was in contact with Judge-Toomey and that Toomey had not made a decision on the motion. After that I contacted the clerk's office at Worcester Superior Court on a monthly basis and the motion was not denied until March of 1994.
40. At the probable cause hearing regarding this case I examined the pictures King claimed were of his eye injury and I told Aloise that they looked phony. I told Aloise that the red color of thepictures depicting King's eye injury looked artificial or not natural. I demanded that tests shouldbe done on those pictures before trial in order to insure that they were genuine. Aloise said there was no tests that he knew of that could be done and that the judge would not go along with it.
41. ADA Mike Ball, during his opening statement on the first day of trial stuck his finger within a few inches of my face while accusing me of various crimes including digging out and gougingout King's eye. This was the first few minutes of the trial and the jury was given this disrespectful image of me. I dropped my pen and squirmed in my chair as there was nothing I could do. I knew that the judge and the court personnel were waiting for any opportunity to make an issue out of nothing. I asked Louie Aloise why he did not do something to help me avoid such embarrassment in front of the jury. Aloise told me that Ball is allowed to stick his finger within a few inches of my face.
42. Aloise told me that Alice Arsenault was a girl who worked for him during the previous summer. Aloise said that Alice got caught selling drugs while she on duty working for his law firm but Aloise got her off with impunity. Aloise told me he could easily get in touch with her. Aloise said he knew her and he spoke fondly of her.
43. Aloise told me he did not contact either Wynne or Arsenault.
44. I told Aloise years prior to the trial of the mayhem charges that I could not stand the bar anymore and wanted to do something else for a living. I told Aloise the reason I bought the bar was of a lack of any other opportunity in the Worcester area and that I had to stay in the Worcester area because my wife had a job a public school teacher. She as a result could not leave or she would have lost her tenure and related pay.
Signed on this day, June 28 1999, under the pains and penalties of perjury.
next to his seat.